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In my thesis, I analyze the constitutionality and effectiveness (both historic and 
future) of the 1973 War Powers Resolution (WPR).  The Founding Fathers, in an effort to 
prevent the rise of a tyrant, split the war powers in the Constitution between the executive 
and legislative branches.  Ever since the Constitution’s ratification, the executive and 
legislative branches have struggled to define their war powers authority.  The WPR was 
an attempt by Congress to provide a constitutional framework for the executive and 
legislative branches to navigate war powers issues in accordance with the powers the 
Constitution vests in both branches.  In 1973, Congress passed the WPR into law over the 
veto of President Nixon.  The law has been highly controversial since its enactment.  
Nearly every president has questioned its constitutionality, and many critics, from 
members of Congress to constitutional scholars, believe it has failed to curtail 
presidential war. 
In my first chapter, I provide a legislative history of the law, review its 
controversial sections, and review the current body of applicable court cases which help 
define the extent of each branch’s war power authority.  In my second chapter, I provide 
eleven case studies of the WPR’s use between 1973 and the present, and build off a 1997 
study by political scientists David Auerswald and Peter Cowhey who performed an 
empirical analysis of the effectiveness of the WPR.  In my final chapter, I review 
prospects for the WPR’s future effectiveness based off attempts to amend or repeal the 
law, its applicability to the modern battlefield, and the executive and legislative branches’ 
contemporary interpretations of it.  After reviewing the history of the WPR and its impact 
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Arguably the most important decision any president and Congress can make is the 
decision to take the nation to war.  The Founding Fathers, in an effort to prevent the rise 
of a tyrant, split the war powers in the Constitution between the executive and legislative 
branches.  The Constitution gives Congress the definitive authority to declare war as well 
as raise and maintain armies under Article I, Section 8.  The Constitution also designates 
the president as Commander in Chief of the armed forces under Article II, Section 2.  The 
president also has implicit authority to defend the nation in times of emergency.   
However, between outright war and a president’s emergency powers to defend the 
nation is what Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson called a “zone of twilight.”1  Ever 
since the Constitution’s ratification, the executive and legislative branches have struggled 
to define their war powers authority between the two vague designations of authority in 
the Constitution and within the “zone of twilight.”  The 1973 War Powers Resolution 
(WPR), about which I have written my thesis, was an attempt by Congress to provide a 
constitutional framework for the executive and legislative branches to navigate war 
powers issues in accordance with the powers the Constitution vests in both branches.     
In June 1950, President Truman deployed United States (U.S.) forces to aid in the 
defense of South Korea from the North Korean invasion.  The Korean War would last 
three years.  U.S. casualties from the war would be over 33,000 killed and 92,000 
wounded.  An estimated 2.5 million civilians would die during the war.2  Congress never 
formally declared or authorized war against North Korea.  Instead, President Truman 
                                                          
1 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
2 Korean War Casualties, accessed on August 17, 2013, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_military_ casualties_of_war, and Korean War Civilian 




claimed the operation was a “police action under the United Nations [U.N.],” thus citing 
authorization from the U.N., not Congress as required by the Constitution.   
   The U.S. would fight the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s under similar 
circumstances.   While Congress gave its authorization for the use of force in Vietnam 
through the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, it did not anticipate the massive expansion 
of the U.S. military presence in Vietnam.  In 1967, President Johnson stated of the 
resolution, “We stated then, and we repeat now, we did not think the resolution was 
necessary to do what we did and what we are doing.”3  The Nixon Administration would 
take this same position on presidential war powers stating, “this Administration has not 
relied on or referred to the Tonkin Gulf resolution of August 10, 1964, as support for its 
Vietnam policy.”4  U.S. casualties for the Vietnam War would be over 58,000 killed, 
303,000 wounded.  Estimates for civilian casualties in and around Vietnam would be as 
high as 2.5 million.5   
By the late 1960s, Congress began to grow frustrated with the unchecked growth 
of presidential power during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.  One State Department legal 
analyst described the executive’s war powers as “very broad,” and congressional 
approval was “at best a needless formality, and at worst, may occasion a dangerous 
delay.”6  As a result, Congress would begin to take action to reassert its constitutional 
rights eventually declaring “the constitutional ‘balance’ of authority over warmaking had 
                                                          
3 S. Rpt. 606, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, page 7.   
4 S. Rpt. 606, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, page 19. 
5 Vietnam War Casualties, accessed August 17, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_War. 
6 Memorandum prepared by Leonard Meeker, State Department. On the Legality of the United States 
participation in the Defense of Vietnam, 54 Department of State Bulletin, pp 484ff U.S. Department of 
State, Washington DC, 1966, as cited in Nathan, James A., “Salvaging the War Powers Resolution,” 




swung heavily to the President in modern times, and that Congress is now required to 
reassert its own prerogatives and responsibilities.”7   
On November 7, 1973, Congress passed Public Law 93-148 into law over the veto 
of President Nixon.  Public Law 93-148 is the WPR, and its purpose is to “[ensure] that 
the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the 
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”8  The 
WPR has been highly controversial since its enactment.  Nearly every president has 
questioned its constitutionality, and many critics, from members of Congress to 
constitutional scholars, believe it has failed to curtail presidential war.9   
 Most discussions about the WPR are single chapters in books on presidential or 
congressional power or 20-40 page papers in academic journals discussing certain aspects 
of the law.  As a result, it is difficult for any reader to get a full understanding of the 
WPR and all of its intricacies from a single source.  The WPR is a fascinating subject.  
First and foremost, it is a classic separation of powers subject.  All three branches of 
government play a role in shaping the WPR, both in their era, and also for the future.  
Second, the WPR is a powerful document which helps to shape a major part of U.S. 
foreign policy.  Finally, and most importantly, the WPR helps to shape how the U.S. 
initiates and conducts war.   
The American public rarely hears about the WPR.  However, since 1973, the 
executive branch and Congress have constantly cited it in the discussions and parameters 
surrounding every major military action in which the U.S. was involved.  Anytime the 
                                                          
7 H. Rpt. 1547, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, page 2.   
8 Public Law 93-148 (see Appendix 1).    




U.S. contemplates going to war, the WPR helps shape the discussion.  And, while the 
public may believe the U.S. never declares war anymore, or that perhaps the president 
now has more power than Congress in taking the country to war, the WPR is working 
behind the scenes as the primary legal framework for war matters, only second to what 
the Constitution explicitly says about war.  In the U.S.’ current military crisis against the 
Islamic State, President Obama in February 2015 specifically cited the WPR in his 
request for authorization from Congress to conduct military operations in Syria and Iraq.   
 The WPR is important.  The central role the WPR plays in the war powers debate 
shows the high expectations the 1973 Congress held for it.  Unfortunately, many argue 
the WPR has never lived up to those expectations.  Make no mistake, the WPR is a 
flawed document.  Some of its sections are contradictory, and critics consider many of its 
sections unconstitutional, either infringing on the inherent powers of the president or 
Congress.  Its most damning repudiation was from President Nixon, who vetoed it, 
requiring the 1973 Congress to override his veto.  The WPR thus came into being as a 
law which defines the scope of a president’s war authority, but was never signed into law 
by a president.  As a result, many, including nearly every president since 1973, feel it 
lacks legitimacy.  Nevertheless, it is the law of the land, and every president and 
Congress must abide by its requirements.    
In my thesis, I analyze the constitutionality and effectiveness (both historic and 
future) of the WPR.  Critics of the WPR fall into two primary groups: those that favor 
more authority for the executive branch and those that favor more for Congress.  Within 
these groups, calls for WPR reforms can vary from minor changes to outright repeal.  




framework within which presidents and Congresses have worked together to define the 
scale and scope of U.S. military conflicts in the post-1973 era.  After reviewing the 
history of the WPR and its impact on conflicts during this period, I agree with those who 
claim the WPR, while an imperfect document, is constitutional, has made a difference, 
and helped to curtail unilateral presidential war. 
 My first chapter analyzes the constitutionality of the WPR.  I first provide a 
legislative history of the law, which took place between 1969 and 1973.  The Senate and 
House of Representatives wanted to accomplish different purposes in a war powers law.  
I discuss how the two chambers reconciled their differences, and then were able to 
override President Nixon’s veto.  I then discuss the controversial sections of the law and 
the various criticisms leveled against them.  In the last part of the chapter, I review the 
current body of applicable court cases which help define the extent of each branch’s war 
power authority.   
 My second chapter reviews the effectiveness of the WPR since 1973.  I analyze 
eleven major cases during this period:  The 1975 Mayaguez Incident; Lebanon (1982-
1984); Grenada (1983); Panama (1989-1990); the 1991 Persian Gulf War; Somalia 
(1992-1994); Haiti (1993-1994); Yugoslavia (1992-1999); The War on Terror (2001-
present); the 2011 Libyan Air Campaign; and Syria (2013-present).  I look at how the 
presidents and Congresses utilized the WPR during these conflicts.  I also discuss 
instances in which members of Congress took the president to court during these events 
and how their rulings impacted the WPR.  The last part of this chapter studies the 1997 
study by political scientists David Auerswald and Peter Cowhey who performed an 




results of their study and use their research parameters to analyze U.S. military operations 
subsequent to 1995.   
 My third chapter analyzes prospects for the WPR’s future effectiveness.  I review 
the significant attempts at WPR reform or repeal, and why in every case they failed.  I 
then look at the WPR’s effectiveness in modern warfare.  The WPR’s trigger is the 
deployment of U.S. military personnel into hostile environments.  As a result, is the WPR 
applicable to covert operations and operations using advanced weapons such as drones 
and cyberwarfare, where U.S. military personnel are not in immediate danger?  This 
requires me to also review the relevant laws of the intelligence community.  Finally, I 
review the contemporary WPR interpretations of both the executive and legislative 
branches, and how their behaviors determine its effectiveness both presently and in the 
future.   
 As I first stated, the decision to take the nation to war is arguably the most 
important decision any president or Congress can make.  It is a decision no individual 
should take lightly.  The vagueness of the Constitution’s delegation of war powers 
between the president and Congress leaves room for a wide range of interpretations by 
both branches.  The WPR was an attempt to help guide both branches through this 
process.  It is not perfect, but I believe it has helped ensure both branches appropriately 
participate in the decision to go to war.  My hope is my research will contribute to our 
understanding of how the U.S. views the decision to go to war through the lens of the 






Chapter 1  
The War Powers Resolution – A Legislative History and Analysis of its 
Constitutionality 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I analyze whether the WPR is a constitutional piece of legislation.  
In order to reach a conclusion, I discuss the origins and legislative history of the WPR, 
analyze the controversial aspects of the legislation that those in favor and against have 
raised, and review how the courts have ruled in cases related to presidential and 
congressional war powers.  In conclusion, I believe the WPR is constitutional, and if used 
properly, can be a useful framework through which to ensure the constitutional 
prerogatives of both the legislative and executive branches are considered in war powers 
matters.   
 
Part I – The Origins and Drafting of the War Powers Resolution 
A. The Legislative History of the War Powers Resolution 
In order to properly analyze the WPR, it is important to first understand its 
legislative origins in Congress.  The WPR originated and evolved in Congress during the 
four years prior to its passing in 1973.  The two chambers of Congress originally had 
different goals in what war powers legislation should accomplish.  Many in Congress still 
had reservations about the WPR after it became law.  In this section, I will discuss these 
matters and the constitutional questions that arose during this period.   
On February 4, 1969, the Senate passed the first congressional resolution to voice 




Commitment Resolution stated it was “the sense of the Senate that a national 
commitment by the United States to a foreign power … results from affirmative action 
taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States.”10  Although only a 
one-chamber resolution and not a joint resolution from both chambers of Congress, the 
Senate hoped its resolution would lay the foundation for increased dialogue between the 
two branches.  The Senate was wrong, and the Nixon administration continued to wage 
the Vietnam War unilaterally and expanded the war to Cambodia and Laos “without the 
consent or even the knowledge of Congress.”11    
 In 1970, members in both chambers of Congress presented the first war powers 
bills for debate.  These bills laid the foundations for the different policy directions both 
chambers would take in the upcoming years.  The Senate bills would favor a curtailment 
of presidential war power with specific roles for both branches while the House bills 
preferred a less restrictive, more collaborative approach between the branches.   
 On June 15, 1970, Republican Senators Jake Javits and Bob Dole co-introduced 
S. 3964.12  The bill outlined instances in which a president could enter into hostilities 
without congressional authorization, a key feature of all future Senate bills.  The 
language of this bill and future Senate bills would attempt to define the president’s war 
authority as Commander in Chief under Article II of the Constitution.  According to 
S. 3964, presidents could use the armed forces only to repulse attacks against the United 
States or armed forces, protect the lives and property of U.S. citizens abroad, and comply 
with legislative authorizations to use force.13  The bill also limited presidential actions 
                                                          
10 S. Res. 85, 91st Congress, 1st Session. 
11 S. Rpt. 220, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, page 5. 
12 S. 3964, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, page 1.     




without congressional authorization to no longer than 30 days, with Congress having the 
option to terminate hostilities prior to the cutoff through a joint resolution.14  The 
definition of the president’s war authority and the mandatory termination of hostilities 
clock would be the key provisions of all future significant war powers legislation in the 
Senate.   
 The bill also required the president to report “promptly” to Congress any 
instances where he commits the armed forces to hostilities and does not have 
congressional authorization.15  The term “promptly” was significant because while vague 
in initial Senate and House legislation, both chambers would begin to tighten presidential 
reporting requirements in future sessions.  The bill also included requirements both 
chambers would eventually adopt for priority review in order to avoid filibuster attempts 
or committee pigeonholing.16  Finally, the bill included language that it would “not apply 
to military hostilities undertaken before the effective date of this Act” (i.e., it would not 
apply to Vietnam).17  The decision whether to make the act applicable to Vietnam would 
become another major issue of debate as the legislation evolved.   
 Democratic Congressman Clement Zablocki led a large group of sponsors in 
introducing the House’s first war powers bill on August 13, 1970.18  As with S. 3964, this 
bill would lay the foundation of the policy direction the House would pursue.  The bill 
began by stating, “The Congress reaffirms its powers under the Constitution to declare 
war.”19  It continued by stating the president has powers to defend the country without 
                                                          
14 S. 3964, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, pages 2-3.   
15 S. 3964, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, page 2.    
16 S. Rpt. 220, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, page 30.    
17 S. 3964, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, page 3.    
18 H. J. Res. 1355, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, page 1.   




congressional approval in “certain extraordinary and emergency circumstances.”20  
Unlike the Senate, the early House bills would continue to avoid defining the president’s 
emergency powers out of fear it would infringe “on the President’s Constitutional 
prerogatives as Commander in Chief.”21  The bill also stated it did not alter the authority 
of Congress or the president; language the House would continue to include in its bills.22   
 The heart of the bill was its reporting requirement, which was the centerpiece of 
all House war powers bills.  As with the Senate bill, the House’s first bill used weak 
language in its reporting requirements such as:  “It is the sense of Congress that whenever 
feasible the President should seek consultation with the Congress before involving the 
Armed Forces of the United States in Armed Conflict.”23  If the president already 
committed U.S. forces into hostilities, it required him to “promptly” report to Congress.  
This language would leave substantial room for legal interpretation by the executive 
branch.24  The House’s trigger for congressional reporting included when the president, 
without congressional authorization, committed U.S. forces into “armed conflict,” 
committed forces “equipped for combat” to a foreign nation, or “substantially enlarges” 
forces already in a foreign nation.25  This definition would remain fairly consistent 
through future House bills and would be an issue of debate with the Senate in future 
conference committees.    
 The success of these two bills in their respective chambers of Congress show how 
far apart in 1970 the House and Senate were on the war powers issue.  The House of 
                                                          
20 H. J. Res. 1355, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, page 1.   
21 H. Rpt. 1547, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, page 4.       
22 H. J. Res. 1355, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, page 3. 
23 H. J. Res. 1355, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, pages 1-2. 
24 H. J. Res. 1355, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, page 2. 




Representatives passed Congressman Zablocki’s bill overwhelmingly; 289-39 on 
November 16, 1970.26  In the Senate, Senators Javits and Dole did not have any other 
public supporters for their bill.  Additionally, the Senate did not act on the House’s war 
powers bill allowing it to expire at the end of the session.  Nevertheless, Senator Javits 
and Dole’s introduction of the first war powers bill in the Senate, coupled with the 
success of war powers legislation in the House, raised attention to the subject in the 
Senate.27   
 In 1971, both chambers would again attempt to pass war powers legislation.  In 
the Senate, Senator Javits revised his war powers bill from the previous year and 
resubmitted on February 10, 1971.28  The new bill only had minor revisions over the 
previous year’s bill.  Senator Javits’ 1971 bill still included the following:  an outline of 
instances in which a president could enter into hostilities without congressional 
authorization; reporting to Congress all unauthorized military actions; the 30-day 
mandatory termination for hostilities and joint resolution override; anti-filibuster 
provisions; and would not apply to military hostilities already undertaken such as 
Vietnam.29   
 A trio of war powers bills, written by other senators, accompanied Senator Javits’ 
bill in early 1971.  Two of the bills, those by Democratic Senators Thomas Eagleton and 
John Stennis, were similar in their requirements to that of Senator Javits.  Senator 
Eagleton introduced his war powers bill on February 17, 1971.30  His bill began in a 
                                                          
26 Spong, Jr., William B., “The War Powers Resolution Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or Surrender?”  
William and Mary Law Review, Volume 16, Issue 4 (1975), page 826.   
27 Wheeler, Winslow T., Wastrels of Defense: How Congress Sabotages United States Security, 
(Annapolis:  Naval Institute Press, 2004). 
28 S. 731, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 1.   
29 S. 731, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, pages 1-3.   




similar fashion to Congressman Zablocki’s by reaffirming the constitutional powers of 
the executive and legislative branches.31  As with Senator Javits’ bill, Senator Eagleton’s 
bill detailed instances in which a president could initiate hostilities without congressional 
authorization.  The bill also included a 30-day mandatory termination of hostilities, 
contained anti-filibuster provisions, required prompt reporting of all unauthorized 
actions, and would not apply to Vietnam.32    
 Senator Eagleton’s bill introduced two items that would become significant to the 
future WPR.  First, his bill stated that presidents could not infer congressional 
authorization for hostilities through treaties or appropriations bills.33  The bill specifically 
stated the charters of the U.N., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty did not authorize the president to engage in 
hostilities without “authorization from both the Senate and House of Representatives.”34  
Presidents Truman and Nixon had used these treaties as justification for the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars, respectively.  Second, the bill was the first to attempt to define hostilities, 
a term whose definition the legislative and executive branches would argue over in future 
military operations subject to the WPR.  Senator Eagleton’s definition of hostilities 
included combat operations in foreign nations, deployment of the armed forces in foreign 
nations where imminent combat is “a reasonable possibility,” and assignment of military 
personnel to accompany foreign regular or irregular forces engaged in hostilities (i.e., 
similar to the origins of the U.S.’ involvement in Vietnam).35      
                                                          
31 S. J. Res. 59, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, pages 1-2.    
32 S. J. Res. 59, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, pages 1-7. 
33 S. J. Res. 59, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 2. 
34 S. J. Res. 59, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, pages 2-3.   




 Senator Stennis introduced his bill on May 11, 1971.36  This bill was very similar 
to those of Senators Javits and Eagleton.  The bill included the same key language of 
these bills including an outline of instances in which a president could enter into 
hostilities without congressional authorization, reporting to Congress all unauthorized 
military actions, the 30-day mandatory termination for hostilities, and anti-filibuster 
provisions.  Senator Stennis’ bill was unique because it attempted to define the 
president’s authority to defend the nation in situations that involved nuclear weapons.37  
As with Senator Eagleton’s bill, Senator Stennis’ stated the president could not infer 
authorization to initiate hostilities from appropriation bills but did not mention treaties.38  
Finally, the bill would not apply to Vietnam, but went further by including to the 
qualification the countries and waters around Vietnam as the war had spread outside its 
borders by the early 1970s.39  Democratic Senator Lloyd Bentsen reintroduced this bill 
with minor drafting changes on May 17, 1971.40 
 Republican Senator Robert Taft, Jr. introduced the fourth war powers bill in the 
Senate during 1971.  Unlike the bills of Senators Javits, Eagleton, and Stennis, Senator 
Taft’s bill focused on defining the president’s war powers and clarifying the Congress’ 
position towards operations in Southeast Asia.41  The bill was significant because it was 
the first to raise the use of a concurrent versus joint resolution to require the president to 
end active military operations.42  Concurrent resolutions, unlike joint resolutions, do not 
require presidential signature and do not carry the force of law.  The bill was also the first 
                                                          
36 S. J. Res. 95, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 1.   
37 S. J. Res. 95, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 2.   
38 S. J. Res. 95, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 3. 
39 S. J. Res. 95, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 5. 
40 S. 1880, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 1. 
41 S. J. Res. 18, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, pages 2-3.   




to set a definitive deadline for the president to report unauthorized military deployments; 
24 hours in its case.43   
 The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held public hearings on the four war 
powers bills between March and October 1971.44  As a result of these hearings, the 
senators of the initial war powers bills jointly introduced S. 2956 on December 6, 1971.45  
S. 2956 was a hybrid bill that combined the key themes of the previous 1971 war powers 
bills.46  The bill first reiterated the constitutional war powers of the executive and 
legislative branches.  It then detailed circumstances in which the president could use 
emergency war powers such as to repel attacks against the U.S. and its armed forces, to 
protect and rescue citizens in foreign nations, and pursuant to specific legislative 
authorization.47  It did not include Senator Stennis’ language about nuclear weapons.   
 S. 2956 included the 30-day mandatory termination for unauthorized presidential 
operations with an option for congressional overrides using a joint versus concurrent 
resolution.48  It also included language from Senators Eagleton and Stennis’ bills that the 
president could not infer legislative authorization from treaties or appropriations.49  The 
bill did not include Senator Taft’s language for a hard reporting deadline, instead, it 
stated the president must “promptly” report unauthorized military operations.50  It also 
included anti-filibuster provisions.51  Finally, the bill would not apply to current military 
                                                          
43 S. J. Res. 18, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 3.   
44 S. Rpt. 220, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, page 5. 
45 S. 2956, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 1. 
46 S. Rpt. 220, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, page 5. 
47 S. 2956, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, pages 2-3.   
48 S. 2956, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 5.   
49 S. 2956, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 3.   
50 S. 2956, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, page 4. 




operations such as Vietnam.52  The Committee on Foreign Relations approved the bill 
and the Senate adopted the bill by the vote of 68-16 on April 13, 1972.  The bill would 
remain the Senate’s position on presidential and legislative war powers for the remainder 
of the war powers debates.   
 In the House of Representatives during 1971, Congressman Zablocki immediately 
reintroduced his war powers bill as H. J.  Res. 1 at the beginning of the 92nd Congress on 
January 22, 1971.53  The only change from the previous year’s war powers bill was the 
House removed the term “whenever feasible” from its consultation requirements prior to 
the president deploying the U.S. armed forces.  While at first glance, this appears to 
strengthen the consultation requirement.  However, the committee report stated, “the 
entire section remains a ‘sense of Congress’ provision and is thus advisory, rather than 
mandatory.”54  The House Foreign Affairs committee unanimously approved the bill and 
the House again passed the bill on August 2, 1971.55   
   In 1972, efforts in both chambers to move the war powers legislation forward 
continued to proceed.  Both chambers now had their final bills and were ready to move 
forward through a conference committee.  However, there were already significant 
differences of opinion between the two chambers over the direction of the final 
legislation based on S. 2956 and H. J. Res. 1.  The Senate bill, which detailed time limits 
and circumstances in which the president could pursue military operations without 
congressional authorization, was much more specific than the House bill, which focused 
on presidential reporting requirements.  Democratic Senator William Spong, Jr. stated the 
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Senate thought the House bill too weak while the House thought the Senate’s bill too 
restrictive on the president in emergencies.56  As a result of the differences of opinion, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended to the Senate not to pass H. J.  
Res. 1.57   
 The Senate’s rejection of H. J. Res. 1 did not end war powers discussion between 
the two chambers.  On August 3, 1972, Congressman Zablocki, in a crafty legislative 
move to “overcome a parliamentary impasse,” took the Senate’s bill into committee, 
replaced the Senate’s language with that of H. J. Res. 1, and recommended its passing to 
the House as amended.58  The House of Representatives overwhelming approved the 
amended Senate bill 345-13 on August 14, 1972.59  A conference committee could now 
debate the war powers legislation.  Unfortunately, the members of the conference 
committee were able to meet only one time before the 1972 elections in what Senator 
Spong called a “desultory meeting.”60  As a result, the war powers legislation debates 
could not continue until the beginning of the 93rd Congress in January 1973.   
 On January 3, 1973, the House introduced its new war powers bill as H. J. Res. 2.  
The bill still focused on presidential reporting requirements, although it included sections 
that detailed the president’s emergency war powers and anti-filibuster/pigeonholing 
provisions.61  The House Foreign Affairs Committee held new hearings on the bill in 
March 1973, and introduced the House’s strongest bill to date – H. J. Res. 542.62  The 
new bill was closer in tone to that of the Senate.  The most significant changes to the 
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House’s bill were the introduction of a 120-day mandatory termination for unauthorized 
presidential military operations and the use of a concurrent versus joint resolution to 
force the president to end military operations.63  The bill also used stronger language such 
as replacing “it is the sense of Congress that the President should seek appropriate 
consultation” with “the President in every possible instance shall consult” in requiring the 
president to report to Congress prior to committing U.S. forces to hostilities.64  The bill 
also gave the president had a hard deadline of 72 hours to report unauthorized military 
operations to Congress.  As with the Senate bill, the president could not infer 
authorization from treaties.65  Unlike the Senate bill, the House bill would apply to 
current operations such as Vietnam.66   
 The House Foreign Affairs Committee reported H. J. Res. 542 to the House on 
June 15, 1973, and the House voted in favor of the bill 244-170 on July 18, 1973.67  The 
Senate, already satisfied with its bill, had less work to do in early 1973.  The Senate 
reintroduced its bill as S. 440 on January 18, 1973.  The only significant revision to the 
Senate bill was an amendment in June to make Vietnam subject to the resolution.68  Both 
chambers now agreed Vietnam would be subject to any war powers legislation they 
passed.  However, this was a moot point by this time as the U.S.’ direct role in Vietnam 
was ending in 1973.  The Senate subsequently referred its bill to the House on July 23, 
1973.69  As the bills of the two chambers were now much more similar, there was a 
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higher probability that the current Congress’ conference committee would be able to 
reach an agreement on the legislation.   
 Both chambers in their respective reports elaborated on the policies within their 
final bills.  The House report emphasized “harmony,” “balance,” and “consultation.”70  
The intent of the House bill “was not to reflect criticisms on activities of Presidents, past 
or present,” but to draft guidelines for both branches to fulfill their constitutional 
responsibilities.71  The Senate report was more partisan than that of the House.  Instead of 
a more collaborate approach, the report stated the bill’s purpose was to “reconfirm and to 
define with precision the constitutional authority of Congress to exercise its constitutional 
war powers with respect to ‘undeclared’ wars.”72  One can easily surmise the goals of 
both chambers from the tone of their reports.   
 The arrival of the two bills to conference committee also marked a low point in 
the Nixon presidency.  President Nixon had recently ordered unpopular airstrikes in 
Cambodia to entice the North Vietnamese to withdraw from that country.73  The 
Watergate scandal was continuing to unfold in the media further damaging the 
president’s popularity.74  In a sense, it had become a perfect moment politically for 
Congress to attempt to pass major legislation that would curtail the powers of the 
executive branch.   
 On October 4, 1973, the conference committee approved the final version of the 
WPR bill.75  The bill was a true combination of both the Senate’s S. 440 and the House’s 
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H. J. Res. 542.  It defined the president’s emergency war powers, the constitutional 
authority for both branches, and included a separability clause as the Senate desired.  It 
also included the reporting requirements and use of a concurrent resolution to terminate 
unauthorized presidential military operations prior to the cutoff date as the House desired.  
Both chambers compromised on their cutoff dates for unauthorized military operations, 
which became 60 days with an automatic 30-day extension if the president deemed a 
withdrawal after 60 days would endanger the safety of U.S. armed forces.76   
Although the two chambers of Congress had passed a final war powers bill, some 
congressmen had already raised concerns regarding the constitutionality of some of the 
key provisions of the future WPR.  In June 1973, eleven representatives affixed their 
minority views to H. J. Res 542.  Their major criticisms of the bill included the automatic 
termination of hostilities provision and ability to terminate hostilities via concurrent 
resolution.   The members questioned the constitutionality of forcing a president to 
terminate military operations through congressional inaction.77  They also believed this 
could place U.S. forces at risk by forcing their withdrawal in the midst of combat.78  In 
place, several of the congressmen recommended requiring Congress to hold a vote to 
authorize a president’s military operations by the end of the specified period.79  The 
congressmen also questioned the constitutionality of Congress’ use of a concurrent 
resolution to override a president, specifically, would a concurrent resolution be binding 
on a president, and would it challenge his constitutional authority as Commander in 
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Chief?80  Although minority views, they raised constitutional questions that haunt the 
WPR to the present day.  I will discuss the constitutional questions over the WPR in the 
next section of this chapter.   
Both chambers overwhelming approved the final bill.  The Senate approved the 
compromise on October 10, 1973 with a vote of 75-20.  The House approved it on 
October 12, 1973 with a vote of 238-123.81  The bill was now on the desk of 
President Nixon.   
 On October 25, 1973, President Nixon vetoed the WPR bill and stated, “The 
restrictions which this resolution would impose upon the authority of the President are 
both unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests of our Nation.”82  The president 
further stated the Founding Fathers intentionally did not specify the war powers of the 
executive and legislative branches in order to promote flexibility and “close 
cooperation.”83  President Nixon, like the congressman who affixed their minority views 
to H. J. Res. 542, believed the WPR provisions for the automatic termination of hostilities 
after 60 days and use of a concurrent resolution to terminate presidential military actions 
were unconstitutional.  For the former, he stated it would “seriously undermine this 
Nation’s ability to act decisively … in times of crisis,” and would allow Congress “to 
increase its policy-making role through a provision which requires it to take absolutely no 
action at all.”84  For the latter, a concurrent resolution was “an action which does not 
normally carry the force of law.”85  President Nixon returned the bill to Congress only 
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welcoming more inter-branch consultation and a non-partisan commission to study the 
roles of the branches in foreign affairs.86   
 Congress anticipated President Nixon would veto any WPR bill that contained 
conditions beyond a reporting requirement.87  The Democratic Party controlled both 
chambers of Congress at this time.  While the Senate had enough votes to override 
President Nixon’s veto, slightly less than two-thirds of the House had voted in favor of 
the WPR bill.  However, two events helped to bring the House vote total above the two-
thirds necessary to override President Nixon’s veto.  The first was legislative history.  
President Nixon had already vetoed the 93rd Congress eight times.  Many members in 
Congress saw an override of President Nixon’s veto of the WPR as a means for Congress 
to reassert itself.88  The second was Watergate.  President Nixon had requested the Justice 
Department to remove independent special prosecutor Archibald Cox from the Watergate 
investigation four days before his veto of the WPR.  The refusals and subsequent 
resignations of Nixon’s Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General became known 
as the Saturday Night Massacre leaving many in Congress infuriated.89  As a result of the 
growing anger towards the Nixon Administration, both chambers garnered enough votes 
to override the president’s veto – 75-18 in the Senate and 284-135 in the House.90  The 
WPR became law as P.L. 98-148 on November 7, 1973 (see Appendix 1). 
   Although both chambers of Congress overwhelmingly voted for the WPR, the 
reactions to its passing were mixed.  Many members felt instead of contracting 
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presidential power, it expanded it by giving presidents 60 to 90 days to conduct military 
operations without congressional authorization.91  Some members of Congress viewed it 
as a judgment on President Nixon’s administration.  Democratic Congresswoman Bella 
Abzug voted against the bill in the House and in conference believing it gave the 
presidency too much power, but voted for the veto override stating, “this could be a 
turning point in the struggle to control an administration that has run amuck.  It could 
accelerate the demand for the impeachment of the President.”92  
 Other Congressmen were not as supportive of the WPR.  Democratic 
Congressman Ronald Dellums, who never voted in favor of the bill, warned Congress 
that “Richard Nixon is not going to be President forever.  Although many people will 
regard this as a victory against the incumbent President, because of his opposition, I am 
convinced that it will actually strengthen the position of future Presidents.”93  Even 
Senator Eagleton, one of the sponsors of the Senate bill, was unhappy with the final WPR 
product and voted against the veto override.94  He stated of the conference version of the 
WPR that “what came out is a total, complete distortion of the war powers concept.”95  
The Senator continued stating that by allowing the president to wage unrestricted military 
operations for 60 to 90 days, the final version of the WPR “was the most dangerous piece 
of legislation that I have seen.”96    
 The WPR was controversial legislation from its enactment.  Many members of 
Congress have questioned the WPR’s constitutionality and effectiveness, which I will 
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discuss in Part II of this chapter, as well as in later chapters.  Since 1973, members of 
Congress have attempted to amend or repeal the WPR on multiple occasions.  I discuss 
the potential amendments and repeal attempts on the WPR in Chapter 3.  In 1983, 
Congress contemplated modifying the WPR’s concurrent resolution provision in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Immigration and Naturalization Service versus 
Chadha.  I will discuss this issue in more detail in Part II of this chapter.   
 Congress drafted the WPR out of a need to rebalance the powers of the executive 
and legislative branches in taking the country to war.  Many members of Congress were 
still unsatisfied with the conference version with some questioning its constitutionality.  
President Nixon’s veto of the legislation calling it unconstitutional and later 
congressional attempts to amend or repeal the WPR are further evidence of its 
controversy.  Nevertheless, the WPR is still the law of the land.  In the upcoming 
sections, I will discuss the controversial sections of the WPR and analyze its 
constitutionality based on judicial history. 
 
Part II – An Analysis of the Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution 
A. What the Founding Fathers Foresaw for War Powers 
The Constitution gives Congress the definitive authority to declare war under 
Article I, Section 8.97  However, between outright war and a president’s emergency 
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powers to defend the nation as Commander in Chief under Article II, Section 2 of the 
Constitution is what Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson called a “zone of twilight.”98  
Presidents and their legal advisors have worked to expand this “zone” to further empower 
the executive branch.  However, historical records show the Founding Fathers were very 
clear in placing the power to take the nation to war with the legislative branch, not the 
executive.   
Future president James Madison of Virginia was against empowering the 
president with the ability to go to war – “Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the 
nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, 
continued or concluded.”99  James Wilson of Pennsylvania stated, “the important power 
of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.”100  His peer, Roger Sherman of 
Massachusetts, further elaborated on the delegation of war powers by stating, “The 
Executive shd [sic.] be able to repel and not to commence war.”101  Constitutional 
convention records indicate the founders used the term “declare war” in place of “make 
war” only to allow the president to “repel sudden attacks.”102  Furthermore, the term 
“declare” had a different definition in 18th century America.  In that era, declare was 
synonymous with commence, and international and English law at the time used the 
words interchangeably.103      
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The Federalist Papers, written to support the ratification of the Constitution, only 
lightly addressed war powers.  However, they reiterated the Founding Fathers’ desire to 
take the authority to declare war out of the hands of a single person, such as the king of 
England, and place it in the hands of the people.  John Jay wrote of the selfish interests of 
monarchs in taking nations to war:   
“Absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes 
and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or 
private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.”104   
 
James Madison wrote of permanent, standing armies as a necessary evil for national self-
preservation.  Madison believed standing armies “[planted] in the Constitution itself 
necessary usurpations of power.”105  As a result, Madison wrote republics such as the 
U.S. “must take corresponding precautions” to counter the risks of maintaining standing 
armies, such as separating war powers between the president and Congress.106   
Alexander Hamilton wrote about war powers from the perspective of the 
president.  He argued “the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national 
security.”107  He further stated the slow, deliberative nature of Congress balances against 
the energy of the executive to “constitute safety in a republican sense.”108  While 
Hamilton promoted energy in the executive as “a leading character in the definition of 
good government,” he also tried to assure the public that the new position of the president 
would not be as powerful as the king of England, particularly in war powers:   
“The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his 
authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much 
inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and 
naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the 
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DECLARING of war and to the RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by the 
Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.”109 
 
The writings of Jay, Madison, and Hamilton in The Federalist Papers showed the 
Founding Fathers recognized the potential for creating a tyrant in the new U.S. 
government.  As such, they built in controls to the new Constitution to prevent the 
accumulation of too much power in any branch, such as separating the war powers 
between the president and Congress.  It is clear that at this point in American history, the 
Constitution intended for Congress to have the sole authority to take the nation to war.     
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison would further debate the scope of the 
president and Congress’ inherent and shared powers, including those related to war, 
during George Washington’s presidential administration.  At this time, Alexander 
Hamilton was one of Washington’s closest advisors as his Secretary of the Treasury, 
while James Madison was a member of the House of Representatives.  Both would argue 
in favor of their respective branches in a series of essays that would become known as the 
Pacificus-Helvidius Debates.   
In April 1793, President Washington announced to the nation the U.S. would 
remain neutral during the war between France and an alliance of European states.  
President Washington’s decision was controversial because the U.S. had a mutual 
defense treaty with France.  The controversy over the proclamation quickly grew beyond 
whether the U.S. was violating its treaty with France to a wider debate about the 
separation of powers between the presidency and Congress, particularly in foreign affairs, 
which at this time were still undefined.110  Hamilton and Madison wrote a series of essays 
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arguing their positions under the pen names Pacificus and Helvidus, respectively, 
between June and September 1793. 
Hamilton argued in favor of a broad interpretation of the president’s power in 
foreign affairs under the general grant of executive authority in Article II of the 
Constitution.  He argued, “The Legislative Department is not the organ of intercourse 
between the [U.S.] and foreign Nations.”111  His most ambitious assertion in favor of a 
strong executive branch was the president’s executive authority was absolute, with the 
exception of only three qualifications:  the Senate’s ability to participate in appointing 
officers and making treaties, and Congress’ authority to declare war.112  Hamilton then 
marginalized in Congress’ authority to declare war by stating all foreign affairs authority 
up to, and immediately after, a congressional declaration of war rested with the 
president.113   
While Hamilton’s assertions may sound reasonable to contemporary Americans 
who have lived entirely in an era of strong, executive authority, opponents to Hamilton’s 
agenda, such as Washington’s Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, believed Hamilton 
was using the neutrality proclamation to expand the power of the executive branch in 
foreign affairs, something Jefferson strongly opposed.114  Jefferson urged his political 
ally and friend James Madison counter Hamilton in an entertaining example of eighteenth 
century political commentary – “For god’s sake, my dear Sir, take up your pen, select the 
most striking heresies, and cut him to [pieces] in the face of the public.”115 
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Madison’s strategy to counter Hamilton’s assertions was to turn the neutrality 
proclamation on its head by claiming that when the Washington Administration 
proclaimed neutrality, it actually infringed on Congress’ inherent constitutional authority 
to declare war.  In Madison’s words: 
“In exercising the Constitutional power of deciding a question of war, the Legislature ought to be as free to 
decide, according to its own sense of the public good, on one side as on the other side. Had the 
Proclamation prejudged the question on either side, and proclaimed its decision to the world; the 
Legislature, instead of being as free as it ought, might be thrown under the dilemma, of either sacrificing 
its judgment to that of the Executive; or by opposing the Executive judgment, of producing a relation 
between the two departments, extremely delicate among ourselves, and of the worst influence on the 
national character and interests abroad.”116 
 
Madison, like many others skeptical of a strong executive branch, felt war was “the true 
nurse of executive aggrandizement.”117  Even a congressional concession on the power to 
declare neutrality could strengthen the presidency beyond the powers which the 
Constitution granted him, creating a tyrant.  Hamilton’s vision for the executive branch 
won out in the end.  The Pacificus-Helvidus Debates helped entrench foreign policy as a 
primarily executive power, expand the reach of the president’s general executive powers 
under Article II of the Constitution, and recognize “overlapping spheres of power” 
between the branches.118  The debate also exposed and foreshadowed the complexities in 
defining war powers boundaries between Congress and the president. 
Why have war powers been so controversial if the Founding Fathers were so clear 
in assigning the power to take the nation to war to the legislative branch?  The vague 
manner in which the Constitution defines both branch’s war powers allows both to 
develop legal positions in their favor.  Presidents have unilaterally undertaken military 
actions and justified them under the Constitution through their powers as Commander in 
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Chief and in accordance with the oath of office, in which they swear to “preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States.”119  Congress hoped the WPR would 
better define the war making roles of both branches.  In the words of Senator Spong, “the 
purpose of the Resolution accepted was not to define constitutional powers, but to 
establish procedures governing their exercise.”120  While Congress may have had these 
intentions, the WPR has raised many constitutional questions.  I will now analyze the 
controversial sections of the WPR and evaluate its constitutionality based on judicial 
history. 
   
B. Controversial Sections of the WPR 
1. Analysis of Section 2 
 Section 2 is the Purpose and Policy section of the WPR.  Part (a) of the section 
states the “collective judgement” of both branches will apply to deploying the U.S. 
military into hostilities.  Part (b) cites Congress’ powers under Article 1, Section 8 to 
make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers of the U.S. 
government.  Part (c) is the most controversial part of the section, in which it states the 
president’s ability to introduce the U.S. military into hostilities are pursuant to “(1) a 
declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency 
created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed 
forces.”121  Many opponents of the WPR believe part (c) to be unconstitutional because it 
infringes on the president’s authority as Commander in Chief in accordance with 
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.  However, as I will discuss in the judicial section 
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below, the courts have never ruled in favor of a president to initiate hostilities in 
situations other than those of a defensive or emergency nature, which supports the 2(c) 
language.   
 Defining circumstances in which the president could initiate hostilities had been 
one of the centerpieces of all Senate war powers legislation in the early 1970s.  The 
Senate’s intent was to contradict the “executive prerogative which holds that the 
President may use the armed forces at will, even in conditions falling short of a national 
emergency.”122  The Senate claimed the Founding Fathers’ intent was for the power to 
authorize all hostilities to be with Congress.123  Thus, it was the Senate’s opinion that all 
along the founders intended for Congress, not the president, to make war aside from 
repelling attacks.   
 As I discussed in Part I of this chapter, the House of Representatives was not as 
hawkish as the Senate to constrain the president’s emergency powers.  Many in the 
House believed the Founding Fathers did not specifically define the war making powers 
for both branches in order to maintain flexibility in emergencies.124  The House never 
attempted to define the president’s emergency powers in its bills.  As a result, when the 
two chambers met in conference committee in 1973, the House members twice rejected 
Senate attempts to define presidential emergency war powers.125   
 The Senate was extremely disappointed with the final version of this language in 
the WPR.  Senator Eagleton criticized the language because the conference committee 
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placed it in the Purpose and Policy Section, in his opinion rendering it meaningless.126  
He felt the statement was non-operative which would allow the president to define his 
own war powers.127  Senator Eagleton was correct as the final conference report stated 
“subsequent sections of the joint resolution are not dependent upon the language of this 
subsection, as was the case with a similar provision in the Senate bill.”128   
 From a legal standpoint, while Section 2(c) may not apply to other sections of the 
WPR, it may still may be enforceable.  Senator Spong believed the section was not part 
of the preamble, but part of the body of the resolution, meaning it “must be interpreted 
together with all other sections” according to statutory construction.129  Nevertheless, he 
stated the final language used in Section 2(c) neither directs the president nor includes 
consequences for failing to adhere to the language.130  As a result, while Senator Spong 
believed the language to be operative, “its effectiveness [was] limited to the advisory 
impact it may have upon a President.”  He concluded by saying Section 2(c) “must be 
viewed as the remnant of the Senate's long effort to define the President's war powers in 
emergency situations.  That effort failed.”131 
 Section 2(c), while controversial to some, is unlikely to cause any constitutional 
problems.  The final language in the WPR is vague and is not directive upon the 
president.  Additionally, it is questionable whether it applies to the later sections of the 
WPR that place requirements upon the president (such as Sections 3, 4, 5, and 8).   
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2. Analysis of Section 3 
 Section 3 is the consultation requirement of the WPR, which originated in the 
House.  Unlike Section 2(c), Section 3 places a direct requirement upon the president.  
Using the language “the President in every possible instance shall,” Section 3 requires the 
president to “consult” with Congress prior to introducing the U.S. military into 
“hostilities” or “imminent hostilities.”132  While the language of Section 3 is simple, and 
even President Nixon showed openness to a consultation requirement in his veto, the 
section is still controversial.133   
 Although the section places a direct order upon the presidency, presidents and 
their legal teams have been able to pick apart to their advantage the terminology of this 
section.  First, the term “every possible instance” has allowed presidents to cite instances 
where they were unable to report to Congress prior to introducing U.S. forces into 
hostilities.134  Second, the terms “consult” and “hostilities” are not specific.  Congress 
defined consult to mean the president is engaged with the Congress asking for its 
“advice,” “opinions,” and in some cases “approval” on military matters.135  Congress was 
specific that consult meant more than having the president inform it of pending 
operations.136  However, presidents have tended to define consultation as informing only, 
and oftentimes after the fact.137  The House defined hostilities in its bill to mean where 
“fighting has actually begun” or “where there is a clear and present danger of armed 
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conflict.”138  Nevertheless, presidents have often defined hostilities and imminent 
hostilities liberally resulting in many situations where they have questioned the 
applicability of the WPR to particular military operations.139   
 There are also questions about the constitutionality of Section 3.  Many believe 
the section to be unconstitutional because it infers presidents will conduct military 
operations without congressional approval.  As a result, these critics claim Section 3 
illegally delegates the power to declare war from Congress to the president.140    
 Section 3 raises both legal and constitutional issues.  Because the Congress 
enacted the WPR into law, presidents must abide by it, regardless if a president did not 
sign it into law.  The liberal interpretation of Section 3 terminology by presidents raises 
additional legal questions.  While some critics claim the section illegally delegates power 
to the presidents, presidents have also claimed this and other sections of the WPR 
infringe on their authority as Commander in Chief.  The issues related to interpretation 
and compliance in Section 3 are examples of problems with the WPR as a piece of 
legislation.   
 
3. Analysis of Sections 4 and 5 
 Sections 4 and 5 of the WPR are closely related.  Section 4 is the WPR’s 
reporting requirement.  Section 4(a) requires the president to report to Congress when he 
introduces troops without a declaration of war into certain scenarios.  Section 4(a)(1) is 
the most important scenario (as will be discussed later), and requires the president to 
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report when he has introduced troops into hostilities or imminent hostilities.141  The 
section requires the president to report to Congress within 48 hours and provide enough 
information in order for Congress to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities.  The 
president must continue to report regularly until he has removed U.S. forces from the 
specific situation.  One scholar criticizes Section 4 for delegating war authority in direct 
contradiction of Section 2(c).142  While his criticism is valid, Section 2(c) is not directive 
upon the president as I discussed above.  Therefore, the Section 2/Section 4 contradiction 
is an example of sloppiness in the language of the WPR, but does not impact its 
guidelines.     
 Section 5 is the WPR’s congressional action requirement and the most 
controversial section of the legislation.  If the president submits his report subject to 
Section 4(a)(1) (note the president, not Congress, determines whether the report is subject 
to the section), the WPR requires the president to terminate the operation within 60 days 
unless Congress:  1) declares war or authorizes the operation; 2) extends the operation for 
another 60 days; or 3) was unable to meet during the 60 days due to an attack against the 
United States (note Congress does not have to vote in order to trigger the termination of 
an operation).143  Furthermore, the WPR authorizes the president to extend the operation 
by 30 days if he certifies to Congress that removal after 60 days would jeopardize the 
safety of U.S. forces.  Section 5(c) of the WPR entitles Congress to direct the president to 
withdraw the U.S. forces at any time by concurrent resolution.144      
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 As with Section 3, Sections 4 and 5 refer to hostilities but do not define them.  
The term hostilities is even more critical to Sections 4 and 5 as the president must report 
under Section 4(a)(1), which relates to hostilities and imminent hostilities, in order to 
activate the 60-day clock for automatic terminations of hostilities in Section 5(b).  
Presidents have been reluctant to report under Section 4(a)(1) in order to avoid the clock, 
which has become a major loophole in the legislation.145  If the president does not report 
under this section, Congress would be left to assemble a veto-proof majority in order to 
activate the 60-day clock by law.146  As a result, the WPR would be hard to enforce in a 
“contentious political environment.”147  This results in the largest weakness of the WPR:  
Congress assumed presidents would willingly report actual or imminent hostilities under 
Section 4(a)(1).  
  Senator Javits considered Section 5 of the WPR to be its “structural heart.”148  It is 
also the most controversial piece of the WPR.  From Congress’ perspective, some critics 
believe Section 5 illegally delegates the ability to declare war for up to 90 days to the 
president, effectively giving him a carte blanche to introduce the military anywhere in the 
world for any reason.149  From the president’s perspective, critics worried the automatic 
termination of hostilities infringed on the president’s constitutional authority as 
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Commander in Chief.150  An additional criticism of the section was the 60-day 
termination would tip off enemies allowing them to alter their strategies to wait out the 
U.S. deployment.  It could also make U.S. allies hesitate to support operations if they 
know the U.S. commitment will end within 60 to 90 days.151     
 Another major issue of contention in Section 5 is it requires the president to 
automatically terminate hostilities without congressional action.  President Nixon raised 
this issue in his veto of the WPR stating, “the Congress is here attempting to increase its 
policy-making role through a provision which requires it to take absolutely no action at 
all.”152  During the WPR hearings, members of Congress worried the executive and 
judicial branches would interpret any language in Section 5 requiring Congress to take 
positive action to be subject to a presidential veto.  Others worried the political and public 
relations pressures of having U.S. forces deployed would prevent the Congress from 
taking a position against the president.153  As a result, Congress decided to make the 
termination automatic regardless of congressional action to avoid a political showdown.     
 Congress did, however, include language in Section 5(c) allowing it to terminate 
U.S. military operations at any time by concurrent resolution, which neither require 
presidential signature nor carry the force of law.  Congress’ basis for a concurrent 
resolution was it was lawful because there was “no congressional authorization for the 
President’s action.”154  Furthermore, Congress had used concurrent resolutions to 
terminate powers of the president prior to the WPR without constitutional showdowns 
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such as the termination of emergency powers of the president after World War II as well 
as with foreign assistance acts during the 1940s and 1960s.155  Nevertheless, critics 
vocally opposed this measure as President Nixon stated a concurrent resolution “does not 
normally have the force of law,” while Republican Senator Strom Thurmond stated, 
“there is no precedent in the history of this government for such a procedure.”156    
 The Supreme Court’s 1983 ruling in I.N.S. v. Chadha would raise additional 
questions about the constitutionality of the use of a concurrent resolution by Congress to 
override the president.  The case ruled it was unconstitutional for Congress to veto 
actions by the executive branch.  There are questions whether this case would apply to 
the WPR, and I will discuss this in more detail later in this chapter.  Congress decided in 
1983 to revise the WPR to require the use of a joint resolution to require the withdrawal 
of U.S. forces.157  The measure did not actually amend the WPR, but was a freestanding 
measure for use in the case of the withdrawal of U.S. forces.158  Congressional scholar 
Louis Fisher stated the freestanding measure did not amend the WPR, therefore leaving 
the concurrent resolution as part of the law.  However, post 1983, it is questionable 
whether Congress would attempt to terminate military hostilities with a concurrent 
resolution.159   
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4. Analysis of Section 8 
 Section 8 of the WPR includes language that the president cannot infer 
congressional authorization for the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities from other 
provisions of law, appropriations acts, or treaties unless the treaty specifically authorized 
the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or referenced the WPR.160  In other words, 
presidents must get specific authorization from the Congress to deploy U.S. forces into 
hostilities and cannot cite other statutory guidance to sidestep the WPR.  Since the end of 
World War II, presidents had used these tactics to justify their decisions to expand and 
continue major military actions such as during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.   
 Ironically, while President Truman, as well as future presidents, would reference 
authorization from international treaties such as the U.N. and NATO to initiate hostilities, 
no international treaties authorize the president to act without congressional 
authorization.  In Section 6 of the U.N. Participation Act, Congress authorizes the 
president to “to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the Security Council 
which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint 
resolution [emphasis added] … in accordance with Article 43 of [the U.N. Charter].”161  
Article 43 of the U.N. Charter states any military arrangements “shall be subject to 
ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes [emphasis added].”162  The North Atlantic Treaty uses similar language stating 
in Article 11 “this Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in 
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accordance with their respective constitutional processes [emphasis added].”163  
Therefore, since both treaties refer back to the “constitutional processes” of its members, 
no president can use authorization from the U.N. or NATO to bypass congressional 
authorization to initiate hostilities.  The Supreme Court’s 1890 ruling in Geofroy v. Riggs 
affirms that treaties cannot usurp constitutional powers (such as to declare war).  I will 
discuss this case in more detail later in the chapter.  In conclusion, Section 8 of the WPR 
reiterates what presidents should already know about the limits of treaty powers.  
Nevertheless, some criticize section 8(a) of the WPR as an “impermissible attempt to 
bind future Congresses” from authorizing military action as they choose, again 
demonstrating the complexity of codifying war powers law.164   
 The WPR is highly controversial, both for the powers it confers to both the 
president and Congress, as well as for its loose wording.  As I have discussed, the WPR’s 
key provisions raise complex constitutional questions.  In the upcoming section, I will 
discuss how past judicial rulings have helped frame the constitutional questions of the 
WPR.  I will conclude this part with a final analysis of the constitutionality of the WPR.   
 
C. Judicial Matters Relevant to the WPR 
1. The “Political Question” 
 Political questions arise when the Constitution allocates all of the power to 
perform a function to a single branch, such as its assignment to Congress of the power to 
declare war.  In these cases, the judiciary has preferred to allow the voters to shape policy 
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through their elected representatives versus the courts.165  Historically, the courts have 
helped to settle issues over presidential power in emergencies.166  I will discuss some of 
these cases below in this section.  However, following the end of World War I, the courts 
became more hesitant to intervene in political questions over foreign affairs; Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer being an exception (discussed later).167   
In the 1960s and 1970s, the courts began to state there were circumstances in 
political questions where courts could intervene.  In the 1962 Supreme Court case Baker 
v. Carr, the court ruled the judiciary could determine whether the Tennessee Legislature 
had properly fulfilled its state power to apportion its congressional districts by stating, 
“the doctrine of which we treat is one of ‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political 
cases.’”168  In 1973, an appellate court ruled within the war powers realm it was within a 
court’s jurisdiction to determine whether Congress had given authorization for a 
president to go to war.169  The court ruled while the judiciary will not hear lawsuits that 
raise political questions (e.g., was Congress right to declare a war?), it is possible for the 
courts to hear cases in which they rule whether the branches of government are in 
compliance with federal and state constitutional laws (e.g., did the president obtain 
authorization from Congress to go to war?).    
 While the courts have opened the door to hear political cases, there are certain 
conditions that each case must have in order for the courts to hear it.  The courts will not 
hear war powers cases in which Congress believes a president did not obtain its 
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authorization unless it is supported by a congressional majority.170  Therefore, only if a 
majority in both chambers of Congress believe a president had assumed Congress’ 
constitutional right to declare war would the court consider the case a political case 
instead of a political question.   
 No court case brought by Congress has met this criteria, resulting in all of their 
dismissals.  Congress has previously taken the president to court over war powers matters 
seven times (four with President Reagan, once with President George H. W. Bush, once 
with President Clinton, and once with President Obama).  The courts reiterated in the 
1990 lawsuit against President George H. W. Bush of the need for a congressional 
majority to bring a suit forward.  In this case, 54 members of Congress sued President 
Bush to obtain congressional authorization before commencing offensive operations 
against Iraq.171  Although the appellate court agreed the matter was justiciable, it 
dismissed the case on the doctrine of ripeness stating “it would be both premature and 
presumptuous for the Court to render a decision on the issue of whether a declaration of 
war is required at this time or in the near future when the Congress itself has provided no 
indication whether it deems such a declaration either necessary … or imprudent.”172  
Therefore, the courts agree to rule on political war powers cases, but Congress must come 
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2. Declaring versus Authorizing War 
Many Americans do not understand the difference between when Congress 
declares or authorizes a war.  However, there are significant legal differences between the 
two.  In order to fully understand the ongoing war powers debate and law behind the 
WPR, it is important to explain the differences.  The Constitution only makes reference to 
declaring war.  The U.S. has declared war only five times:  The War of 1812; The 
Mexican War; The Spanish-American War; World War I; and World War II.  This does 
not mean that every other war in which the U.S. fought was unconstitutional.  In many 
other cases, Congress has instead authorized the president to use force.     
 Legally under a declaration of war, a country formally declares a state of war 
exists between it and another state, thereby cutting all diplomatic and commercial ties 
between the two.173  The declaration also creates a state in which the country can kill 
combatants, take prisoners, and seize property subject to the laws of war and international 
norms.174  In the U.S., a declaration of war gives the president full discretion in which to 
conduct the war, as well placing the resources of the nation at his disposal and giving 
special him domestic powers in the name of national security.175   
An authorization is much more limited.  In this case, Congress specifically 
delegates powers to the president thus placing limits on the resources and means he may 
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use.176  Authorizations also do not give the president the special emergency powers he 
receives under a declaration.  While the Constitution is silent with regards to 
authorizations, the Supreme Court ruled in the 1800 case Bas v. Tingy that Congress 
alone has the power to declare or authorize war – “Congress is empowered to declare a 
general war, or congress may wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects and in 
time.”177  While this ruling should prohibit presidential uses of force that are not of a 
defensive nature, the post-WWII “expansive interpretation” of the president’s inherent 
war powers and passing of the WPR shows it has not.178   
 Declarations of war have fallen out of use in the post-WWII era, not only in the 
U.S., but internationally.  Many scholars believe the reason is due to the increased 
codifying of the laws of war.  International organizations have passed laws concerning 
the treatment of civilians and banning of certain weapons and strategies.  At the forefront 
of these laws is the U.N. Charter, which bans nations from “threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”179  As a result, the U.N. 
technically has made any declaration of war illegal – “It is asking the nation to solemnly 
declare itself to be an international outlaw.”180  
 Because of the huge expansion of international laws of war during the 20th 
century, actual declarations of war place states in complicated situations legally.  Political 
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scientist Tanisha Fazal believes states avoid declarations of war due to the litigious risk 
they place on their leaders and themselves – “as the costs of engaging in formal war have 
increased with the demand for compliance with a growing body of international 
humanitarian law, states’ calculations may well have shifted such that the formalities of 
war are no longer worthwhile.”181  A formal state of war can result in war crimes 
convictions and international condemnation to states, their leaders, and their soldiers.182  
As a result, Fazal says, “we often see very large conflicts labeled as ‘police actions,’ 
‘counterterrorism,’ or ‘incidents’ precisely because political actors want to avoid the legal 
ramifications of calling their conflicts ‘war.’”183 
 
3. Does I.N.S. v. Chadha invalidate the WPR?   
 Immigration and Naturalization Service versus Chadha (I.N.S. v. Chadha) was a 
landmark 1983 Supreme Court case that curtailed congressional authority over the 
executive branch.  The Supreme Court ruled one chamber of Congress could not veto an 
executive branch action once Congress had delegated the authority to the executive 
branch.184  Although the decision involved a one-chamber veto of the executive branch, 
many interpret the decision to invalidate any legislative veto attempt by Congress not 
presented to the president for signature.185  Section 5(c) of the WPR and its use of a 
concurrent resolution to force the withdrawal of U.S. personnel would therefore be 
unconstitutional applying this interpretation.   
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 There is disagreement whether I.N.S. v. Chadha applies to the WPR.  Justice 
Lewis Powell, in concurring with the judgment, noted the legislative veto in many 
statutes, including the WPR, and added, “I would be hesitant to conclude that every veto 
is unconstitutional on the basis of the unusual example presented by this litigation.”186  
In I.N.S. v. Chadha, Congress had delegated power to the executive branch through the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.187  Congress has never delegated the authority to 
declare war to the executive branch and does not do so in the WPR.188  As a result, many 
believe the I.N.S. v. Chadha verdict should not apply to the WPR.  However, because 
Congress has never implemented Section 5(c) of the WPR, the courts have never had the 
opportunity to rule on its constitutionality.189  One scholar believes the WPR “presents an 
appropriate case for fashioning an exception to Chadha.”190  Nevertheless, most experts 
now concede the courts would likely find Section 5(c) unconstitutional due to the 
ruling.191  Regardless of how the courts would apply I.N.S. v. Chadha to Section 5(c) of 
the WPR, Section 9 of the WPR contains a separability clause that states the rest of the 
statue would remain in effect even if Section 5(c) became unconstitutional.192   
 
4. Judicial War Powers Rulings that Favor Congress 
 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer was a 1952 Supreme Court case that 
dealt with defining the extent of the president’s emergency powers during times of war.  
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During the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order to seize the nation’s 
steel mills in order to avert a strike he felt would impede the nation’s ability to wage war 
in Korea.193  The Supreme Court determined neither Congress nor the Constitution gave 
President Truman the power to seize private property.  Additionally, the court disagreed 
that the ability to seize private property fell under the president’s military powers as 
Commander in Chief.  The court found President Truman violated “the essence of the 
principle of the separation of governmental powers” and sided with the steel industry.194   
 A second significant case in establishing the limits of presidential war power is 
Fleming v. Page, a Supreme Court case from 1850.  The case dealt with the Mexican War 
and the extent of the president’s war powers from a congressional declaration of war.  
The Supreme Court’s decision found the president’s congressionally-approved war 
powers to be “purely military.”195  The court found a president could not infer a 
declaration of war authorized him to delegate other powers of the legislative branch such 
as the ability to make unilateral treaties or assess taxes.196  As the Supreme Court stated, 
“Congress alone has the power to declare war, and the President is only the agent of 
Congress in carrying it on.”197       
 Little et al. v. Barreme et al. was a Supreme Court case that arose out of the Quasi 
War with France in the late 1790s.  During the Quasi War, Congress authorized the U.S. 
Navy and privateers to seize French vessels “bound or sailing to [emphasis added]” 
France.198  President John Adams then disseminated orders to the U.S. Navy and 
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privateers “to prevent all intercourse … between the ports of the United States, and those 
of France or her dependencies, where the vessels are … bound to or from French ports 
[emphasis added].”199  A U.S. privateer, following President Adam’s orders, captured a 
vessel sailing from France and brought it to Boston.  The Supreme Court determined the 
seizure was illegal as the privateer captured the vessel sailing from, rather than to, 
France, as Congress dictated.  Although the case revolved around legal technicalities, the 
court’s ruling reemphasized presidential orders could not exceed war authorizations 
passed by Congress.   
 A fourth significant court case dealing with the scope of presidential war powers 
was United States v. Smith from 1806.  In this case, a circuit court ruled Colonel William 
S. Smith engaged in military actions against Spain, a country with which the U.S. was not 
at war.200  Colonel Smith claimed he was “begun, prepared, and set on foot with the 
knowledge and approbation of the president of the United States.”201  The court ruled it 
was irrelevant whether the president was aware of the operations, Congress had not 
authorized any type of hostilities against Spain, and any actions undertaken by any 
individual to conduct hostilities would be illegal.202  In making its ruling, the court stated, 
“it is the exclusive province of congress to change a state of peace into a state of war.”203 
 The Supreme Court has also made a ruling that significantly weakens a 
president’s ability to use treaties as justification for war.  Geofroy v. Riggs was an 1890 
case that dealt with the inheritance rights of French nationals to property of their parents 
in the District of Columbia.  An 1853 treaty between the U.S. and France implied the 
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children were not entitled to the property.  However, an 1887 law passed by Congress 
inferred the children were entitled.  The court ruled in favor of the children (and 
Congress) stating, “It would not be contended that [a treaty] extends so far as to authorize 
what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government.”204  
Because the Constitution gives the power to declare war to solely Congress, the 
Geofroy v. Riggs ruling should negate any claim a president makes in using a treaty as 
authorization for taking the nation to war.   
 A final Supreme Court case that limits a president’s war powers is Ex Parte 
Milligan.  This case dealt with the trying of southern sympathizers accused of planning 
insurgent attacks in northern states.  The military arrested and tried the sympathizers in 
Ohio in 1864, a state not in rebellion and whose civilian courts were open.  The court 
ruled it was unlawful for the military to try the sympathizers in a military court where 
civilian courts were still open.  In making this ruling, the court stated the president can 
only exceed Congress’ authority “in times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or 
foreign war” when Congress is unable to meet.205  One expert believes this ruling limits 
the president’s unilateral war authority to “a threat to national sovereignty.”206   
The aforementioned cases have helped to define the scope of a president’s war 
powers, both in times of emergencies and when Congress has declared war.  It is clear 
from the cases that Congress is the superior branch in matters of war.  A president’s war 
powers are limited to what the Constitution explicitly states (which is not much): direct 
intervention in times of emergency (including when Congress is unable to meet) and 
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through authorizations Congress gives to the president.  In the case of the WPR, the 
rulings of I.N.S. v. Chadha and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer hem Congress’ 
ability to terminate military operations in between them.  One scholar believes a president 
ignoring a congressional resolution to terminate hostilities would create a justiciable 
court case – “Chadha suggests that bicameral passage and presentment is required; 
Youngstown would allow something less.”207 
 
5. Judicial War Powers Rulings that Favor the President   
 The court has also ruled in favor of the presidency in cases involving the rights of 
the executive branch over the legislative branch in times of peace and war.  The Prize 
Cases was a Supreme Court case heard during the Civil War.  The Supreme Court 
determined President Abraham Lincoln’s blockade of southern ports prior to 
congressional authorization was legal.  Congress was on recess when President Lincoln 
imposed the blockade under his own authority as Commander in Chief.  Congress 
subsequently recognized the measures President Lincoln undertook when it returned to 
session.   
The case upheld President Lincoln’s actions and expansion of presidential powers 
during times of war.  However, the Supreme Court’s ruling is applicable only under 
narrow circumstances as it cited, “the condition of things was unprecedented,” “the ‘state 
of things’ … had arisen in [a congressional] vacation,” and “Congress has recognized the 
validity of these acts of the President” since reconvening.208  Therefore, it is unlikely that 
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a future president could use this case as justification for initiating hostilities outside of a 
future U.S. civil war.     
The courts have also ruled in favor of the president when he has acted in certain 
circumstances without congressional authorization.  In Myers v. United States, the 
Supreme Court ruled in 1926 the president has the authority to remove executive branch 
officers he appointed with “the advice and consent of the Senate” without any further 
congressional approval as this was an executive power under Article II of the 
Constitution.209  This ruling supported Alexander Hamilton’s belief that the president has 
broad authority in executive matters.210  However, this ruling does not likely impact the 
war powers debate.  The Constitution is silent with regards to the removal of political 
appointees while it is explicit that Congress has the power to declare war.  Furthermore, 
the courts have historically ruled a president’s war powers are limited to those Congress 
authorizes and times of national emergency.  
In re Neagle was an 1890 Supreme Court case which ruled in favor of presidential 
actions in the public good without congressional authorization.211  The case dealt with the 
executive branch providing U.S. Marshals protection to Supreme Court Justices, but 
could be expanded to other situations when the president is taking action to ensure the 
laws of the Constitution “are faithfully executed” as required by the oath of office in 
Article II.212  This ruling supports a president’s use of emergency war powers to protect 
the nation, but would not likely expand to a president’s use of the military in offensive 
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operations without congressional authorization based on the aforementioned court 
rulings.   
U.S. v. Midwest Oil Company was a 1915 Supreme Court case in which the court 
ruled in favor of the executive branch when repeatedly pursuing actions “in the public 
interest.”213  If Congress repeatedly ignores an executive action, “an implied grant of 
power to preserve the public interest would arise out of like congressional 
acquiescence.”214  A second, more recent case, dealt with congressional acquiescence to 
the president in foreign affairs.  The 1981 Supreme Court case Dames & Moore v. Regan 
dealt with the president’s ability to cancel claims between U.S. companies and Iran in the 
wake of the agreement the U.S. and Iran reached to free the U.S. hostages held by Iran.  
The court found “Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by 
executive agreement.”215  As a result, the court ruled “in light of the fact that Congress 
may be considered to have consented to the President's action in suspending claims, we 
cannot say that action exceeded the President's powers.”216  Although the court noted “the 
narrowness of our decision,” the executive branch has repeatedly cited this case as an 
example of executive authorization through congressional acquiescence in foreign 
affairs.217   
Orlando v. Laird was a recent court decision at the time Congress passed the 
WPR in 1973.  A portion of the case dealt with whether Congress had authorized the 
Vietnam War through “appropriating billions of dollars to carry out military operations in 
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Southeast Asia.”218  An appellate court in 1971 ruled its judgment would not raise a 
political question and Congress had authorized the executive branch to continue military 
operations in Vietnam through its continued appropriations for the conflict.219  In 
reporting S. 2956 in 1972, the Senate stated its disagreement with the Orlando v. Laird 
ruling – “the ‘approval’ implied by an appropriation for a war-making operation already 
underway is admixed with the unwillingness to withhold the material support required 
from our forces in the field once they are engaged, rather than a freely given expression 
of consent.”220  Congress included Section 8(a)(1) of the WPR to prevent presidents from 
citing appropriations as congressional authorization.221  However, Section 8(a)(1) may 
not stand up against the Orlando v. Laird ruling if a future lawsuit citing appropriations as 
authorization went to court.     
The courts have found presidents to have an inherent right to protect the lives of 
U.S. citizens and their property abroad.  In 1860, a U.S. Navy ship bombarded a village 
in Nicaragua in retaliation for threats against an American diplomat and loss of property 
to an American firm.222  A circuit court found the president to be justified in his actions to 
protect U.S. citizens and property abroad.  “The protection of the lives or property of the 
citizen, the duty must, of necessity, rest in the discretion of the president.  Acts of lawless 
violence, or of threatened violence to the citizen or his property … may, not 
unfrequently, require the most prompt and decided action.”223  As a result, presidents 
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have justification for the use of military force abroad if they can show evidence that the 
lives and property of U.S. citizens were in danger.   
 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation was a landmark 1936 
Supreme Court case that many argue gave the president unlimited authority in foreign 
affairs.  The case dealt with President Franklin Roosevelt’s executive orders that 
concerned arms embargos to South American countries.  The Supreme Court’s ruling, 
written by Justice George Sutherland, authorized a sweeping expansion of presidential 
authority in foreign affairs – “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations 
-- a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress.”224  
The ruling is frequently referenced in court cases that support broad powers for the 
presidency.225   
However, the case’s ruling has detractors as well.  Sutherland’s use and citation of 
John Marshall’s “sole organ” speech from 1800 was taken out of context.  John Marshall 
was referring to a situation where Congress had delegated authority to President John 
Adams for an extradition treaty with England.  Therefore, in that instance, Adams was 
the “sole organ” of the government.  Marshall did not mean this as a blanket statement 
for the president in foreign affairs.226   A federal appeals court stated in 1981 it rejected 
Sutherland’s “characterization” of plenary presidential power in foreign affairs.227  
Therefore, while this case is a popular reference in presidential power matters, it is not on 
as solid footing as some legal scholars claim.  Additionally, it deals with powers 
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Congress has delegated to the president through legislation, versus the power to declare 
war, which Congress cannot delegate to the president.   
 The court’s rulings in favor of the president have been limited to granting power 
to him in emergencies, and in acceding to the executive branch for the nation’s greater 
good when the Constitution has been vague or silent on matters.  The courts have never 
ruled in favor of a president initiating an offensive war without congressional 
authorization.  The reason is because the Constitution is clear in delegating the power to 
declare war with Congress, not the president.  The courts have not deviated from this 
position.   
 
D. Is the WPR Constitutional?   
In my opinion, the WPR is a constitutional piece of legislation.  The document 
has its share of critics from presidents, to members of Congress, to scholars.  Many 
criticisms are true about the WPR, from its contradictory language to loopholes.  
However, the language in the WPR is consistent with the Constitution and judicial 
history.  Section 8(d) of the WPR states the resolution neither alters the constitutional 
powers of either branch, nor gives the president more war authority than he had before 
the WPR became law.228  The WPR can ensure both branches fulfill their constitutional 
duties before taking the country to war, but only if both branches are willing to abide 
by it.   
The largest criticism of the WPR is it illegally delegates Congress’ constitutional 
authority to declare war to the president by allowing him to wage war for up to 90 days in 
accordance with Sections 4 and 5.  This assumption is incorrect.  Sections 4 and 5 
                                                          




provide flexibility to both the president and Congress.  In accordance with the 
Constitution and judicial history, presidents can respond militarily to emergencies at 
home and abroad.  The WPR allows presidents to respond to minor crises for a limited 
period of time (up to 90 days), situations in which one scholar says Congress would 
prefer to avoid formal involvement.229  One could consider this by itself as an 
unconstitutional delegation of power from Congress to the president.  However, 
Section 5(c) allows Congress to terminate the president’s military operations at any time 
through the use of a concurrent resolution.  Because Congress can terminate 
presidentially-initiated hostilities at any time, the president is operating under a de facto 
authorization by Congress until it says otherwise.  Therefore, Congress never delegates 
its constitutional power to declare war to the president making this criticism moot.   
The use of a concurrent resolution under Section 5(c) is the second major 
criticism of the legislation.  As I have discussed, concurrent resolutions do not typically 
carry the force of law because they do not require presidential signature.  Furthermore, 
many believe I.N.S. v. Chadha invalidated the use of concurrent resolutions to override 
presidential actions.  Since the courts have never had the opportunity to judge the 
constitutionality of Section 5(c), we cannot definitively say whether the section is legal.  
However, many signs point favorably towards the constitutionality of Section 5(c).  
First, Congress never delegated the power to declare war to the president, unlike in the 
circumstances of I.N.S. v. Chadha.  Because Congress is asserting its constitutional right 
to declare war, many scholars believe a concurrent resolution would suffice to override 
                                                          




the president.230  Additionally, the court’s ruling in Dellums v. Bush (see Chapter 2, 
Persian Gulf War case) points to signs the courts would hear a case brought by majorities 
in both chambers to override a president’s decision to unilaterally go to war.  However, 
this would require a unified Congress, something that is difficult to achieve in the current 
era of political polarization.  Nevertheless, Congress has a strong case that any action it 
took pursuant to Section 5(c) against the president would be at a minimum justiciable, if 
not legal.   
 There has also been criticism over Section 5(b) allowing Congress to terminate 
hostilities through inaction.  On one hand, the automatic provision of this section actually 
forces Congress to act if it believes hostilities should continue beyond 90 days.  If a 
majority in Congress cannot support the military action, then it would not have 
authorized the hostilities in the first place, necessitating its termination.  On the other 
hand, Congress designed Section 5(b) in this manner to avoid presidents from overriding 
congressional resolutions or blackmailing Congress into support by placing U.S. forces 
into danger before Congress has been able to vote.  The advantages of this section 
outweighed the potential constitutional risks of inaction.  Furthermore, Sections 6 and 7 
include expedited procedures for war powers legislation in both chambers.  Therefore, the 
WPR has built-in procedures to expedite votes to authorize a continuation of hostilities 
when majorities are present, and terminate operations when there is not a majority.  There 
is nothing unconstitutional about this.   
 There are also no constitutional issues with Section 8’s provision that treaties do 
not provide authorization for hostilities, a position many presidents have taken.  The U.N. 
                                                          
230 Rushkoff, Bennett C., “A Defense of the War Powers Resolution,” page 29, and Wald, Martin, “The 




and NATO treaties are very clear that presidents must obtain congressional approval for 
actions within these organizations.  The Supreme Court ruling in Geofroy v. Riggs 
further negates this position for presidents.  Section 8’s provision that appropriations do 
not provide authorization is not as definitive.  The court’s ruling in Orlando v. Laird 
supports the position that appropriations do signify authorization from Congress.  
However, this ruling was pre-WPR.  It is Congress’ hope that this legislation will help 
avoid situations in which congressional authorization was not clear at the onset of 
hostilities.   
 A last criticism is over Section 2(c) and whether it infringes on the president’s 
authority as Commander in Chief.  Section 2(c) follows both constitutional and judicial 
interpretations of war powers between the executive and legislative branches.  This leads 
to my final point.  The courts have always sided with Congress when authorizing 
hostilities.  They have sided with the president only in matters involving his emergency 
powers, which include national defense and protection of U.S. nationals and their 
property abroad.  No ruling has given the president authorization to unilaterally take the 
nation to war.  As the courts are in firm agreement with the Constitution that only 
Congress can bring the nation to war, it makes the need for a piece of legislation like the 
WPR even more vital as it helps to prevent presidential usurpations of that power and 
keep it in the hands of the people, through their elected representatives in Congress.    
 
Part III – Chapter 1 Conclusions  
The Founding Fathers split the war powers between the president and Congress so 




disaster.”231  They intentionally left the war powers of the two branches vague to allow 
for flexibility “in grave matters.”232  When Congress passed the WPR into law in 1973, 
it provided the country with better controls to help rebalance war authority between the 
executive and legislative branches, which in recent years had shifted to the executive 
branch.  The WPR does not attempt to define the war powers of the two branches.  
Rather, it provides a constitutional framework for the executive and legislative branches 
to navigate war powers issues in accordance with the powers the Constitution vests in 
both branches.   
The WPR is not a perfect document.  Some of its sections are contradictory, and 
critics consider many of its sections unconstitutional, either infringing on the inherent 
powers of the president or Congress.  However, when one looks past its defects, the 
WPR’s framework ensures two key elements.  First, Congress is always in control of 
overall authorizations for offensive war, whether through an outright authorization or the 
WPR’s de facto 60-day authorization, which Congress can terminate at any time through 
a vote.  Second, the WPR acknowledges the president has constitutional authority as 
Commander in Chief in operations of a defensive or protective nature.  This framework 
does not deviate from the intentions of the Founding Fathers or U.S. case law.  The WPR 
can ensure both branches fulfill their constitutional duties before taking the country to 
war, but only if both branches are willing to abide by it.   
On November 7, 1973, the WPR was a brand new law.  It would not have to wait 
long for its first tests as deteriorating conditions in and around Vietnam in the wake of the 
U.S. withdrawal would bring the U.S. military back into the region.  As the first tests 
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neared, there were still many unanswered questions about the WPR.  Would presidents 
recognize the WPR although no president signed it into law?  Would presidents try to 
send U.S. forces into combat unilaterally?  Would presidents report to Congress under 
Section 4(a)(1), or would Congress need to activate the 60-day clock of Section 5(b) by 
itself?  Would the WPR’s loose wording, such as the definition of “hostilities” and 
reporting “in every possible instance” create further presidential loopholes?   In the next 
chapter, I will look at these issues, as well as how the WPR has fared in the courts, as I 





The War Powers Resolution – An Analysis of its Effectiveness (1973-Present) 
Introduction 
 War places tremendous costs upon a country, in terms of both human and 
economic costs.  The recent war in Iraq and ongoing war in Afghanistan are perfect 
examples of the high costs of war.  Not only have the costs been high for the U.S., but 
they have been equally high for the people of Iraq and Afghanistan.  Because so much is 
at stake, sending the nation to war is one of the most difficult and important decisions the 
government can make on behalf of the American people.  Congress passed the WPR as a 
tool to aid the president and Congress in making these decisions.   
In this chapter, I analyze the WPR’s application in significant military operations 
since Congress passed it into law in 1973.  My analysis provides an understanding of how 
presidents and Congress have taken the country to war since 1973, and how they have 
interacted together in the process.  The war powers of the executive and legislative 
branches are a classic example of how the Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution to 
provide for checks and balances.  In my research, I found the two branches often acted as 
adversaries, not only in acting as checks over the other branch, but also in attempting to 
assert their own constitutional authority.  In conclusion, I side with the many scholars 
who believe the WPR has successfully curtailed presidentially-initiated military 






Part I – Significant Applications of the WPR post 1973 
 Presidents have submitted over 150 reports to Congress between 1973 and 2015 
in which they cited the WPR.233  The following 11 cases are examples of significant 
instances in which the WPR has played a role in the dialogue between the president and 
Congress in military operations.  Each of these cases were significant milestones in the 
history of the WPR and have helped shape its applicability in future conflicts.   
The presidents and Congresses from these cases oftentimes did not overtly abide 
by the WPR’s requirements.  Nevertheless, it was a key factor in the outcomes the 
branches reached.  Presidents regularly denounced the WPR publicly and in signing 
statements, while still being careful not to ignore Congress’ constitutional role in 
declaring or authorizing war.  Congress, on the other hand, was often silent or did not 
challenge the president in the operations.  However, many experts believe this was 
because it was satisfied with the operations or worked with the presidents to achieve a 
dialogue and arrive at an acceptable course of action and authorization.  While neither 
branch may have followed the WPR to the letter, it is clear both branches established 
boundaries through their actions which helped shape the ultimate policy decisions. 
   
A. The Mayaguez Incident – 1975 
The Mayaguez Incident would mark the fourth use of the WPR in its history.  The 
previous three times all occurred under President Ford in April 1975 and involved the use 
of U.S. forces to aid in the evacuation of U.S. personnel and civilian refugees from 
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Vietnam and Cambodia.234  None of the previous operations involved actual combat.  On 
May 12, 1975, just twelve days after the fall of Saigon, Cambodian naval patrol boats 
seized the SS Mayaguez and its crew of 40 Americans.235  Later that evening, President 
Gerald Ford decided to use military force to rescue the sailors after negotiations failed.236  
President Ford was the House minority leader when Congress passed the WPR two years 
earlier.237  He had voted against the bill, supported President Nixon’s veto, and voted 
against the veto-override.238  Nevertheless, President Ford attempted to comply with the 
provisions of the WPR.   
 In order to satisfy the WPR’s consulting requirement in Section 3, President Ford 
ordered his staff on May 13 to notify a list of senior members of Congress of the 
imminent hostilities.  The president’s staff did not seek consultation from the 
congressmen as required by the WPR, but claimed to have received positive support from 
all.239  The military operation was poorly planned and executed.  While U.S. forces 
rescued the crew and ship without harm, they lost 41 killed and 49 wounded plus several 
helicopters in the operation; more lost than the entire crew of the Mayaguez.240  The 
mission and hostilities were over by the morning of May 15.241   
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 President Ford formally reported to Congress on May 15 “taking note of [WPR] 
Section 4(a)(1),” as well as his executive authority to act as Commander in Chief.242  This 
is significant for several reasons.  First, a presidential report under Section 4(a)(1) 
triggers the 60-day automatic withdrawal clock in Section 5(b).  Second, this report is 
still the only time in the WPR’s history a president has reported under Section 4(a)(1).243  
Finally, although President Ford reported under Section 4(a)(1), the operation had already 
ended making the automatic withdrawal provision a moot point.  Nevertheless, President 
Ford complied with the WPR.  The Mayaguez Incident was short operation (i.e., less than 
60 days), thus making congressional authorization unnecessary in accordance with the 
WPR.  The operation is infamous in the history of the WPR for being the only operation 
to cite Section 4(a)(1), but again, only after the completion of the operation.        
 
B. Lebanon – 1982-1984 
The U.S. military involvement in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984 was a 
significant test of the WPR.  In the summer of 1982, President Reagan announced he 
would deploy 800 U.S. Marines to assist in the peaceful evacuation of Palestine 
Liberation Organization from Lebanon.244  Congressman Zablocki informed the Reagan 
Administration this deployment would subject U.S. forces to imminent hostilities and 
would require the president to file a report under Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR, thus 
triggering the 60-day clock.245  The Reagan Administration stated it would only deploy 
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the peacekeeping force for 30 days and during that time, it was unlikely the force would 
be involved in combat.  Therefore, the administration planned to report under 
Section 4(a)(2) as “equipped for combat,” but unlikely to be involved in hostilities and 
not subject to the 60-day clock.246   
 However, President Reagan surprised Congress when in his official report on 
August 21, 1982, he did not cite the WPR and stated only it was his “desire that the 
Congress be fully informed.”247  The State Department reported President Reagan 
decided against reporting under the WPR because of the limited duration of the operation 
(i.e., under 30 days), the assurances from all parties involved in the Lebanon conflict that 
the U.S. forces would face no danger, and since the president and Congress could not 
agree on the section under which to report, the Reagan Administration felt “the eminently 
sensible thing” was to not cite the WPR.248  The peacekeeping/evacuation operation was 
a success and the U.S. forces withdrew after 30 days having not been engaged in 
combat.249  As a result, Congress felt no need to press the matter of proper compliance 
with the WPR.250   
 The situation in Lebanon began to deteriorate in September 1982 after the 
September 17 massacre of 460 Palestinian civilians by Lebanese Christian militiamen.  
The incident was in retaliation for the assassination of President-Elect Bashir Gemayel on 
September 14.  Israeli forces also reoccupied West Beirut at this same moment.251  On 
September 29, 1982, President Reagan reported to Congress “consistent with the [WPR]” 
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that he ordered 1,200 U.S. Marines to deploy to Lebanon.252  The president did not 
anticipate the Marines would be engaged in combat, but stated they had the right of self-
defense and were equipped for combat.253  Again, President Reagan did not report under 
a specific section of the WPR.  Furthermore, President Reagan, in a statement no doubt to 
assert his authority exclusive of the WPR, stated: 
“this deployment of the United States Armed Forces is being undertaken pursuant to the president's 
constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief of the 
United States Armed Forces.”254 
 
 In November 1982, the 1,200 U.S. Marines’ deployment to Lebanon exceeded 60 
days.  However, because President Reagan did not report under Section 4(a)(1) of the 
WPR, he did not activate the automatic termination provision of Section 5(b).   Also 
during November, Lebanon asked the U.S., along with Italy and France, to double the 
size of their peacekeeping forces in the country.255   President Reagan stated he would 
consider the request.  In response to the president’s statement, members from both 
chambers of Congress requested the administration to seek congressional approval prior 
to any further expansion of the U.S. military presence in Lebanon.256      
 On April 18, 1983, a car bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut resulted in 
the deaths of 61 people.257  The embassy attack increased congressional fears over a 
military escalation in Lebanon.  Congress was at that moment in the process of drafting 
an emergency aid package to Lebanon.  The bill required the president to “obtain 
statutory authorization from the Congress” for any expansion of the U.S. presence in 
Lebanon and explicitly stated, “Nothing in this section is intended to modify, limit, or 
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suspend any of the standards and procedures prescribed by the [WPR] of 1973.”258  
President Reagan signed the bill into law with this language on June 27, 1983.259   
 The first Marines to be killed in Lebanon occurred on August 29, 1983.260  
President Reagan reported their deaths to Congress the following day and included the 
phrase, “consistent with Section 4 of the [WPR].”261  This was President Reagan’s third 
report to Congress with regards to the ongoing military presence in Lebanon and the third 
time he did not specifically cite the WPR 4(a) subsection under which he was reporting 
as required by the WPR.  As a result, the president’s reports had still not activated the 
60-day clock for the automatic termination of hostilities.  The following month, enemy 
rockets killed two more Marines on September 5.  President Reagan ordered retaliatory 
naval and air strikes against enemy positions and placed additional 2,000 Marines on 
standby offshore.262  The Reagan Administration continued to deny the escalating 
military operations fell under the hostilities or imminent hostilities definitions of 
Section 4(a)(1).263   
 While the Reagan Administration publicly stated the U.S. was not involved in 
hostilities in Lebanon, it was privately working on a compromise with Congress.  
President Reagan “reportedly” told members of Congress that a report under 
Section 4(a)(1) or a showdown with Congress would play into the hands of their enemy 
and encourage them to fight for the forced withdrawal of the Marines from Lebanon.264  
On October 12, 1983, the president signed into law a bill which satisfied the objectives of 
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both branches.265  Public Law 98-119 stated August 29, 1983 triggered Section 4(a)(1) of 
the WPR (i.e., the day the first Marines died in Lebanon).266  As a result, Congress 
authorized the U.S. to continue participating in the multilateral force in Lebanon for 
eighteen months in accordance with the WPR under Section 5(b)(1).267  The law allowed 
both the president and Congress (by joint resolution) to terminate operations early “if 
circumstances warrant.”268    
In signing the bill, President Reagan attempted to reassert that while he signed the 
bill into law acknowledging Section 4(a)(1) and Section 5(b) of the WPR applied to 
Lebanon, he questioned the constitutionality of the WPR itself: 
I believe it is, therefore, important for me to state, in signing this resolution, that I do not and cannot cede 
any of the authority vested in me under the Constitution as President and as Commander in Chief of United 
States Armed Forces. Nor should my signing be viewed as any acknowledgment that the President's 
constitutional authority can be impermissibly infringed by statute, that congressional authorization would 
be required if and when the period specified in section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution might be deemed 
to have been triggered and the period had expired, or that section 6 of the Multinational Force in Lebanon 
Resolution may be interpreted to revise the President's constitutional authority to deploy United States 
Armed Forces.269 
 
 Less than two weeks after the signing of the bill that authorized the U.S. military 
presence to continue in Lebanon for eighteen months, an incident occurred that again 
redefined the scope of the operation.  On October 23, 1983, a suicide car bomb attack on 
the U.S. Marine barracks in West Beirut killed 239 Marines.270  The attack diminished 
public and congressional support for the U.S. military presence in Lebanon.  The 
combination of growing public and political unhappiness with the upcoming presidential 
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election in 1984 put President Reagan in a difficult position.271  By February 1984, he 
had decided to withdraw U.S. forces from Lebanon.272  The U.S. military presence would 
be gone from Lebanon by the end of March.273   
 The application of the WPR in Lebanon showed many of the flaws in the law.  
President Reagan refused to report under specific subsection of Section 4(a) of the WPR 
as Congress had expected a president to do when it wrote the law.  Therefore, the 
automatic clock to terminate hostilities never started.  On the other hand, Congress 
allowed U.S. forces to remain in Lebanon for longer than 60 days in late 1982 without 
giving authorization to or taking action against the president.  Even President Reagan’s 
signing statement of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution denounced the 
validity of the WPR.  One could easily conclude the WPR was a failure from these facts.   
 However, many scholars and politicians believe Lebanon proved the WPR a 
success.  Political scientists David Auerswald and Peter Cowhey praised Congress in its 
“stage management” of the operation through the WPR – “they established a time frame 
for the deployment, constrained its scope, gathered information, delineated a reversion 
point should the president exceed his writ of authority, and initiated procedures by which 
Congress could rescind its delegated authority.”274  Congress’ passing of the 
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution is still the only time it has formally enacted 
the WPR and given the president a fixed period of deployment.275  Although President 
Reagan repeatedly denied the applicability of the WPR to Lebanon and denounced it in 
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his signing statement, his administration was very careful to regularly report to Congress 
and negotiate an extension of authorization with it.276  Congressman Zablocki called the 
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, “a delicate balance of congressional control 
and executive flexibility;” precisely the type of result he and his fellow WPR drafters 
hoped to achieve through the legislation.277 
 
C. Grenada – 1983 
U.S. military operations began in Grenada on October 25, 1983; only two days 
after the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon.  President Reagan decided to send a 
military force of 1,900 personnel to restore order and protect the lives of American 
citizens living in the small island nation.278  The Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States requested the United States to intervene in Grenada after an October 12, 1983 coup 
left the country under the control of an oppressive regime.279  President Reagan reported 
in advance to members of Congress the night before the invasion in loose accordance 
with Section 3 of the WPR.  Democratic Senator Charles Mathias stated of the meeting, 
“Congressional leaders were simply called to the Oval Office and told the troops were 
underway.  That is not consultation.”280  The following day as the invasion was 
underway, President Reagan formally reported the operation to Congress only stating he 
was reporting, “in accordance with my desire that the Congress be informed on this 
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matter, and consistent with the [WPR].”281  The president continued his practice of not 
citing a specific section of the WPR in his report to Congress.   
The House of Representatives was fast to respond to the U.S. military actions in 
Grenada and passed H. J. Res. 402 on November 1, 1983 by a lopsided vote of 403-23.282  
The bill declared “the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) of the [WPR] became operative on 
October 25, 1983, when United States Armed Forces were introduced into Grenada.”283  
The Senate attempted to pass the House’s bill, but was delayed when the debt ceiling bill 
to which it attached the House’s resolution was defeated.284  By this time, there was no 
need for the Senate to take up the House’s resolution.  U.S. forces secured Grenada on 
October 28, and would leave the island by December 15; still within the 60-day 
window.285  Furthermore, the success and speed of the operation made it popular with 
both the American public and Congress.286   
 Democratic Representative John Conyers and 10 other members of Congress took 
President Reagan to court claiming the invasion of Grenada was unconstitutional.  On 
January 20, 1984, a judge dismissed the suit citing “equitable discretion,” meaning the 
legislators had other remedies available to them such as the congressional override 
provisions of the WPR.287  The congressmen appealed the ruling, but the appellate court 
dismissed the appeal as moot because the conflict was over.288    
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 The Grenada invasion is an example of the difficulties of applying the WPR to 
brief military operations.  Congress essentially authorized presidents to unilaterally 
conduct military operations with durations of less than 60 days when it passed the WPR.  
Although the majority of the American public and Congress supported the operation, it 
demonstrates the potential risks of unauthorized military actions.  In this case, an 
American president was able to conquer a small island nation before the legislature could 
respond.  The U.S. military can accomplish a great deal in a short amount of time, and 
therefore an unchecked rogue executive could create great havoc if he wanted.  The 
following case is another short, successful invasion accompanied by regime change, but 
on a larger scale.   
 
D. Panama – 1989-1990   
On December 20, 1989, U.S. forces invaded Panama.  The invasion would 
involve 27,000 U.S. military personnel; the largest military operation since the WPR 
became law.289  President Bush’s objectives were to protect the 35,000 American citizens 
living in Panama, restore democracy, preserve the Panama Canal treaties, and apprehend 
General Manuel Noriega.290   The U.S.’ relationship with Noriega had been deteriorating 
during this period.  On November 21, 1989, Congress passed, and the president signed 
into law, P.L. 101-162, which stated the U.S. should pursue “measures directed at 
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removing Manuel Noriega from any position of power in Panama.”291  The congressional 
session ended the following day and would not reconvene until January 23, 1990.292   
 President Bush informed senior members of Congress hours before the invasion 
in loose compliance with Section 3 of the WPR.  Congressman Thomas Foley recalled of 
the meeting:  “The President made it clear… that he was informing me of this action not 
consulting with me or the other members of the Congressional leadership.”293  The day 
after the Panama invasion, President Bush formally informed Congress in accordance 
with Section 4 of the WPR to be “consistent with” the WPR and his actions were in 
accordance with “constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of foreign relations 
as Commander and Chief.”294   
 As Congress was not in session, there was little it could immediately do about the 
invasion.  However, as with Grenada, the invasion was extremely popular with the 
American public and the majority in Congress.295  When Congress reconvened in 1990, 
U.S. forces had arrested Noriega, the operation was nearly complete, and it was evident 
major military operations would conclude within 60 days.  As a result, it is unlikely 
Congress would have taken any action against the president or raised the invasion as a 
violation of the WPR.  In fact, the House passed a resolution which stated the president 
“acted decisively and appropriately” in Panama.296  As political scientist Eileen Burgin 
stated, “In the Panama operation … three elements-popularity, limited duration, and 
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strategically good timing-coincided and helped to inhibit legislators from actively 
rallying around the WPR.297   
 The Panama invasion, like the invasion of Grenada, brought a new element into 
the WPR debate – congressional support of short, successful operations undertaken by 
the president.  If the will of the people, and therefore the will of Congress, is behind a 
unilateral operation by a president, then it is not necessary to invoke the WPR as it is 
likely Congress would have authorized the action anyway.  However, there will always 
be risk that this power to unilaterally wage war could be dangerous in the wrong hands.  
Christopher Ford, former State Department official and present Chief Counsel for the 
Senate Committee on Appropriations, has appropriately stated that in brief operations, 
“the President always wins.”298  This is largely due to constitutional design of the 
branches where the executive branch was designed to respond quickly to issues versus 
the legislative branch, which was to be more deliberative.   
 
E. The Persian Gulf War – 1990-1991 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 precipitated a 
showdown with the western world.  As the Iraqi forces moved towards the Saudi Arabian 
border, the U.S. feared Saddam Hussein would attempt to invade that country as well, 
placing a large proportion of the world’s oil reserves under his control.299  President Bush 
immediately ordered a blocking force to Saudi Arabia, led by a quick reaction brigade of 
the 82nd Airborne Division.300  The president did not report to Congress until August 9, 
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1990, after troops began to deploy to Saudi Arabia, and longer than the 48 hour report 
deadline required by the WPR.301   
President Bush’s report to Congress stated his “desire that Congress be fully 
informed … consistent with the [WPR].”302  The House and Senate passed resolutions 
H. R. 5431 and S. Res. 318, respectively, which both approved of the president’s actions 
and encouraged the use of unilateral and multilateral actions, including embargos, to 
force Iraq to abandon Kuwait.  Neither resolution authorized the president to use force.303  
The president took no issue with the lack of authorization to use force as his position to 
Congress at the time was hostilities were not “imminent” and the deployment “will 
facilitate a peaceful resolution of the crisis.”304   
President Bush ordered a significant buildup of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia while 
Congress was on summer recess bringing the total number of troops in Saudi Arabia to 
230,000.305  Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney noted the significance of Congress being 
adjourned during the buildup when he stated, “As a former member, I have to say it was 
an advantage that Congress was out of town.”306  In late August, the United Nations 
(U.N.) Security Council authorized an embargo of Iraq.307   
In early November 1990, Iraq still occupied Kuwait and the U.S. and its allies 
continued to amass forces to oppose it.  On November 8, 1990, President Bush ordered an 
additional 150,000 troops to Saudi Arabia.  This was significant because Congress had 
just adjourned and President Bush had not disclosed the additional buildup to a 
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congressional consultation group on October 30, 1990.308  It is worth noting at this time 
President Bush’s repeated use of congressional recesses to deploy and commit U.S. 
forces to military operations, both in Panama, and now twice in the Persian Gulf.   
If Congress was caught off guard by the significant increase of U.S. forces to the 
Persian Gulf, it was even more surprised when it learned of President Bush’s decision for 
U.S. forces to take “an offensive posture” in theater.309  The Bush Administration only 
notified one member of Congress of this decision, Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, while at a restaurant for dinner.310  The notification 
announced to Senator Nunn that President Bush’s announcement to change the posture of 
U.S. and coalition partners in Saudi Arabia would take place within the hour.311   
On November 16, 1990, President Bush formally reported the buildup and change 
in posture to Congress stating only he was “updating the Congress with the news.”312   
Furthermore, President Bush reiterated hostilities were still not imminent – “My views on 
these matters have not changed.”313  While Congress supported the defense of Saudi 
Arabia, it wasn’t yet prepared to authorize offensive operations, particularly when the 
president repeatedly sidestepped his obligations under the WPR to coordinate with 
Congress.   
On November 29, 1990, the U.N. Security Council authorized Resolution 678 
which ordered Iraq to leave Kuwait by January 15, 1991.  If Iraq did not comply with the 
deadline, the resolution authorized “all member states” to “use all necessary means” to 
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remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait.314   President Bush would later state the U.N. 
resolution gave him “inherent power to commit our forces to battle.”315   However, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, no international treaties authorize the president to act 
without congressional authorization.  A showdown between the president and Congress 
began to loom.   
During December 1990, the Bush Administration continued to send mixed signals 
about operations in the Persian Gulf.  On one hand, the Justice Department continued to 
claim the president’s reports to Congress still indicated the “[peacekeeping] intent of U.S. 
troops.”316  On the other, the administration continued to take a war footing.  On 
December 3, 1990, Secretary of Defense Cheney stated to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee he did not “believe that the President required any additional authorization 
from the Congress before committing U.S. forces to the Gulf to achieve our 
objectives.”317  This was not a new position for the administration, as Secretary of State 
James Baker had already stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
October 17, 1990:  “The President has a right as a matter of practice and principle to 
initiate military action.”318  At this moment in December, President Bush was intent on 
holding Iraq to the January 15, 1991 deadline set by the U.N. Security Council.     
 While these events were happening in November and December, Democratic 
Congressman Ron Dellums, along with 53 representatives and one senator, took 
President Bush to court.  In the court case Dellums v. Bush, the members of Congress 
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requested an injunction to prevent the president from conducting offensive operations 
against Iraq without first obtaining authorization from Congress.319  The district court 
judge denied the injunction on December 13, 1990, because judicial action would require 
a majority in Congress to file the suit and the executive branch had yet to show a 
definitive course of action.320  However, in making this ruling, the judge determined a 
suit in which Congress believed the president infringed on its constitutional power to 
declare war was justiciable.321  Furthermore, the court ruled the size of forces engaged 
could help determine whether hostilities would exist as defined in the WPR: 
“Here the forces involved are of such magnitude and significance as to present no serious claim that a war 
would not ensue if they became engaged in combat, and it is therefore clear that congressional approval is 
required if Congress desires to become involved.”322   
 
This case created a precedent in future WPR incidents – courts could rule whether a 
president had exceeded his constitutional rights in going to war without congressional 
authorization.   
As a result of this decision, the Senate Judiciary Committee believed it had “legal 
justification” to bring impeachment proceedings against President Bush if he acted 
without congressional authorization.323  The Bush Administration also concluded there 
was significant legal risk to act without congressional authorization.  On January 8, 1991, 
President Bush requested approval from Congress to use force against Iraq.324  The date 
of the request is significant for several reasons.  First, the U.N. Security Council deadline 
was only one week away from the date the president asked for congressional 
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authorization.  Second, Congress had reconvened on January 4, but the president waited 
four days to request its consideration, giving Congress four less days to deliberate on the 
matter.  Finally, the president had the power under Article II, Section 3 of the 
Constitution to convene both chambers “on extraordinary occasions.”325  Therefore, he 
could have brought both chambers back early from their recess to give them more time to 
deliberate.  President Bush did not, and as political scientist James A. Nathan wrote, 
Congress was already “pre-committed” to the war.326       
 On January 12, 1990, three days before the U.N. Security Council deadline, both 
chambers of Congress voted in favor for war.  H. J. Res. 77, which President Bush would 
sign into law as Public Law 102-1, authorized the president to use force in order to 
implement the U.N. Security Council resolutions passed against Iraq.327  The proportion 
of those in favor of war to those against was the lowest in the history of Congress.328  
Congress ensured the authorization for force tied directly to the WPR.  Section 2(c) of the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution specifically referenced 
WPR Section 8(a)(1), in which a president cannot infer authorization from a treaty, and 
Section 5(b), in which Congress can end the automatic 60-day termination of hostilities 
through an authorization for war.  The section concludes with “nothing in this resolution 
supersedes any requirement of the [WPR].”329  While President Bush signed the 
authorization into law, he disagreed with the WPR references.  President Bush wrote in 
his signing statement: 
 As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for congressional support did not, and 
my signing of this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive 
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branch on either the President’s constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. 
interests or the constitutionality of the [WPR].330  
 
On January 16, 1991, the day after the U.N. Security Council resolution deadline expired, 
President Bush reported to Congress he had directed U.S. forces to commence combat 
operations “consistent with the [WPR].”331 
 The political showdown between the president and Congress prior to the start of 
the Persian Gulf War was a significant moment in the history of the WPR.  The conflict 
combined the largest assembly of forces deployed since the enactment of the WPR with 
an aggressive presidential administration and a hawkish interpretation of executive 
power.  The Dellums v. Bush determination on the justiciability of war powers cases 
strengthened the WPR in the post I.N.S. v. Chadha era, and likely contributed to 
President Bush’s request to Congress for authorization.   
While President Bush and his administration vehemently spoke out against the 
WPR, in the end, he complied with its provisions fairly well.  The president reported to 
Congress on multiple occasions when he expanded the size and scope of the operation.  
While one may question the quality and timeliness of the reports, he did notify Congress.  
And finally, the president requested and received congressional authorization for the use 
of force against Iraq.  Furthermore, while many around the world called for the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein, President Bush limited the war to the liberation of Kuwait, which 
was the extent of the use of force Congress authorized.332  As James A. Nathan wrote 
about the conflict, “had it not been for the [WPR], President Bush might have disregarded 
Congress altogether in the Gulf War.”333  
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F. Somalia – 1992-1994 
The U.S. military operations in Somalia were unique because they originated out 
of a humanitarian assistance mission and spanned two presidential administrations.  
Somalia entered into a civil war in 1991 after the collapse of dictator Siad Barre’s 
regime.334   To make matters worse, a severe drought hit the country at the same time.  As 
a result, approximately 300,000 Somalis would die over the next two years.335  On 
November 25, 1992, President Bush offered to deploy U.S. forces as part of a multi-
national U.N. peacekeeping force.  The U.N. Security Council accepted the offer and on 
December 3, 1992 passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 that requested member 
states use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”336  The following day, President Bush met 
with senior congressional leadership to discuss the operation, which could be considered 
loose compliance with the consulting requirement of Section 3 of the WPR.   
 On December 8, 1992, a U.S. force that would grow to 25,000 strong began to 
land in Somalia.337  Two days later, President Bush made his formal report to Congress as 
the WPR requires under Section 4.  The president cited his report was “consistent with 
the [WPR],” and cited the mission was to achieve the objectives of U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 794.338   He also reported he did not foresee hostilities, but U.S. forces were 
equipped to defend themselves.339  As with previous presidents and conflicts, the report 
did not cite WPR Section 4(a)(1) and therefore did not trigger the 60-day automatic 
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termination of hostilities clock.  President Bush’s deployment of U.S. forces to Somalia 
would be one of his last actions as president as President Bill Clinton would take office in 
January.   
 When President Clinton took office in January 1993, Congress still had not 
authorized the U.S. military presence in Somalia.  The Clinton Administration stated it 
would welcome congressional authorization, but did not believe it was needed to 
continue the operation.340  The Senate was the first chamber of Congress to take action on 
the Somalia operation by passing S. J. Res. 45 on February 4, 1993.  The resolution 
authorized the president under Section 5(b) of the WPR to implement the U.N. Security 
Council resolution.341   The resolution had significant constitutional and WPR 
implications because Congress was attempting to assert itself in “non-4(a)(1) 
deployments.”342  The House did not take up S. J.  Res. 45 until April in large part 
because the operation was already winding down; the U.S. military began withdrawing in 
February and passed over control to of the operation to the U.N. in late March.343  On 
May 25, 1993, the House passed an amended version of S. J. Res. 45 that included an 
amendment which triggered Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR and authorized the operation for 
twelve months.344   
Both chambers of Congress had now passed bills to authorize the president not to 
go to war, but to commit U.S. forces to a peacekeeping operation.  The passing of this 
authorization would greatly, perhaps unconstitutionally, expand the Congress’ role in 
military operations short of outright war.  It was questionable whether President Clinton 
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would sign the bill into law as it stood and Congress did not have enough votes to pass it 
without the president’s signature.  While the Senate version passed unanimously, the 
House version passed along party lines, short of the two-thirds needed to override a 
veto.345  In the end, S. J. Res. 45 and its constitutional implications would become moot.  
The U.S. presence in Somalia during May was down to 4,000 personnel.  The operation 
was becoming minor and Congress did not see the need to go to conference committee to 
draft a final bill.346  It would hardly matter, because the scope and scale of the mission 
was about to irrevocably change.   
On June 5, 1993, Somalia militants massacred 23 Pakistani soldiers who were part 
of the U.N. peacekeeping operation.347  The following day, the U.N. Security Council 
passed Resolution 837 which authorized the U.N. to “take all necessary measures against 
all those responsible for the armed attacks,” and called on member nations to “contribute 
military support ... to confront and deter armed attacks.”348  President Clinton authorized 
military strikes to retaliate and reported the actions “consistent with the [WPR]” on 
June 10, 1993.  The president also stated the strikes were made to eliminate obstacles to 
the U.N. operations in Somalia.349  While President Clinton did not report under 
Section 4(a)(1), U.S. forces were clearly now involved in hostilities in Somalia.   
 Instead of invoking the WPR, Congress used one of its strongest weapons, the 
power of the purse, to dictate policy in Somalia.  Both the House and Senate voted on 
amendments in September 1993 to the 1994 defense authorization bill (for the 1994 fiscal 
                                                          
345 Ford, Christopher A., “War Powers as we live them,” pages 38-39. 
346 Ford, Christopher A., “War Powers as we live them,” page 40. 
347 Grimmett, Richard F., “The War Powers Resolution:  After Thirty-Eight Years,” page 27. 
348 United Nations Security Council Resolution 837 (1993), June 6, 1993, accessed on August 17, 2013, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/837(1993).     




year beginning October 1, 1993).  The amendments required the president to consult with 
Congress about the future of the operation in Somalia by October 15, 1993 and seek 
congressional authorization by November 15, 1993.350  Congress knew it had leverage 
over President Clinton because U.S. forces were clearly involved in hostilities and it 
could invoke the WPR at any time.   
 The Clinton Administration tried to counter the WPR argument by stating U.S. 
forces were not involved in sustained hostilities.  Additionally, the administration 
claimed Congress had already authorized military action in Somalia because both had 
passed versions of S. J. Res. 45 earlier in the year.351  This was a weak argument because 
the two chambers did not pass the same bill and did not meet in conference to reconcile 
the bills.  On October 3, 1993, the situation in Somalia took another turn for the worse 
when 23 Americans were killed and nearly 100 wounded in a failed raid against a Somali 
warlord.352   
 Four days after the failed raid, President Clinton fulfilled his obligations as part of 
the 1994 defense authorization bill and consulted with Congress.353  On this same day, he 
announced he would withdraw most U.S. forces by March 31, 1994.354  However, at this 
same time, he was increasing the firepower and number of troops in Somalia in 
preparation for a showdown with the Somali warlords.355  In order to avoid a further 
escalation in Somalia, Congress incorporated language into the 1994 defense 
authorization bill to force the withdrawal of not most, but all U.S. forces by March 31, 
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1994.356  President Clinton signed the bill into law in November, 1993.  A combination of 
public and political pressure had made the Somalia operation as unattractive to the 
Clinton Administration as it was to Congress.  The U.S. was out of Somalia, but would 
briefly return to in March 1995 to support the evacuation of the final U.N. personnel in 
the country.357   
 The differences in opinion over the extent of presidential and congressional war 
powers arose again during the operation in Somalia.  The fact that both Presidents Bush 
and Clinton maintained communication with Congress throughout the operation showed 
the executive branch felt the WPR had some relevance.  Although it is questionable 
whether Congress would have been able to expand its influence into the authorization of 
non-combat military operations, it was able to reassert that the power of the purse was 
still one of its strongest policy weapons.   While the WPR did not play as large a role in 
Somalia as it had in other conflicts, many credit Congress with forcing the president to 
abandon an escalating conflict with limited upside for the nation.358  As constitutional law 
professor Peter M. Shane wrote, “A less vigilant Congress--the Congress of the 1960s, 
for example--could easily have allowed [Somalia] to become a version of Vietnam.”359 
 
G. Haiti – 1993-1994 
On September 30, 1991, Haitian General Raoul Cedras led a successful military 
coup over Haiti’s first democratically-elected president Jean Bertrand Aristide.360  By 
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July 1993, Cedras and Aristide had reached an agreement for Aristide to return to power 
on October 30 of that year.361  As a result of the agreement to restore Aristide to power, 
the U.N. Security Council decided to lift all embargos against Haiti in August.362  
Because of the elevated violence in Haiti, which the U.N. believed was “politically 
motivated” to prevent a stable transition, the Security Council decided in September to 
authorize a U.N. support mission to assist in the transition of power.363   
The U.S. was to provide the majority of the personnel for the U.N. mission.  
When a second transport for this mission attempted to land on October 11, 1993, a group 
of hostile protestors met it at the docks, forcing the ship to depart.364  Two days later, in 
response to the hostile reception of U.N. personnel and assassinations of Aristide 
officials, the Security Council voted to re-implement the embargos against Haiti and 
called on member states “to use such measures … as may be necessary” to enforce the 
embargos.365  On October 20, 1993, President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent 
with the [WPR]” the U.S. Navy was enforcing the U.N. embargo against Haiti.366   
The embargo would continue through the summer of 1994.  In April 1994, 
President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent with the [WPR]” that the U.S. Navy 
had boarded 712 vessels bound for Haiti since the beginning of the embargo.367  In 
June 1994, the U.N. Security Council voted to implement stronger sanctions in order to 
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pressure the leaders in Haiti to “end the political crisis.”368  As a result, President Clinton 
tightened the U.S.-led embargo on Haiti and stated he would not rule out the use of force 
to end the crisis in Haiti.369  As the standoff continued and conditions in Haiti continued 
to worsen due to the effects of the embargo, the U.N. Security Council authorized on 
July 31 member states to “use all necessary means” to remove the military leadership and 
reinstate President Aristide.370   
During this time, Congress sent mixed signals regarding its positions on Haiti.  
On November 11, 1993, President Clinton signed the 1994 Defense Appropriations Act, 
P.L. 103-139, into law.  In this law, §8147 dealt with military appropriations for 
operations in Haiti.  The section stated the president could not use appropriations for 
operations in Haiti unless Congress preauthorized the operation, was part of a temporary 
deployment to protect U.S. citizens within Haiti, or was necessary to protect U.S. citizens 
and national security and the president did not have time to seek authorization in 
advance, but did so as soon as possible afterwards.  However, the section also stated the 
president could also intervene in Haiti if he transmitted a report to Congress detailing 
specific criteria about the operation.371  This last clause could allow the president to 
circumvent congressional authorization by merely filing a report.   
 There were other examples of mixed signals.  In May, the House voted in favor of 
an amendment to the 1994 Defense Appropriations Act only to remove the amendment in 
June.  The amendment would have required the president to certify in advance of 
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operations in Haiti that they were necessary because the situation had become a clear and 
present danger to U.S. citizens and interests.372   The Senate rejected measures twice 
between June and August which would have made congressional authorization 
mandatory prior to operations in Haiti.373  The Senate passed a measure in August as an 
amendment to the appropriations bill for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and 
Housing and Urban Development, that the U.N. authorization to use all necessary means 
did not constitute congressional authorization.374  However, the conference committee 
defeated the measure.375  As a result, Congress did not issue specific legislation requiring 
the president to get preapproval for military operations in Haiti.  It had even given the 
president a way to circumvent authorization altogether.  If the president decided to 
intervene in Haiti using the report option of §8147 of P.L. 103-139, how would this 
impact the WPR? 
 In August, President Clinton took a strong position for executive action in Haiti 
stating, “I would welcome the support of the Congress… Like my predecessors of both 
parties, I have not agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get it."376  At this time, 
public opinion was not behind President Clinton intervening in Haiti; approximately 
70 percent of the public was against a military intervention in Haiti and 78 percent 
believed the president should get authorization from Congress before intervening.377  On 
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September 15, 1994, President Clinton addressed the nation that he had sent two carrier 
groups to Haiti and was warning the Haitian military rulers to leave Haiti or the 
U.S. military would remove them and restore President Aristide to power.378  The U.S. 
expeditionary force included 20,000 troops from the 10th Mountain Division and 
82nd Airborne Division.379  The following day, the president sent former President 
Jimmy Carter, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and Senator 
Sam Nunn to negotiate an exit with the military rulers.380   
 On September 18, 1994, President Clinton announced his negotiation team had 
reached an agreement with the Haitian military rulers that they would depart the country 
by October 15.  On September 19, U.S. forces entered Haiti.  The president reported the 
operation in accordance with §8147 of P.L. 103-139, not the WPR.381  Shortly thereafter, 
both chambers passed resolutions commending the negotiating team, supporting the 
restoration of the rule of law in Haiti, and supporting the withdrawal of U.S. forces “as 
soon as possible.”382   
Congress eventually gave the president a slight reprimand stating “the President 
should have sought and welcomed Congressional approval before deploying United 
States Armed Forces to Haiti.”  The bill also included reporting requirements for the 
president to regularly provide to Congress while U.S. forces were deployed in Haiti.  The 
bill ended with Congress further complicating its position on Haiti – “Nothing in this 
resolution should be construed or interpreted to constitute Congressional approval or 
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disapproval of the participation of United States Armed Forces in the United Nations 
Mission in Haiti.”383  The president signed this bill into law, including the congressional 
reprimand, on October 25, 1994 as P.L. 103-423.384 
 The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided Congress with 
a brief of its position that President Clinton had legal authority to unilaterally deploy U.S. 
forces in Haiti.  The brief stated three points, that – 1) the president satisfied the 
authorization requirements of §8147 of P.L. 103-139 when he submitted his report to 
Congress detailing the need for the operation; 2) the president was in compliance with the 
WPR because the law assumes presidents have the authority to unilaterally deploy U.S. 
forces or the 60-day period of Section 5(b) would not be necessary; and 3) “the nature, 
scope and duration of the deployment were not consistent with the conclusion that the 
event was a ‘war’” as the Constitution defines it in Article I, Section 8.385   
The U.S. intervention into Haiti in 1994 was a complex matter from a legal 
perspective.  While the Clinton Administration was able to find a last minute political 
solution to the standoff, it is very likely President Clinton would have invaded Haiti 
without the consent of Congress based on his previous statements on the matter.  
Therefore, it is worthwhile to analyze the crisis based on both what did happen and what 
could have happened if the U.S. invaded.  Because no widespread combat broke out 
when U.S. forces landed in Haiti, the OLC is likely right that the president had 
authorization for military operations in Haiti after complying with the reporting 
requirement of §8147 of P.L. 103-139.  Additionally, the authorization from P.L. 103-139 
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would likely trump the WPR because it was a law the current Congress passed that was 
specific to the conflict.    
Furthermore, President Clinton was likely in compliance with the WPR, but not 
for the reason stated by the OLC.  President Clinton had reported regularly to Congress 
about the military deployment.  Although he used the term “consistent with” for WPR 
compliance, it is likely that an operation of this type would qualify under Section 4(a)(2) 
(equipped for combat), which would not trigger the Section 5(b) 60-day clock.  Finally, 
because combat did not break out, the OLC’s position on the constitutional definition of 
war is also moot in how circumstances played out.   
If the U.S. invaded Haiti, which almost occurred, circumstances would have been 
different.  I believe the OLC’s opinion with regards to §8147 of P.L. 103-139 would still 
hold.  Columbia law professor Lori Damrosch cited Congress’ intention in the reporting 
requirement of §8147 was meant for limited peacekeeping missions only, and therefore 
should not apply to size and scale of the U.S. intervention.386  However, §8147 does not 
state peacekeeping operations, but speaks of “mission” and “military operations,” which 
also fits what actually transpired.387  Therefore, Congress would have difficulty disputing 
the OLC position, and its best counter would be to prove President Clinton’s report did 
not satisfy the reporting requirements of §8147.   
The strength of the OLC’s positions on the WPR and declare war clause are more 
complex if the U.S. had invaded Haiti.  The OLC claimed the WPR assumes presidents 
have the authority to unilaterally deploy U.S. forces, or it would not include the 
Section 5(b) automatic-withdrawal clause; one of the major criticisms of the WPR.  
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Furthermore, history has shown Congress typically defers to the president in short, 
successful wars.  The size of the U.S. expeditionary force in Haiti was similar to that in 
the 1990 invasion of Panama.  Therefore, if the U.S. had been able to quickly overwhelm 
the anti-Aristide forces, it is likely Congress would not pursue the matter as in Panama.  
However, if the fighting became prolonged, Congress would have had a case that the 
invasion violated both the WPR and constitutional positions of the OLC.  The Dellums v. 
Bush ruling stated the size of the forces involved could help determine whether war 
would ensue.388  Prolonged combat operations in Haiti with a 20,000-man American 
expeditionary force would likely meet that requirement.  As a result, Lori Damrosch 
wrote the OLC opinion with regards to the WPR and Constitution was flawed.389   
While much of the debate over the operations in Haiti focus on President Clinton, 
Congress behaved unusually.  Both chambers waffled on whether authorization would be 
a prerequisite to the insertion of U.S. forces into Haiti.  They also allowed for the 
reporting loophole of the 1994 Defense Appropriations Act, which President Clinton 
exploited.  Then, after praising the results of the operation, they reprimanded the 
president for not requesting authorization first.  In the end, I believe the risks never 
became high enough in Haiti for Congress to fully mobilize itself as a check on the 
president.  Haiti is yet another example of Congress’ deference to the president in small-
scale operations unless things go seriously wrong.   
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H. Operations in Yugoslavia – 1992-1999 
The U.S. military was heavily involved in operations across the warring states of 
former Yugoslavia throughout most of the 1990s.  During this time, President Clinton 
deployed U.S. forces citing his executive authority to do so, while showing little interest 
in the opinions of Congress on the matter.  At the same time, Congress was never able to 
pass a unified position on the U.S. role in Yugoslavia, sending repeated mixed signals, 
but all the while appropriating funds for the U.S. military to operate in combat 
operations.  The U.S.’ role in this conflict, and the accompanying congressional lawsuit, 
would result in one of the largest challenges to the authority and relevance of the WPR in 
its history.   
In August 1992, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 770 for 
humanitarian assistance in Sarajevo, which was embroiled in the Yugoslavian civil 
war.390  On August 5, the Senate passed a hawkish resolution for the president to pursue 
U.N. action, including using “all necessary means, including the use of military force” for 
humanitarian purposes in Yugoslavia.391  The Senate also resolved for Congress to 
“promptly consider any use of United States military forces.”392  The House passed a 
similar resolution on August 13 for the U.N. to pursue humanitarian relief, including 
through the use of military force.393  The Democratic-controlled House and Senate did 
not meet to reconcile their bills, and as a result, did not provide any formal authorization 
to the president.     
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The U.S. commitment to Yugoslavia continued to grow in early 1993.  On 
February 10, 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced the U.S. was 
working to reach a political resolution to the conflict in which U.S. forces would deploy 
to Yugoslavia to help maintain any peace agreement.394  The U.S. military began an 
airlift to Sarajevo on February 28 to provide relief supplies to the besieged city.395  As a 
result of repeated violations of Bosnian airspace by aircraft of the other warring states, 
the U.N. Security Council authorized its member states to take “all necessary measures” 
to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia.396  On April 13, 1993, President Clinton reported 
to Congress, “consistent with section 4 of the [WPR]” that U.S. aircraft were involved in 
NATO air operations to enforce the U.N. no-fly zone.397  Throughout 1993, U.S. forces 
would participate in “airlifts into Sarajevo, naval monitoring of sanctions, and aerial 
enforcement of a ‘no-fly zone.’”398   
On July 9, 1993, President Clinton reported “consistent with section 4 of the 
[WPR]” the deployment of a small contingent of troops to Macedonia as part of a U.N. 
force charged with preventing fighting in Yugoslavia from entering the country.399  
During this time, the U.N. member states continued to plan for a peacekeeping force once 
a peace agreement could be reached with the former Yugoslavia states.  The U.S. 
commitment to this force was projected to be as high as 25,000 troops, significantly 
increasing the U.S. military presence in the region.400   
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To ensure it had a role in any decision to deploy significant U.S. forces to 
Yugoslavia, Congress included in its 1994 Defense Appropriation Act that the president 
could not use funds from the act to deploy a peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia without 
congressional authorization.401  However, instead of making the requirement binding, 
Congress used the term “it is the sense of Congress,” thus making it a desire of Congress, 
but non-directive upon the president.402  It is unlikely President Clinton would have 
signed the bill into law with a directive requirement.  The section also included a clause 
that the qualification did not apply to operations beginning prior to October 29, 1993, 
effectively authorizing the U.S. operations in Yugoslavia to that point.403   
As the conflict continued into 1994, the U.S. and its allies began to conduct 
airstrikes to lift the siege of Sarajevo and help push for a settlement.  On February 11, 
1994, President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent with the [WPR]” that he had 
ordered 60 U.S. aircraft to be available for participation in NATO air operations.404  
President Clinton would go on to make five reports during 1994 in which U.S. forces 
conducted airstrikes throughout Yugoslavia.405  During 1994, the Senate took action 
passing S. 2042 which authorized the U.S. to conduct airstrikes “around [U.N.] 
designated safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to protect [U.N.] forces.”406  
However, the House never took up the measure, and as a result, it did not constitute 
congressional authorization of hostilities in Yugoslavia.407  As with the 1994 Defense 
Appropriations Act, Congress included language in the 1995 act which required the 
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president to obtain authorization for the deployment of U.S. forces as part of a 
peacekeeping force, but again with the “it is the sense of Congress” modifier, likely 
making it non-directive.408   
The president reported to Congress on multiple times in early and mid-1995 
“consistent with the [WPR]” that U.S. forces were still regularly involved in air strikes in 
Yugoslavia.409   As with the previous two defense appropriation acts, the 1996 act 
contained the same “it is the sense of Congress” disclaimer for congressional 
authorization before introducing U.S. forces as part of a peacekeeping operation into 
Yugoslavia.410  The act also authorized the appropriations for the ongoing operations 
through the end of 1995.   
In October of 1995, the warring parties declared a cease fire and planned for a 
final peace settlement.411  As a result, the likelihood was growing that President Clinton 
would order a major deployment of U.S. forces into the former Yugoslavian states.  
Clinton Administration officials stated to the Senate during hearings over the matter that 
they welcomed approval from Congress, but believed President Clinton had the 
constitutional right to deploy the troops without congressional authorization.412  As of 
January 1995, the Republican Party controlled both chambers of Congress, resulting in a 
divided government with the president.413  Nevertheless, the Republican-controlled 
Congress was unable to achieve consensus on a position towards the peacekeeping force 
deployment with the House voting strongly in favor of requiring advance congressional 
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authorization before deployment (243-171) and the Senate overwhelmingly against the 
House’s bill (22-77).414  As a result, Congress essentially stepped aside to allow President 
Clinton deploy forces to the former Yugoslavia and have appropriated funds to do it.   
On November 30, 1995, the OLC drafted a memorandum stating the position of 
the executive branch to deploy troops into Yugoslavia without specific congressional 
authorization.415  The OLC stated it is within a president’s power to deploy U.S. forces 
into situations where hostilities are not expected based on “historical practice.”416  It 
specifically cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dames & Moore v. Regan as an example 
of Congress acquiescing to the president in a matter of foreign affairs.417  The OLC 
believed the legality of a presidentially-ordered deployment to Bosnia should be viewed 
no differently than previous deployments since Congress had historically allowed 
presidents to deploy U.S. forces around the world without specific authorization.  The 
memorandum also stated the WPR gave the president authorization to deploy U.S. forces 
in non-combat situations for an unlimited period of time in accordance with 
Section 4(a)(2).418  Further, it stated the WPR did not require congressional authorization 
for this type of deployment.419   
President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent with the [WPR]” on 
December 6, 1995 that he had begun to deploy U.S. forces as part of the U.N. 
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peacekeeping force in the region.420   The bulk of U.S forces would deploy after the 
formal peace signing in Paris on December 14, 1995.421  Both chambers of Congress 
again debated authorization for deployment.  The House narrowly voted down a 
resolution, 210-218, to prohibit the use of any funds to support U.S. ground troops as part 
of the Bosnian peacekeeping force.422  Instead, the House settled on a non-binding 
resolution that it had “serious concerns and opposition” to the deployment of U.S. forces 
to Bosnia.423  The resolution also took the unusual step of putting the onus back on the 
president to furnish “the resources and support … to ensure the safety, support, and well-
being [of U.S. forces];” a constitutional responsibility, one could argue, of Congress.424   
The Senate also debated measures, voting down one bill that would have 
prohibited funding for ground forces without congressional authorization and a second 
opposing President Clinton’s decision to send a large peacekeeping force to the region.425  
The Senate passed a resolution authorizing the president to deploy U.S. forces to Bosnia 
for up to one year as part of the international peacekeeping mission, while reemphasizing 
“reservations” the Senate had about the president’s decision.426  However, the House and 
Senate did not meet in conference, and as a result, did not legally arrive at a position in 
favor or against President Clinton’s deployment.427   
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 President Clinton reported the full scale deployment to Bosnia “consistent with 
the [WPR]” on December 21, 1995, further stating the deployment was within his powers 
as “Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.”428  Just over two-years later, with U.S. 
forces still deployed to Bosnia, Congressman Tom Campbell introduced a bill directing 
the president to remove U.S. forces in accordance with Section 5(c) of the WPR by 
June 30, 1998.429  Although the House voted down the bill, it would not be 
Representative Campbell’s last attempt to use the WPR to remove U.S. forces from the 
former Yugoslavian states.430     
On March 26, 1999, President Clinton reported to Congress “consistent with the 
[WPR]” he had ordered two days previous for U.S. aircraft to commence airstrikes 
against Yugoslavian forces in Kosovo.431  The goal of the airstrikes was to end the 
Yugoslavian government’s campaign of oppression against Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian 
majority.  Yugoslavian atrocities in Kosovo ultimately led to the deaths of over 10,000 
ethnic Albanians and left 1.5 million displaced.432  The Republican Party still controlled 
both chambers of Congress in 1999, and Congress as a body continued to send mixed 
signals in the latest crisis in Yugoslavia.  Three days before President Clinton’s 
announcement of airstrikes, the Senate passed a non-binding resolution authorizing the 
president “to conduct military air operations and missile strikes … against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.”433  The House did not immediately vote on the Senate’s 
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resolution or provide an alternative.  As a result, Congress was again silent as the 
president’s air campaign opened.   
In April, the House deliberated and voted on four measures that reflected 
Congress’ various options for the conflict.  On April 28, the House voted against the 
Senate’s previous bill authorizing air operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavian 
forces in a dramatic 213-213 tie vote.434  The House also voted against two bills 
introduced by Representative Campbell, who had introduced a bill in 1998 to set a 
deadline for a U.S. withdrawal from Bosnia.  The first bill would have declared a state of 
war between the U.S. and Yugoslavia “pursuant to Section 5(b) of the WPR.”435  The 
second bill would force President Clinton to withdraw U.S. forces from Kosovo 
“pursuant to Section 5(c) of the WPR.”436  Representative Campbell stated his reason for 
introducing the two bills was to allow “Congress to choose whether it wished the country 
to be at war or not.”437  The House approved the fourth bill, which prohibited the 
president for using funds “for the deployment of ground elements … unless that 
deployment is specifically authorized by law.”438  As a result, the House made no 
decision on the president’s air war, and only passed a bill prohibiting the use of ground 
forces in Kosovo.   
Senator John McCain was furious with the House’s lack of decisiveness stating, 
“[the House] voted against the war and against withdrawing our forces.  Such a 
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contradictory position does little credit to Congress.”439  The Senate, for its part, voted to 
table a bill that would have authorized the president to “use all necessary force and other 
means” in Kosovo.440  To further murky the position of Congress, it authorized over 
$5 billion in emergency “overseas contingency operations,” which specifically cited the 
U.S. air operations in Kosovo.441  The Senate voted to table two amendments to the 
appropriations bill that would have prohibited funds for ground forces and required 
congressional authorization prior to funding for further operations, respectively.442  As a 
result, Congress appropriated funds for a war it did not formally authorize.   
As a result of the House voting down his two bills and an overall lack of 
consensus from Congress while the air campaign continued over Kosovo, Representative 
Campbell and thirty other members of Congress filed a lawsuit against President Clinton 
which stated he “violated the War Powers Clause of the Constitution and the [WPR].”443  
Their objective was for the president “to obtain either a declaration of war or specific 
statutory authorization from Congress in order to continue the war in Yugoslavia.”444  
The district court dismissed the case due to the congressmen lacking standing.445  To 
have standing, the judge stated the “plaintiffs must allege that their votes have been 
‘completely nullified’ … Such a showing requires them to demonstrate that there is a true 
‘constitutional impasse’ or ‘actual confrontation’ between the legislative and executive 
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branches.”446  Furthermore, the judge chided Congress for not having sent “a clear, 
consistent message” with regards to its position on the air campaign in Kosovo.447  
Because Congress as a body had not voted to stop the war, Representative Campbell and 
the other plaintiffs could not assert the president violated the Constitution – “Absent a 
clear impasse between the executive and legislative branches, resort to the judicial branch 
is inappropriate.”448 
The district court judge’s opinion framed war powers in a strict, separation of 
powers framework.  He did not even consider the applicability of the WPR in his ruling, 
which could set precedent for further bypassing of the WPR by the executive branch 
absent a congressional resolution against a war.  Representative Campbell stated the 
“narrow technical ruling would, in effect, destroy the [WPR].”449  A federal appellate 
court would uphold the district court’s ruling, and the Supreme Court refused to hear the 
appeal, letting the ruling stand.450  As a result, Section 5(b) may no longer be enforceable, 
and Congress now must rely on its powers to terminate hostilities through a concurrent 
resolution under Section 5(c), which also has enforceability issues.  Nevertheless, the 
ruling shows a willingness for the courts to hear a “constitutional impasse” lawsuit.   
The air campaign against Yugoslavian forces in and around Kosovo lasted for 
78 days; 18 longer than the 60-day limit in Section 5(b) of the WPR.451  Technically, 
President Clinton violated the law in exceeding the 60-day limit.  However, no action was 
taken against President Clinton beyond the Campbell lawsuit.  There are many reasons 
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for this.  First, Congress was divided about the course of action to take with regards to 
Kosovo.  As a result, it was unable as a body to pass a bill or resolution that would have 
legal ramifications.  Second, the dismissal of the Campbell v. Clinton case demonstrated 
the courts felt the president had not violated Congress’ constitutional rights.  As 
constitutional law scholar John Yoo stated, “a congressional decision to not exercise its 
constitutional prerogatives does not translate into an executive branch violation of the 
Constitution.”452  Finally, the Clinton Administration had its own legal position for 
justifying President Clinton’s unilateral decision to launch the air campaign in and around 
Kosovo.   
On December 19, 2000, the Justice Department’s OLC released a memorandum 
stating the executive branch’s position on the legality of the air campaign in Kosovo.  
The OLC opinion stated Congress’ appropriations for operations in and around Kosovo 
under P.L. 106-31 gave the president authorization to continue hostilities beyond the 
60-day time limit of Section 5(b) of the WPR.453   The memorandum further stated 
Section 8(a)(1) of the WPR, the section which states appropriations do not imply 
authorization, was not binding on future Congresses.454   
To reach this conclusion, the OLC cited case law, including Orlando v. Laird, in 
which the courts ruled Congress’ appropriations for the Vietnam War inferred its 
authorization for the war (see Chapter 1 for a brief discussion of this case), as well as the 
venerable Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief Justice Marshall stated acts “void” in 
theory that subvert the separation of powers of the Constitution “would be giving to the 
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legislature a practical and real omnipotence.”455  As a result, the OLC concluded, 
“Section 8(a)(1) establishes procedural requirements that, under the statute, Congress 
must follow to authorize hostilities; nonetheless, a subsequent Congress remains free to 
choose in a particular instance to enact legislation that clearly authorizes hostilities and, 
in so doing, it can decide not to follow the WPR's procedures.”456  In the OLC’s opinion, 
“the only clear message that Congress sent [for Kosovo],” was the appropriations for 
continued operations.457 
The actions of both President Clinton and Congress over the use of the U.S. 
military in Yugoslavia damaged the effectiveness of the WPR.  President Clinton clearly 
violated Section 5(b) by not ending U.S. airstrikes in Kosovo after 60 days, or requesting 
a 30-day extension as is possible under this section.  Ironically, as the air operations in 
and around Kosovo only lasted 78 days, had the president requested and received the 
extension, the entire operation would have been legal under the WPR and scholars would 
view Kosovo as a WPR victory.  However, President Clinton maintained a position of 
strong executive inherent authority.   
Congress for its part, was inconsistent throughout the operations in Yugoslavia, 
and one could argue did not fulfill its constitutional responsibilities in authorizing 
military intervention beyond continued appropriations.  Throughout the 1990s, either the 
Democrats or Republicans controlled both chambers of Congress at the same time, with 
the Democrats controlling both chambers through January 1995 and the Republicans 
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thereafter.458  Nevertheless, the two chambers could never reach a consensus on the 
extent of authorization to give President Clinton in using the military in Yugoslavia.   
However, was the WPR a complete failure in Yugoslavia?  President Clinton, to 
his credit, did report regularly to Congress regarding changes in operations in Yugoslavia 
as the WPR requires.  Peter M. Shane argued that without the WPR, President Clinton 
may have decided to deploy ground troops to Yugoslavia prior to the 1995 peace 
settlement – “the country experienced a better informed and more substantial intra-
government debate over military policy than the executive mustered in the Vietnam 
era.”459   
However, other scholars view Yugoslavia, particularly Kosovo, as the final failure 
of the WPR.  In U.S. Army lawyer Geoffrey S. Corn’s opinion, the WPR is a failure and 
even more significant, unconstitutional.  He argues no president has ever acted in 
opposition of “express congressional opposition,” and as a result, one cannot argue the 
rise of unilateral executive power.460  Furthermore, he states history has shown Congress 
does not always authorize wars expressly through a yes/no declaration, and presidents 
have relied on the various methods Congress has used to pursue military operations, such 
as through appropriations.461  This evidence has created a “historical gloss” on war 
powers which has created legal precedent.462  As a result, he concludes the WPR is 
unconstitutional in prohibiting future Congresses from giving authorization in methods of 
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their choosing and future presidents from relying on those various methods.463  This 
conclusion is similar to the one Chief Justice Marshall reached in Marbury vs. Madison.   
President Clinton violated the provisions of Section 5(b) of the WPR with no 
consequences.  When a group of congressmen led by Representative Tom Campbell tried 
to enforce the WPR through the courts, the courts overruled them citing lack of standing.  
The actions of President Clinton and the courts clearly damaged the credibility WPR.  
However, that does not mean they were wrong in their positions.  Instead, the military 
operations in Yugoslavia helped to further define the scope of the WPR.  The Campbell 
v. Clinton ruling placed the onus back on Congress to enforce both its own constitutional 
prerogatives and the WPR through giving its opinion through votes versus hiding behind 
the language of the WPR.  The actions of future presidents and Congresses will show 
what effect the operations in Yugoslavia ultimately have on the WPR.   
 
I. The War on Terror (Afghanistan and Iraq) – 2001-Present 
The military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are different than the 
aforementioned cases.  For both Afghanistan and Iraq, the president went to Congress in 
advance and obtained authorization to use military force before U.S. forces engaged in 
combat.  Both wars have created different degrees of controversy at home, particularly 
the war in Iraq.  However, from a WPR standpoint, they were both legal.   
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, 
D.C., President George W. Bush met with senior congressional leadership to discuss the 
U.S. response.  The two branches were in agreement for Congress to draft a joint 
resolution that authorized the president to retaliate militarily against those responsible for 
                                                          




the terrorist attacks.464  On September 14, 2001, only three days after the attack, both 
chambers of Congress passed what would become Public Law 107-40, the Authorization 
for Use of Military Force.  The authorization gave President Bush authorization to “use 
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”465  The law also cited 
authorization “within the meaning of Section 5(b) of the [WPR].”466 
The authorization was significant because it was the first time Congress had used 
the WPR to authorize hostilities against anything other than a nation.  The authorization 
was so broad that 14 years after its enactment, President Obama is still using it as 
authority to continue to launch strikes against Al Qaeda and its affiliates around the 
world.  I will discuss in Chapter 3 whether the president should still be able to use the 
2001 authorization so long after it was enacted, as well as after the deaths of Osama Bin 
Laden and much of the leadership that planned the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.   
President Bush signed the authorization into law on September 18, 2001 and 
added a qualification that had become common with presidents over the WPR:   
“In signing this resolution, I maintain the longstanding position of the executive branch regarding the 
President’s constitutional authority to use force, including the Armed Forces of the United States and 
regarding the constitutionality of the [WPR].”467   
 
President Bush adhered to the reporting requirements of the WPR both on September 24, 
2001, when he deployed U.S. forces to the Afghanistan theater, and October 9, 2001 to 
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report the commencement of the war in Afghanistan on October 7.  The president stated 
both reports were “consistent with the [WPR].”468 
President Bush began to lobby hard in the summer of 2002 for action against Iraq 
because of the threats his administration felt it posed to the U.S. and its allies.  The 
president met with senior congressional leadership on the matter and also addressed the 
U.N. during September 2002.469  On September 19, 2002, the president sent an ambitious 
draft authorization to Congress asking for authorization to use force against Iraq and 
throughout the region “to restore international peace and stability.”470  By October, both 
chambers of Congress had passed what would become Public Law 107-243, the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002.  The resolution 
authorized President Bush to “defend the national security of the United States against 
the continuing threat posed by Iraq” as well as enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions 
and continue to battle terrorist organizations responsible for the September 11, 2001 
attacks.471  As with Public Law 107-40, the Iraq authorization cites it is “authorization 
within the meaning of Section 5(b) of the [WPR].”472   
The authorization was not the carte blanche President Bush wanted, but gave him 
the authorization he needed to legally invade Iraq.  The president signed the authorization 
into law using similar language to what he used with Public Law 107-40 stating his 
signature did not change his position over a president’s ability to use force or the 
“constitutionality of the [WPR].”473 
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There were no constitutional showdowns over the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Congress used its constitutional war authority to authorize President Bush to use force to 
battle Al Qaeda both within and outside Afghanistan, and to invade Iraq.  Congress also 
ensured the authorizations were in compliance with the WPR by citing its authorizing 
sections in both bills.  While many aspects of both wars have received criticism, the 
president and Congress took the appropriate steps to make both actions legal under the 
Constitution before they began.   
 
J. Libya – 2011 
In February 2011, the regime of Libyan ruler Muammar Qaddafi began to 
disintegrate pitting the pro-Qaddafi forces concentrated in the west of the country against 
the rebel forces concentrated in the east.  By mid-March, pro-Qaddafi forces were 
overpowering the rebel forces and threating to massacre civilians in eastern Libya.  The 
League of Arab Nations requested the U.N. Security Council to implement a no-fly zone 
over Libya on March 12, 2011. 474  On March 17, 2011, the U.N. Security Council passed 
Resolution 1973 which authorized member states “to take all necessary measures … to 
protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form 
on any part of Libyan territory.”475  While the resolution forbid forces on the ground, it 
explicitly authorized a no-fly zone, arms embargo, and the freezing of Libyan assets.476  
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As congressional scholar Louis Fisher wrote, “‘all necessary measures’ are diplomatic 
code words for military force.”477   
 The United States, Great Britain, France, and Canada led a NATO force along 
with their Arab League allies to intervene in Libya.  On March 21, 2011, President 
Obama submitted a report to Congress “consistent with the [WPR]” that U.S. forces 
began to conduct military operations in Libya on March 19, 2011.478  President Obama 
stated the military operations “will be limited in their nature, duration, and scope,” and 
were “authorized under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973.”479  As I discussed in 
Chapter 1, Section 8 of the WPR states presidents cannot infer authorization from 
treaties.  The U.N. Charter specifically states Congress must approve military actions in 
support of the U.N. 
 Also on March 21, 2011, President Obama stated during a news conference “it is 
U.S. policy that Qaddafi must go.”480  U.N. Security Resolution 1973 did not make any 
mention of regime change in Libya; only to protect the lives of Libyan civilians.  
Furthermore, Congress had yet to provide any authorization for operations in Libya, and 
authorization in support of a humanitarian crisis would be very different from 
authorization to aid in the overthrow of a government by force.  Nevertheless, by April 4, 
2011, the U.S. had transferred operational control over to its NATO allies and was 
providing predominately intelligence and logistical support to the mission.  However, the 
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president did report U.S. forces were still carrying out some “precision strikes … in 
support of the NATO-led coalition’s efforts.”481   
 President Obama reported to Congress in May on the 60th day of the operation.  
While neither the president nor Congress had yet triggered the 60-day automatic 
termination of hostilities provision of the WPR, the president still felt it prudent maintain 
an open dialogue with Congress and not ignore the WPR.  In his 60-day report, President 
Obama stated U.S. support was still “crucial to assuring the success of the international 
efforts.”482  While the president felt congressional support in Libya “would demonstrate a 
unity of purpose among the political branches in this important national security matter,” 
he also asserted his presidential authority stating the military action was “pursuant to my 
constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and 
Chief Executive.”483    
 President Obama’s administration believed it did not need congressional 
authorization for the military operations in Libya.  On April 1, 2011, the Justice 
Department’s OLC provided a memorandum in which it concluded President Obama 
“had constitutional authority to direct the use of force against Libya.”484  The OLC 
opinion stated presidents may authorize the use of force to protect national interests.  
In the case of Libya, those national interests were “preserving regional stability and 
supporting the [U.N. Security Council’s] credibility and effectiveness.”485  The 
memorandum also stated the operation in Libya did not constitute “the level of a ‘war’ 
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in the constitutional sense” because of the operation’s limited objectives and duration.486  
As a result, the OLC concluded President Obama did not need a declaration of war or 
special authorization from Congress.487 
 President Obama reasserted the OLC position in his June 15, 2011 32-page report 
to Congress.  In this report, President Obama focused on the key WPR term “hostilities” 
and how it did not apply to the military operations in Libya.  The administration’s 
counter-argument term had become “limited.”  President Obama wrote to Congress, 
“the President had constitutional authority, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive 
and pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, to direct such limited military operations 
abroad.”488  The president then referenced the WPR and stated, “U.S. military operations 
[in Libya] are distinct from the kind of ‘hostilities’ contemplated by the Resolution’s 
60-day termination provision.”489  President Obama’s definition of “hostilities” became 
controversial.  The U.S. military was involved in a major air campaign over Libya, was 
paying its personnel “imminent danger pay,” and included drone strikes.490  As 
Democratic Senator Richard Durbin stated, “hostilities by remote control are still 
hostilities.”491   
So, how exactly did the Obama Administration define “hostilities” and why was it 
not applicable to Libya?  On June 28, 2011, Harold Koh, the State Department’s legal 
advisor, testified in front of Congress to discuss the applicability of the WPR to the 
operations in Libya.  Mr. Koh claimed the administration was “acting lawfully, with both 
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the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the [WPR].”492  He continued to state neither 
the courts, nor Congress, had ever defined “hostilities.”493   It was his opinion the 
congressional founders of the WPR intentionally left the term vague to “avoid making the 
resolution a one-size-fits-all straight jacket that would operate mechanically without 
regard to the facts.”494  According to Mr. Koh, the administration did not believe the 
operations in Libya constituted “hostilities” because of four factors:  a limited mission; 
limited exposure to U.S. personnel; limited risk of escalation; and limited use of military 
tactics.495 
 Congressional scholar Louis Fisher found the interpretation of “hostilities” by the 
Obama Administration and Mr. Koh troubling.  He believed the administration’s opinion 
that limited military actions did not fall under the WPR was false – “The [WPR] does not 
speak of ‘risk.’  It speaks of hostilities.”496  Furthermore, Mr. Fisher turned the tables on 
the administration’s position by asking, “If another nation sent missiles into New York 
City or Washington, DC, and did not suffer significant casualties, would we call it 
war?”497   
Mr. Fisher believed the Obama Administration violated the WPR in Libya.  First, 
he cited presidents cannot infer authorization to use force from international bodies as 
both the Constitution and WPR forbid this delegation of power outside of Congress.498  
Second, Section 4 of the WPR does not provide exemptions for “limited” hostilities 
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versus outright hostilities.499  Mr. Fisher concluded by giving an example of the slippery 
slope to which the Obama Administration’s definition of hostilities could lead – “a nation 
with superior military force could pulverize another country – including the use of 
nuclear weapons – and there would be neither hostilities nor war.”500  Mr. Fisher also 
cited the ease in which the president was able to escalate the operation – “Obama went 
beyond the Security Council resolution … such as attempting regime change and giving 
direct aid to the rebels.”501 
 The 112th Congress was in session during the military operations in Libya.  This 
was a divided Congress, with the Democratic Party controlling the Senate and the 
Republican Party the House of Representatives.  The operations in Libya were a partisan 
issue in Congress.  As such, the Senate was mostly supportive of President Obama’s use 
of the U.S. military in Libya while the House was strongly against it.  As with any 
congressional action, if the two chambers of Congress are divided against each other, it 
will be very difficult, if not impossible, to pass legislation.  The WPR requires Congress 
to pass joint or concurrent resolutions in order to implement the will of Congress under 
the WPR.  This is particularly true when presidents do not report under Section 4(a)(1) to 
trigger the automatic provisions of Section 5(b), which as I have discussed, has only 
happened one time in history (during the 1975 Mayaguez Incident).     
 On June 3, 2011, the House voted on two bills concerning the military operations 
in Libya.  H. Con. Res. 51 would have triggered Section 5(c) of the WPR and required 
the president to remove all U.S. forces from Libya within 15 days.502  The bill would 
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have required a continuing resolution, meaning the Senate would also have to vote in 
favor.  The House voted down this bill 148-265, demonstrating even the Republican-
controlled House was not ready to completely pull out of Libya.503   
The second bill was more successful.  In H. Res. 292 the House stated the 
president had “failed to provide Congress with a compelling rationale based upon United 
States national security interests for current United States military activities regarding 
Libya.”  It ordered the president to not deploy ground troops in Libya and provide a 
report to the House that among other things required explanation for “the President's 
justification for not seeking authorization by Congress for the use of military force in 
Libya,” and “United States political and military objectives regarding Libya.”504  The 
resolution passed the House by a vote of 268 to 145.505  However, because H. Res. 292 
was only a resolution of the House, it would not have the force of law.  Nevertheless, the 
president’s aforementioned 32-page report from June 15, 2011 was in response to this 
request.   
On June 28, 2011, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed S. J. Res. 20, 
which would authorize the president’s actions in Libya under the WPR.  The bill had 
bipartisan support in the committee and included as cosponsors Republican Senators John 
McCain and Lindsey Graham.506  The bill authorized the operations in Libya under 
Section 5(b) of the WPR.  It would also allow the limited operations to continue for up to 
one year, but would not allow the president to use any appropriations to introduce ground 
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forces in Libya.507  However, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reed decided against 
bringing the resolution to vote in the Senate due to building Republican opposition in the 
Senate.508  Senator Reed also likely realized the issue was moot as the House had voted 
against two similar resolutions on June 24.509  The first House resolution would have 
authorized the Libya operations and the second would have forbid president to use any 
Libyan military appropriations to introduce ground forces.510   
On October 27, 2011, the U.N. Security Council voted to terminate the military 
actions it authorized under Security Council Resolution 1973 effective October 31, 
2011.511  Congress never approved or terminated the U.S. military operations in Libya 
between March and October 2011.  As Congress could not reach a consensus on Libya, it 
fell into the “zone of twilight” which Justice Robert Jackson described in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.512  The military operations in Libya were similar to those in 
Panama during 1989 in the sense that Congress typically defers to the president either 
through its actions, or inaction (due to a lack of consensus in Congress during 2011) 
in short, ultimately successful operations undertaken by the president.   
However, Libya marked the second time in 12 years a president had disregarded 
the 60-day automatic termination of hostilities provision of Section 5(b) of the WPR (the 
first being President Clinton in Kosovo in 1999).  What did this mean for the future 
relevance of the WPR?  U.S. forces were involved in combat operations in the cases of 
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both Libya and Kosovo.  However, both conflicts were limited to air campaigns and did 
not involve large ground forces in combat.  In both conflicts, one chamber of Congress 
passed a resolution barring the deployment of ground forces.  While a one-chamber 
resolution is not binding upon a president, Presidents Clinton and Obama avoided 
showdowns with Congress by not escalating hostilities through the deployment of ground 
forces.    
Libya and Kosovo demonstrate that not only will Congress defer to presidents in 
short, successful operations, but it will also defer in operations limited to air campaigns.  
While the Libyan and Kosovar conflicts were controversial both in Congress and across 
the nation, their risks in terms of human lives, cost, and international relations were less 
than that of a conventional land and air war.  Therefore, neither conflict rose to the level 
that the American people and its elected representatives felt was necessary to intervene.  
It should also be noted that in June 2011, a small group of ten congressmen led by Dennis 
Kucinich and Ron Paul sued President Obama to end the war.  However, as with all other 
attempts of this kind, the courts found the plaintiffs to lack standing and still had 
legislative remedies available.513   
Louis Fisher believes the Obama Administration’s strategy to loosen the WPR 
definition of hostilities is “likely to broaden presidential power for future military 
actions.”514  However, this may be a moot point as Congress’ behavior since 1973 has 
been defer to the president unless the size of the conflict required congressional 
authorization (i.e., the 1991 Persian Gulf War or the War on Terror), or the U.S 
commitment on the ground was dangerous and had limited upside (i.e., Lebanon).  
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Therefore the actual definition of hostilities may not be as important as the size and scope 
of the hostilities.     
 
K. Syria – 2013 
On August 31, 2013, President Obama announced he would go to Congress for 
authorization to use military force against Syrian military forces loyal to President Bashar 
al Assad.515  The Syrian civil war began in 2011.  The U.S. and its allies believed 
President Assad’s forces were using chemical weapons against rebels and civilians, alike.  
However, only after the international community confirmed a major chemical weapons 
attack on August 21, 2013 did President Obama decide to make his call for action.516   
On September 6, 2013, President Obama submitted to Congress draft legislation 
for authorization to use force against pro-Assad forces.   The proposal stipulated it 
constituted authorization under Sections 5(b) and 8(a)(1) of the WPR.517  It would give 
the president authorization to use the military “as he determines to be necessary and 
appropriate” to prevent the “use or proliferation” of chemical weapons in and around 
Syria.518   Congressional scholar Louis Fisher criticized the proposal as “far too broad … 
Nothing in the bill limits the scope and duration of military activity.”519  Furthermore, 
Fisher noted President Obama’s previous promises leading up to the 2011 air campaign 
in Libya in which he quickly expanded the scope of the operations from protecting 
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civilians to regime change as an example of the risks for escalations of commitment in 
military operations.520   
 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee drafted its own authorization for the use 
of force in Syria on September 10, 2013.  It was much more limited than the draft from 
the Obama Administration.  The bill required the president to exhaust political options 
before resorting to force, limited the duration of the combat to the 60 and 90-day limits of 
the WPR, and did not permit the use of ground forces.521  The bill also included regular 
reporting requirements for the president to make to Congress.522 
 In the end, neither bill was necessary.  On September 10, 2013, the president 
asked Congress to postpone the vote.  While the president stated it was to pursue 
diplomatic options, some believed it was because he knew Congress would not vote in 
favor of the authorization.523  The president, however, was telling the truth.  A joint 
U.S.-Russian proposal was in the works to place the place the supervision and destruction 
of Syria’s chemical weapons in the hands of an international body.524  The proposal 
eventually became U.N. Security Council Resolution 2118, which the council adopted on 
September 27, 2013.525  The resolution called for Syria to transfer its chemical weapons 
under the control of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
and requested member states to provide assistance to the OPCW for inspection, removal, 
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and disposal of the weapons.526  The agreement has helped to defuse the international 
crisis to this point.  However, the Syrian civil war still continues.   
 What is most interesting about the Syrian conflict is President Obama’s approach 
to request authorization from Congress versus in Libya, where he unilaterally decided to 
join and support the NATO air campaign.  The difference in strategies is likely due to the 
differences in political risk and popularity of both wars.  In Libya, the major European 
powers in NATO, Britain and France, were taking active roles in the air campaign.  
In Syria, while France supported military strikes, British Parliament voted against Prime 
Minister Cameron’s call for military action.527  Military strikes were equally unpopular in 
America lacking support of both the public and Congress.528  Furthermore, the U.S. 
military anticipated the need of “thousands of special operations forces and other ground 
forces” to secure Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles.529  As a result, it was too risky 
politically for President Obama to unilaterally commence strikes against Syria.   
 President Obama and his administration believed the threat of force “was 
instrumental in convincing [President Assad] to commit to the disarmament plan,” similar 
to how President Clinton used the threat of force to achieve a diplomatic solution in Haiti 
twenty years earlier.530  Louis Fisher stated President Obama “appropriately sought … 
authority from Congress.”531  While President Obama disregarded the WPR in Libya, his 
deference to the WPR for Syria was likely genuine, due to the higher political stakes 
including the high probably of a ground war.  Nevertheless, as has been said for other 
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conflicts during the WPR era, a president from an earlier era may have disregarded 
Congress altogether.  Therefore, while President Obama’s actions in Libya may have 
weakened the WPR, his actions in Syria demonstrated the WPR still has some relevance; 
time will tell how much.   
 
Part II – Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of the WPR  
 The eleven case studies I discussed in the previous part of this chapter 
demonstrate the differences in interpretation of the WPR by both the executive and 
legislative branches.  While neither branch has followed a strict interpretation of the 
WPR, both have referenced it in their inter-branch communications.  Although criticism 
about the WPR continues, has it been effective in minimizing presidential war as the 
1973 Congress intended?  Furthermore, what is the best approach with which to measure 
the effectiveness of the WPR?   
Political scientists David Auerswald and Peter Cowhey in a 1997 study tested 
whether the WPR had changed presidential and congressional behavior.  Auerswald and 
Cowhey analyzed the behaviors of both branches and the durations of military operations 
before and after the WPR’s enactment.  Their universe was all U.S. military operations 
between 1899 and 1995 that Congress did not preauthorize and involved greater than 
500 personnel.  They then broke their universe into three periods: operations from the 
turn of the century up to 1925; operations after World War II through 1972 (i.e., the early 
Cold War); and post-WPR operations through 1995.532  The reason for the two periods 
prior to 1973 was to test the post-1973 period against a non-Cold War period “to see 
                                                          





whether Cold War consensus might explain congressional behavior.”533  To conduct their 
research, Auerswald and Cowhey used reports from the executive branch, Department of 
State, Senate, and the House of Representatives, as well as books by John E. Jessup, 
Louis Fisher, and the Institute for Defense Analyses.534  I agree with their methodology, 
and plan to analyze the results of their research, and then expand upon it to analyze the 
conflicts after 1995 to see if their conclusions still hold.   
The results of Auerswald and Cowhey’s research found the WPR did change the 
behaviors of both presidents and Congress.  They found for unauthorized military 
operations between 1900 and 1972 (i.e., before the WPR’s enactment), “none of the 
unauthorized conflicts … lasted less than two and one half months, and most lasted 
years.”535  From 1900 to 1925, they noted five military operations Congress did not 
authorize in advance.  The combat operations and subsequent occupations for these 
conflicts lasted between two and nineteen years.536  From 1926 to 1972, they noted eight 
operations Congress did not preauthorize.  Congress would eventually authorize four of 
these (Vietnam, Korea, Trieste, Italy, and the Taiwan Straits), and these operations would 
last a combined total of over 19 years.  For the remaining four operations, two lasted 
approximately 18 months and the other two approximately three months.537  Auerswald 
and Cowhey did not note a single case prior to 1973 where Congress challenged or 
overturned an unauthorized military operation.538  In each case, the operations lasted 
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longer than the 60 days the WPR would give the president for operations without 
congressional authorization.     
 Auerswald and Cowhey then analyzed the operations subsequent to the WPR 
enactment in 1973.  They noted a definitive difference in the behaviors of both branches 
and the duration of the operations.  Between 1973 and 1995, they noted 14 conflicts 
without prior congressional authorization that involved over 500 personnel.  Ten of these 
conflicts lasted less than 60 days.  Congress intervened in the remaining four, all of 
which lasted longer than 60 days.  Congress was able to pressure President Bush into 
requesting congressional authorization for the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and pressured 
Presidents Reagan and Clinton to withdraw U.S. forces from Lebanon and Somalia, 
respectively.  In the final operation, the 1987 Persian Gulf reflagging exercises, Congress 
allowed the operation to continue, but succeeded in requiring greater reporting from 
President Reagan (see Appendix 2 for the results of Auerswald and Cowhey’s study).539    
 It is clear from the work of Auerswald and Cowhey that the WPR succeeded in 
changing both the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in 
authorizing wars as well as the scope and duration of conflicts through 1995.  However, 
I also wanted to test Auerswald and Cowhey’s theories for U.S. conflicts that have arisen 
since the end of their study to see if their conclusions still held.  In Appendix 3, I have 
listed the major combat operations in which the U.S. has been involved since 1995.  The 
operations can be grouped as follows:  the Iraqi no-fly zone prior to the 2003 invasion; 
U.S. operations in the former Yugoslavian states including Bosnia and Kosovo; the 1998 
                                                          





cruise missile strike in Sudan and Afghanistan; the War on Terror (i.e., Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and other anti-terror operations after 2001); and the 2011 Libyan air campaign.   
 The biggest difference in Auerswald and Cowhey’s study of the post-1973 
military operations through 1995 and my analysis of the post-1995 operations was 
presidents twice violated the 60-day automatic termination provision of Section 5(b) of 
the WPR after 1995 without consequence (i.e., Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011).  
Aside from Kosovo and Libya, I found both the executive and legislative branches 
correctly utilized the WPR in conflicts after 1995.  The Iraqi no-fly zone was authorized 
under the same law which authorized the 1991 Persian Gulf War.  Congress authorized 
the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and the surrounding states through multiple 
appropriations bills.  Congress also authorized in advance the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, as well as the ongoing anti-terrorist operations against Al Qaeda.  Finally, there was 
only one combat operation under 60 days during this period, the 1998 air strikes in 
Afghanistan and Sudan in retaliation for the Al Qaeda embassy bombings in Africa.  
In this case, President Clinton did report the action to Congress “consistent with the 
[WPR].”540   
 The post-1995 military actions other than Kosovo and Libya were in accordance 
with the WPR, but did the Kosovo and Libya WPR Section 5(b) violations damage or 
destroy the effectiveness of the WPR?  In the case of Kosovo, as I discussed in the 
previous section, while President Clinton exceeded the 60-day automatic termination of 
hostilities provision, he did report regularly to Congress, and Congress appropriated 
funding for the military operations.  The Campbell v. Clinton ruling also placed the onus 
from the WPR back to Congress to require a president to end hostilities through a 
                                                          




majority vote.  As a result, the ruling likely weakened the authority of Section 5(b) for an 
automatic termination of hostilities, but did not eliminate Congress’ ability under 
Section 5(c) to force a president to terminate hostilities via a concurrent resolution and 
create a constitutional impasse.  Therefore, Campbell v. Clinton ruling redefined the 
WPR to take a more traditional approach to war powers (via a vote in Congress), but did 
not destroy it.  Since Congress did not have the votes terminate the air campaign in 
Kosovo, and had in fact appropriated funds for it, the president was within his power to 
continue it.   
 When the Libyan air campaign began 12 years later, Congress was likely not able 
to rely on Section 5(b) to terminate the air strikes (as a result of the Campbell ruling).  
Furthermore, as Congress was divided with the Democrats controlling the Senate and the 
Republicans controlling the House, it could not muster the votes to use a concurrent 
resolution to end the fighting.  There were also no efforts in Congress to use the power of 
the purse to terminate the air strikes.  Rather, the debates in both chambers revolved 
around the scope of the campaign.  As I previously noted, while a small group of 
congressmen tried to sue President Obama to end the war, the courts ruled the suit lacked 
standing.  President Obama, for his part, did report regularly to Congress in accordance 
with the WPR.  Therefore, I believe the Libyan air campaign was in accordance with the 
WPR under its revised requirements as a result of the 1999 Campbell ruling.  Since 
Congress was unable to vote down the president’s decision, the operation should fall 
within his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.   
 I believe Auerswald and Cowhey’s conclusions still hold through the post-1995 




Congress cited authorization under the WPR in its authorizations for military force in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, Public Laws 107-40 and 107-243, respectively.  Furthermore, 
Presidents Clinton and Obama did not escalate or expand combat operations beyond air 
strikes in Kosovo and Libya, respectively.  It is likely that the presidents feared potential 
constitutional showdowns as the House in both cases expressed its unwillingness to 
authorize ground operations through one-chamber resolutions.  I believe this is evidence 
that presidents in the post-WPR era recognize Congress as more of a partner in major war 
powers matters, which was not the case prior to 1973.   
Auerswald and Cowhey could not foresee the Campbell v. Clinton ruling, and 
how it would change the WPR.  However, it is hard to disagree with the ruling, as it 
returned the WPR to a traditional separation of powers approach.  One can argue that the 
Campbell ruling strengthened the WPR as it likely nullified the constitutionally-
questionable Section 5(b).  Therefore, while the WPR still is not followed as intended, it 
continues to influence the behaviors of both presidents and Congress. 
 
Part III – Has the War Powers Resolution been Effective?   
 In the early 1970s, the House of Representatives attached a background section to 
most of its proposed WPR legislation in which it explained the necessity for the 
legislation.  The section stated the House had found through its congressional hearings 
“the constitutional ‘balance of authority’ over war making had swung heavily to the 
President in modern times.”541  The House hoped by enacting war powers legislation both 
the president and Congress would be able to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities and 
“work together in mutual respect and maximum harmony toward their ultimate, shared 
                                                          




goal of maintaining the peace and security of the Nation.”542  The question now is did 
Congress succeed in its goal after passing the WPR as Public Law 93-148?   
 We now have over 40 years of history with which to evaluate the WPR.  Over this 
time, the WPR has evolved through historical precedent of use and court rulings.   The 
courts have had a major impact on the WPR, first in ruling war powers cases are 
justiciable (Dellums v. Bush), and by repeatedly stating modern war powers lawsuits 
were not “ripe” for the courts to hear if Congress had not exhausted all remedies 
available to it.  The Campbell v. Clinton ruling made this definitive by stating there must 
be a “true constitutional impasse” before coming to the courts.543  As a result, the onus is 
now on Congress to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities and vote on war powers 
matters instead of relying on Section 5(b) of the WPR.   
 The executive branch has refined its WPR position over the past 40 years.  While 
presidents have done a reasonably good job keeping Congress informed on WPR-related 
matters, their position has become to avoid citing Section 4(a)(1) deployments and thus 
evade the 60-day termination of hostilities clock under Section 5(b).  Presidents also 
claim authorization from international bodies such as the U.N. allowing its member states 
“to take all necessary measures” give them authority to bypass Congress.  Through the 
OLC, executive branch positions have claimed low-intensity conflicts, or conflicts that do 
not involve ground forces, do not meet the definition of hostilities in the WPR, thus 
stating the WPR did not apply.  They also cite appropriations as evidence of 
congressional authorization claiming the 1971 Orlando v. Laird ruling trumps the 
Section 8 anti-appropriation language in the WPR.  A final traditional executive branch 
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position has been it is unnecessary to obtain congressional authorization for non-combat 
deployments, citing congressional acquiescence in these deployments and the decision in 
the 1981 Dames & Moore v. Regan case.  
  Critics have long cited the Section 4(a)(1) loophole as a weakness of the WPR.  
This loophole may be moot now anyway due to the Campbell v. Clinton ruling.  
Nevertheless, it is a smart tactic legally and politically for the executive branch to 
continue to avoid citing a specific clause of Section 4(a)(1) to avoid future liability.  
I have previously discussed that the executive branch is incorrect in believing it can 
bypass congressional authorization on authority of international bodies.  While many 
presidents have taken this position, and will likely continue to do so, it is incorrect from a 
legal standpoint.  Congress has never stepped aside when presidents have used this 
position.  Even while Congress was unable to reach a consensus between the two 
chambers during the 2011 Libyan air campaign (in which President Obama cited 
authorization under the U.N. and NATO), it was able to put pressure on the president to 
avoid placing forces on the ground and provide greater presidential reporting.   
The executive branch is likely correct that the courts would uphold congressional 
appropriations as evidence of authorization.  The courts already ruled in favor of this in 
the Orlando v. Laird case.  Although this ruling was two years prior to the WPR anti-
appropriation language in Section 8, it is likely the courts would not only maintain this 
position, but continue on the path set by the Campbell v. Clinton ruling and disregard 
language in the WPR in favor of a congressional action, such as authorizing 




The executive branch is also correct that presidents can deploy U.S. forces in non-
combat operations without congressional authorization.  Congress has typically not 
intervened in non-combat deployments and the Supreme Court rulings in U.S. v. Midwest 
Oil Company and Dames & Moore v. Regan support the position of executive 
authorization through congressional acquiescence.  Additionally, the WPR does not place 
termination requirements on deployments in which U.S. forces are not subject to 
hostilities or imminent hostilities.  Therefore, it would be difficult legally for Congress to 
place any limitations on a president’s authority in this area.    
Congress, for its part, has been definitive in using the WPR when it has mattered 
most; deliberating authorization under the WPR for major wars such as the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  However, Congress has been very 
inconsistent in its application of the WPR with conflicts short of major war.  In these 
situations, the two chambers have had difficulty agreeing on a uniform position, even 
when both chambers were under control of the same party.   
Nevertheless, Congress has done a good job in preventing presidents from 
escalating conflicts with limited upside such as in Lebanon, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Libya, 
and Syria.  If this is to be the WPR’s legacy, it is an excellent legacy to have.  I have 
quoted the opinions of several scholars who believe pre-WPR Congresses may have 
stepped aside and allowed presidents to escalate conflicts such as these similar to what 
happened in Korea and Vietnam.  While the results of congressional applications of the 
WPR have been mixed, the WPR restored modern Congresses with a confidence that 
earlier Congresses had lost in asserting themselves against the executive branch.  As a 




WPR to the letter, both branches have established boundaries through their historical 
actions and the country has to date avoided presidentially-escalated wars on the scale of 
Korea and Vietnam.   
 David Auerswald and Peter Cowhey wrote of the WPR, “The Act as a piece of 
legislation has few defenders.”544  The WPR was born out of controversy after Congress 
had to override President Nixon’s veto of it.  Since then, every president, with the 
exception of President Obama, has considered the WPR an unconstitutional infringement 
on their authority.545  The WPR has its detractors in Congress as well.  After the 
showdown between Congress and President Clinton over operations in Somalia, both 
Senators Biden and Byrd called the WPR a failure.546   
 The criticisms against the WPR are long.  From a constitutional standpoint, 
detractors believe it is an abdication of war making authority to the president.547  From a 
legal standpoint, many criticize the actual text saying it weak and contradictory.548  Many 
believe the Supreme Court’s ruling in I.N.S. v. Chadha invalidated the WPR’s key 
termination of hostilities provision.549  This is still subject to debate as Section 5 has 
never been tested in court.  Additionally, the judicial rulings in Dellums v. Bush and 
Campbell v. Clinton may have weakened that claim as the courts will hear war powers 
cases when the branches have reached a constitutional impasse.  The House would not 
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have introduced a bill in 2011 to require President Obama to pull U.S. forces out of Libya 
under Section 5(c) of the WPR if there was a possibility it was invalid.   
 From an application standpoint, critics cite as a failure the loophole in Section 4 
where presidents have avoided citing Section 4(a)(1) which activates the automatic 
termination of hostilities provisions in Section 5.550  Critics also cite how presidents have 
begun to follow a “script” where they cite their reports are “consistent” with the WPR.551  
Furthermore, presidents avoid consulting with Congress as the WPR requires, but only 
inform it of pending and ongoing operations.  Others claim the WPR curtails a 
president’s ability to act in emergencies – “it would prevent the President from reacting 
immediately even to attacks on Canada or Mexico.”552   
Louis Fisher and David Adler believe Congress should return to the traditional 
checks and balances of government, including impeachment, to oversee war powers.  
In their words, “outright repeal would be less risky than continuing along the current 
path.”553  They may be correct.  However, the Campbell v. Clinton ruling likely redefined 
the WPR more along these lines.  What Fisher and Adler should be more concerned about 
is Congress’ inability to achieve consensus as a body against the executive branch in war 
matters.  I will discuss this issue in Chapter 3.   
 Many scholars believe it is too easy to dismiss the WPR outright, even in the face 
of so much criticism.  In their opinions, critics of the WPR are not evaluating the actual 
behaviors of presidents and Congress since the WPR became law in 1973.  Congress has 
not had to force presidents to withdraw troops in military operations because they have 
                                                          
550 Auerswald, David P. and Peter F. Cowhey.  “Ballotbox Diplomacy: The [WPR] and the Use of Force,” 
page 512. 
551 Nathan, James A., “Salvaging the War Powers Resolution,” page 245. 
552 Rushkoff, Bennett C., “A Defense of the War Powers Resolution,” page 1330. 




either been satisfied with the operations, particularly in short-term operations, or have 
worked with the presidents to achieve a dialogue and arrive at an acceptable course of 
action and authorization.  I agree with this position.   
David Auerswald and Peter Cowhey believe presidents realize domestic 
infighting weaken the U.S.’ credibility internationally, and therefore either tailor military 
operations to either be short in duration or work with Congress for authorization for 
larger, longer operations.554  Eileen Burgin noted Congress closely scrutinized every 
presidential troop deployment in the 1980s leading up to the Panama invasion.555  She 
noted while Congress was out of session at the time of the invasion, it did not invoke the 
WPR because it was satisfied with the result of the operation.556  As a result, one senior 
congressional aide stated the WPR “is not nothing.”557   
 Constitutional law professor Peter Shane noted a significant change in the 
behavior of Congress in the post-Vietnam era – “Congress used the WPR and its own 
claims to authority to force the executive to sharpen its articulation of American 
objectives, respond to contrary positions with regard to the executive branch's foreign 
policy analyses, and share substantial information with Congress.  In every case, the 
country experienced a better informed and more substantial intra-government debate over 
military policy than the executive mustered in the Vietnam era.”558   
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Ellen Collier found the WPR “remains in the Executive’s field of vision.”559  She 
noted presidents do cite the WPR in their reports to Congress, thus acknowledging its 
relevance.  In her opinion, were it not for congressional intervention in operations such as 
Lebanon and the Persian Gulf War, the scope and duration of those operations could have 
been much worse – “the [WPR] is a ‘moral firebreak’ that clearly gives an incentive to 
the Executive to pause before taking recourse to arms.”560   
What about the textual flaws of the WPR, particularly the Section 4(a)(1) 
loophole?  Christopher Ford believes it is not clear either side wants strict compliance 
with the WPR.561  He believes the ambiguity of the WPR helps establish boundaries for 
the executive and legislative branches while “leaving conceptual space in which the 
statute's commands neither obviously apply nor fail to do so.”562  As a result, both 
branches can avoid constitutional showdowns while using the ambiguity (or flexibility) 
of the WPR to chart a politically-desirable course of action through the complexities of 
each foreign policy crisis.563  The WPR will always be a controversial piece of 
legislation.  While the WPR may not be a perfect piece of legislation, it has created a 
better dialogue between the two branches in charting a course for the nation in times of 
war.   
The founders of the WPR hoped it would help the U.S. avoid another Vietnam.  
Unfortunately, the U.S. did endure another type of Vietnam-style war after the WPR’s 
enactment in 1973, this time in Iraq from 2003 to 2011.  However, in the case of Iraq, 
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Congress authorized military action in advance of hostilities in accordance with the 
WPR.  Therefore, the war in Iraq was not the result of an unauthorized presidential 
military expedition run amok, but one in which Congress did deliberate.  One can 
conclude the WPR worked in the case of the war in Iraq, although questions will always 
remain over the justifications for the invasion.   
No piece of war powers legislation will be perfect due to the vagueness of the 
Constitution.  However, the WPR has undeniably rebalanced the war powers relationship 
between the executive and legislative branches.  It gives presidents the flexibility to act in 
short-term operations in which Congress would prefer to avoid.564  It also ensures 
Congress has a seat at the table for large conflicts, in which the Constitution requires 
congressional action.  As Christopher Ford concludes, “can we really say that [the WPR] 
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The War Powers Resolution – An Analysis of its Future Effectiveness 
Introduction 
The 1973 Congress wrote the WPR with traditional, conventional wars in mind, 
such as Vietnam.  They could not foresee the partisan nature of today’s politics and how 
it could weaken the legislative branch’s ability to mobilize to counter a future president’s 
actions.  They did not address counter-terrorism and other covert operations that are short 
in duration, but can have significant political consequences.  And most significantly, the 
drafters could not foresee how modern technology would change warfare.  The U.S. is 
now able to wage war at a distance through drones, long-range missiles, and cyber whose 
inflicted damage is very real but does not pose any immediate risk to U.S. personnel.   
In my final chapter, I look at what the future holds for the WPR.  There have been 
multiple attempts to amend or repeal the WPR since 1973.  However, none of these 
attempts were successful.  I will first review the traditional criticisms of the WPR and 
major attempts at reform or repeal.  I will then discuss why no president or Congress has 
been successful in any reform attempt.  I then analyze the applicability of the WPR 
towards modern weapons and warfare.  I end this chapter by analyzing the president and 
Congress’ modern interpretations of the WPR.   
In conclusion, I believe it is very unlikely that any war powers reforms will take 
place due to the political stakes involved for both branches.  As a result, both future 
presidents and Congresses will need to continue to work within the WPR’s frameworks, 
including determining how best to authorize covert operations and ones involving the use 




assert themselves in matters of war, it is up to Congress to also assert its constitutional 
prerogatives, something it has struggled to do since passing the WPR in 1973. 
 
Part I – Efforts to Amend or Repeal the WPR 
 It is little surprise that a law as controversial as the WPR has been the target of 
many calling for amendments or its repeal.  Critics of the WPR fall into two groups: 
those that favor more authority for the executive branch and those that favor more for 
Congress.  Within these groups, calls for WPR reforms can vary from minor changes to 
outright repeal.  Many calls for change have focused on amending the WPR to correct the 
constitutional and other criticisms of the WPR sections which I explained in Chapter 1.  
A second source of calls for change aim to expand the reach of the WPR over non-
conventional warfare to better equip it for challenges in the 21st century.  However, the 
presidents and Congresses of the post-WPR area have not passed any reforms into law.  
In this section, I will discuss the key areas in which critics have attempted to revise the 
WPR and highlight several significant proposals to overhaul the WPR.  I will also explain 
both why no measures have become law and prospects for reform in the future.   
 
A. Key Proposed Changes to the WPR 
As I discussed in Chapter 1, critics have noted deficiencies in nearly every section 
of the WPR.  Members of Congress and constitutional scholars have pressed for changes 





 The WPR should expand the types of military operations that the president may 
unilaterally pursue (Section 2); 
 The presidential consulting requirements to Congress should be strengthened 
(Section 3); 
 Congress should refine the WPR’s definition of hostilities, and its scope should 
expand to include the following operations:  covert; strike; and operations that 
involve advanced weaponry (e.g., drones, cyber, etc.) (Section 4); 
 The WPR should be self-executing or include a second trigger (Section 5);  
 Congress should clarify the circumstances under which it can use the legislative 
veto (Section 5); 
 The WPR should include an appropriations cutoff (Section 8); and 
 The WPR should include criminal penalties and court procedures for members of 
Congress to bring the executive branch into court.   
I will discuss each of these proposals in more detail below.   
 
1. Expansion of the Scope of Presidential Unilateral Uses of Force 
As I have previously discussed, Section 2(c) of the WPR states the president may 
introduce the U.S. military into hostilities pursuant to “(1) a declaration of war, 
(2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon 
the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”566  Many believe this 
language unconstitutionally limits the scope of a president’s ability to unilaterally wage 
war as Commander in Chief.  Some proposals to amend the WPR, such as the 1995 Use 
                                                          




of Force Act and War Powers Consultation Act of 2009 (I will discuss both later in this 
section), aim to expand the circumstances in which presidents may use force to include 
rescuing citizens abroad, participating in operations sanctioned by the U.N. and NATO, 
and preemptively strike to prevent attacks on U.S. interests.567    
As I discussed in Chapter 1, Section 2(c) is controversial, but is likely non-
operative and therefore does not limit presidents.  Furthermore, both the Founding 
Fathers and the courts have sided with the executive branch that presidents may use force 
to rescue citizens abroad, so while this is not in the text of the WPR, presidents can likely 
order rescue operations with little fear of retribution.  Presidentially-ordered preemptive 
strikes, on the other hand, are a slippery slope, with the potential to act as a loophole for 
presidents to initiate offensive war.  It is unlikely Congress would be in support of 
broadening the president’s authority in this area.   
 
2. Improved Presidential Consulting Requirements 
As I discussed in the Chapter 2 case studies, presidents have created an 
established practice of providing Congress with last-minute notification of the 
commencement of hostilities without consultation in lieu of the Section 3 requirements.  
As I noted in Chapter 1, Section 3 has critics from both camps as it may 
unconstitutionally delegate war making powers from Congress to the president, while 
also infringing on a president’s authority as Commander in Chief.  Further criticisms of 
this section are it is vague as to when the president must consult with Congress and does 
not state how many members of Congress require consultation; loopholes presidents have 
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regularly exploited.568  The 1973 Congress which passed the WPR expected consultation 
to be much more than being informed.569  As a result, the pro-Congress WPR camp has 
tried to strengthen the consulting requirements.   
Most revisions for Section 3 center around tightening the instances in which 
reporting is required and forming a permanent congressional consultative group, which 
would include congressional leadership and various other senior members of Congress 
such as in Representative Lee Hamilton’s Consultation Act of 1993.570   Proponents of a 
consultative group believe it will improve communication between the executive and 
legislative branch as it will clarify with who the president must consult and how often.  
However, there are many of criticisms of taking consultation out of the hands of the 
entire Congress and putting it in the hands of the few.  Louis Fisher infers it is 
unconstitutional to place matters of war outside of the entire Congress citing the equality 
of all members of Congress in votes – “the decision to go to war is for all of Congress, 
not for a subset of the legislative body.”571  Michael Glennon further warned against the 
use of a congressional group citing the dangers of groupthink and the previously reached 
conclusions and biases of small groups; something the full legislative body would 
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3. Revision of the Definition and Scope of Hostilities 
The Section 4(a) loophole and the executive branch’s efforts to question the 
definition of hostilities are two of the biggest weaknesses of the WPR.  Major proposals 
have been made to revise Section 4.  The proposals include defining hostilities to 
eliminate that loophole and to expand the definition to include the following types of 
operations:  covert, strike, and those that involve advanced weaponry (e.g., drones, cyber, 
etc.).  The present interpretation of the WPR is it only applies to U.S. military personnel 
in combat.  The post-WPR rise of counter terrorism and other covert operations, as well 
as the use of advanced weaponry (which do not require U.S. personnel to be in harm’s 
way), have created situations which most believe do not fall under the WPR’s purview.573  
Because covert operations and advanced weaponry warfare have become a significant 
(and controversial) component of U.S. national security, I will discuss them in separate 
sections later in this chapter.  In this section, I will focus in this section on defining 
hostilities and strike operations.   
As I discussed in Chapter 2, State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh picked 
apart the WPR’s lack of a definition of hostilities during a 2011 congressional hearing on 
war powers and Libya.  In Koh’s words, “the operative term, ‘hostilities,’ is an 
ambiguous standard, which is nowhere defined in the statue,” and the administration’s 
interpretation, “is correct, and confirmed by historical practice.”574  One recommendation 
to revise the definition of hostilities was “to embody more clearly either liberal or realist 
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assumptions, but not both.”575  This scholar recommended defining hostilities as 
“deliberate combat, either by or directed against [U.S.] forces,” or through “a particular 
magnitude of [U.S.] casualties.576  However, measuring hostilities by casualties is risky as 
sporadic casualties can occur during a large military buildup such as in Lebanon.  
Michael Glennon noted this risk when he stated, “a gradual escalation of hostilities can 
generate serious confusion about when the time limit is triggered.”577  Another option 
came from the National War Powers Commission, which I will discuss in more detail 
below.  The commission recommended defining hostilities as “combat operations lasting, 
or expected to last, more than one week.”578  However, this definition would continue to 
leave the door open for exclusion of limited, sporadic operations such as those Harold 
Koh stated would not be applicable to the WPR.579   
There is also debate about whether the WPR should be amended to include strike 
operations, such as strikes similar to President Clinton’s 1998 cruise missile strike against 
Al Qaeda or President Obama’s 2011 raid to kill Osama Bin Laden.  While the 
aforementioned operations were legal, the former being a retaliatory strike and the latter a 
congressionally-authorized strike under the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force 
(AUMF), they are examples of potential strikes that many believe presidents should first 
clear with Congress.  The reason is that as strikes will typically involve violating the 
sovereignty of foreign nations, a unilateral presidential strike could have serious foreign 
policy implications for the nation.  However, as one scholar states, “the WPR has 
effectively delegated discretion to the executive,” due to the 60-day window Section 5(b) 
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gives to presidents.580  Instead, this scholar recommends Congress make a commitment 
keep presidents in check with post-mortem hearings “to merit public confidence in the 
decisions ultimately reached.”581  There are problems with this recommendation as well 
since Congress will be less likely to hold congressional inquiries against a president of 
the same party.  I will discuss the weakness of Congress as a check against the president 
in Part III of this chapter.   
 
4. Make the WPR Self-Executing or Include a Second Trigger 
One of President Nixon’s primary criticisms when he vetoed the WPR, as well as 
a criticism of many of its opponents in Congress, was the WPR did not require Congress 
to act to trigger the 60-day clock.582  Furthermore, as I stated in Chapter 1, perhaps the 
biggest weakness of the WPR was Congress assumed presidents would willingly report 
actual or imminent hostilities under Section 4(a)(1).  As a result, some have called for the 
WPR to be self-executing, or include a second trigger for Congress.  While a self-
executing WPR would be stronger than the current version, one which Congress actually 
triggers would “[make] U.S. diplomacy more credible,” give Congress “a meaningful role 
in the formulation of policy,” and “make enforcement easier in the courts.”583   
The WPR actually already has a second trigger for Congress:  Section 5(c), which 
requires the president to withdraw U.S. forces if Congress passes a concurrent resolution.  
While the constitutionality of this section is uncertain due to the I.N.S. v. Chadha ruling, 
a concurrent resolution by Congress would create the “true constitutional impasse” 
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required by the courts in the Campbell v. Clinton ruling to make the case justiciable.584  
To prevent presidents and courts calling a congressional concurrent resolution an 
unconstitutional legislative veto, one scholar recommends requiring a congressional vote 
at the outset of any military operation.585  Until the courts hear a case that meets this 
criteria, it is unlikely we will have any resolution to the constitutionality of this trigger in 
the WPR.    
 
5. Appropriations 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the 1971 appellate court ruling in Orlando v. Laird 
found congressional appropriations for the Vietnam War constituted authorization to the 
executive branch to continue the war.  The WPR tried to counter this through 
Section 8(a)(1), which states authorization cannot be inferred from appropriations that did 
not specifically authorize combat operations.586  This section has never been challenged 
in court, however it is likely it would not hold up against the Orlando v. Laird ruling, 
particularly in circumstances such as in Yugoslavia where Congress was authorizing 
appropriations for overseas contingency operations while not formally authorizing 
hostilities.   
Some critics have proposed adding a termination of funding provision to the WPR 
if the president did not comply with the WPR’s provisions.  However, this is 
controversial as it legally may be unconstitutional to obligate a future Congress in this 
manner, and Congress may want to avoid public opinion crises where it is found to pull 
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funding on U.S. forces engaged abroad.587  Another proposal is to prohibit the use of 
backdoor financing through other sources, which Section 8(a)(1) should prevent against, 
but what all presidents do, particularly in short operations.588  It appears any potential 
option Congress takes in this area would raise legal controversy.  Further, I believe it is 
inappropriate for Congress to focus on appropriations as it can avoid all legal and 
constitutional showdowns if it would only pass a resolution in favor or against hostilities, 
something Congress has done only once (Lebanon in 1983).   
 
6. Increased Involvement of the Courts in War Powers Matters 
As discussed, the Campbell v. Clinton ruling has in essence made it mandatory 
for Congress to vote as a body against a president’s actions before the case will be 
justiciable.  Nevertheless, there have been calls, such as by political scientist Nathan 
James, to amend the WPR to include criminal penalties and court procedures for hearing 
war powers cases.589  However, even this scholar states, “clearly, the right to be in court 
when it comes to war powers issues would be helped if there were meaningful numbers 
that turned up or signed a petition.” 590  This again leads Congress to the need to vote as a 
body.  Michael Glennon has stated Congress cannot legally force the courts to ignore 
political questions in determining justiciable cases.  He has recommended a “nonbinding, 
sense-of-the-Congress statement,” which again would require Congress to vote as a 
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body.591  At this point, it seems beyond question Congress must pass a resolution before 
it can bring the executive branch into court in war powers cases.   
 
B. Significant Attempts to Amend or Repeal the WPR 
The previous section discussed key areas of the WPR that critics have tried to 
change.  In this section, I discuss some of the more prominent attempts to amend or 
repeal the WPR.  Most attempts were never been brought to a vote in both chambers and 
Congress has never sent a bill to the president for signature.   
 
1. Byrd-Warner – WPR Amendments of 1988 – S. J. Res. 323, 100th Congress 
The first significant WPR amendment bill to which most WPR scholars refer is 
the bill Senators Byrd and Warner co-sponsored in 1988.  The bill would have repealed 
the executive action-constraining Section 2(c), the WPR time limits in Section 5(b), and 
the legislative veto in Section 5(c).592  The bill is best known for the recommendation to 
create a permanent consultative group (PCG), which would include the senior 
congressional leadership, as well as the committee chairmen and ranking minority 
members of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs (Relations), Armed Services, and 
Intelligence Committees.593  The bill also included procedures for judicial review and 
prohibition on the use of appropriated funds.594  Criticisms of the bill include eliminating 
the 60 to 90-day clock, retaining vague language for when the president must consult 
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with the PCG, and not requiring consultation for covert and hostage rescue operations.595  
Despite reintroducing the bill in 1989, Congress never acted on it.  Ironically, President 
Clinton signed a presidential directive in 1994 to support legislation that would amend 
the WPR with the Byrd-Warner provisions.596   
 
2. Dole – Peace Powers Act – S. 5, 104th Congress – 1995  
In 1995, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole introduced his own WPR bill named 
the Peace Powers Act of 1995.  It would place Congress in more of an advisory/oversight 
role.  The bill began by repealing the WPR in its entirety.  In its place, it reinstated word 
for word the WPR’s Section 3 reporting requirement and the circumstances under which 
reports would be necessary from Section 4(a).597  However, in Senator Dole’s bill, all 
three parts of Section 4(a) would require a report.  The bill also required the president to 
obtain approval from Congress for all U.N.-sanctioned military and peacekeeping 
operations, both for deployment of U.S. forces and expenditure of funds.598  Auerswald 
and Cowhey believed placing restrictions on the president’s ability to use funds for 
U.N.-sanctioned operations could “hurt presidential credibility in future conflicts.”599  
This bill was the only one of the three 1995 WPR proposals I discuss in this section to 
have had a congressional hearing, which was likely due to the 104th Congress’ inability 
to determine a course of action on the WPR.600    
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3. Hyde – Repeal of the WPR – Amendment to H.R. 1561, 104th Congress – 
1995  
 
On June 7, 1995, Representative Henry Hyde proposed an amendment to the 
American Overseas Interest Act of 1995 (H.R. 1561) which would have repealed the 
WPR.  In its place the amendment proposed a bill similar to Senator Dole’s.  The 
amendment used the original WPR text from Sections 3 and 4(a).  However, 
Representative Hyde’s bill did not include Senator Dole’s special provisions for U.N. 
operations and funding.601  The amendment kicked off a very interesting two-hour debate 
in the House about the effectiveness and necessity of the WPR.  From the comments of 
some of the congressmen, Representative Hyde’s amendment to repeal the WPR was 
unexpected.   
The debate swung between comments that the bill was ineffective, to Congress 
should rely on the power of the purse to curtail presidential war, to the bill has changed 
presidential behavior.602  The climax of the debate was when Speaker of the House Newt 
Gingrich made his push to repeal the WPR.  Speaker Gingrich’s comments are 
remarkable and worth repeating in full due to both the partisan hostility between 
Congress and President Clinton at this time and because he as Speaker was calling on 
Congress to concede power to the executive branch –  
“I think the American nation needs to understand that as Speaker of the House and as the chief spokesman 
in the House for the Republican party, I want to strengthen the current Democratic President because he is 
the President of the United States.  And the President of the United States on a bipartisan basis deserves to 
be strengthened in foreign affairs and strengthened in national security.  He does not deserve to be 
undermined and cluttered and weakened.”603  
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Immediately after Speaker Gingrich’s speech, the House voted against repealing 
the WPR by a very slim margin – 201-217.604  Louis Fisher believed the vote to repeal 
failed for two reasons: 1) It is possible a full repeal of the WPR would have attracted 
more votes as the pro-Congress and pro-president camps would have united to eliminate 
what they all felt was a bad law, versus only a partial repeal which still required 
consultation; and 2) Gingrich’s call to strengthen the powers of President Clinton may 
have actually “repelled” Republican congressman as 44 members did not support the 
Speaker’s proposal.605 
 
4. Biden – Use of Force Act – S. 564, 104th Congress – 1995  
The Use of Force Act, on which Senator Joe Biden was the lead sponsor, 
originated in the late 1980s when Senator Biden chaired a special war powers 
subcommittee.  Out of this experience came a 1988 Georgetown Law Review article 
titled “The War Powers at a Constitutional Impasse: A ‘Joint Decision’ Solution,” which 
later evolved into the 1995 Use of Force Act. 606  The bill would have broadened the 
president’s inherent authority to use force in many areas including to rescue American 
citizens, respond to foreign military threats which Congress will not have time to 
deliberate, and “forestall imminent acts of international terrorism.”607  It also would 
establish a congressional leadership group similar to the composition of the Byrd-Warner 
PCG and regular reporting requirements.608  The bill retained the 60-day clock, but 
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allowed presidents to bypass it without authorization if they reported to Congress that an 
emergency existed which would threaten the nation.609  It also included a legislative veto, 
procedures for judicial review, and prohibition on the use of appropriated funds which it 
also tied to the 60-day clock.610   
As with all proposals, critics had much to say about the Use of Force Act.  Louis 
Fisher warned that expanding the president’s inherent authority to use force as the bill 
proposed would have made nearly every military action of the 1980s and 1990s, as well 
as the Korean War, exempt from congressional oversight.  He additionally did not 
support removing the majority in Congress from presidential reporting and 
consultation.611  Another critic commented that presidents could use the emergency 
exemption to the 60-day clock as a loophole to avoid WPR regulation.612  Although 
Senator Biden reintroduced the bill in 1998, Congress never put the bill to a vote.613   
 
5. Baker-Christopher – National War Powers Commission – 2009 
During 2007 and 2008, former Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren 
Christopher co-chaired the Miller Center’s National War Powers Commission, whose 
goal was:  
“not to resolve constitutional conundrums that war powers questions present — only definitive judicial 
action or a constitutional amendment could do that.  Instead, we chose to serve on the Commission to see if 
we could identify a practical solution to help future Executive and Legislative Branch leaders deal with the 
issue.”614  
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The commission’s report is unique because it represented an attempt of two former 
secretaries of state from different parties and a panel of government and academic experts 
to create an effective replacement to the WPR, the War Powers Consultation Act of 2009.   
The act would only require congressional authorization for “significant armed 
conflict” lasting over one week.  Its definition of significant armed conflict explicitly did 
not include operations traditionally agreed to be within a president’s authority:  
congressionally-authorized operations, repelling attacks, and rescuing U.S. citizens.  
However, the act went even further by explicitly excluding operations to “prevent 
imminent attacks” against the U.S., “limited acts of reprisal against terrorists or states that 
sponsor terrorism,” and covert operations.615  Once a president reported to Congress that 
he had initiated significant armed conflict, the act would require Congress to vote on a 
resolution approving the action within 30 days.  If Congress voted down the operation, 
the act would require Congress to then pass a “joint resolution of disapproval,” which 
would be subject to presidential signature.  The act also laid out procedures and instances 
for presidential consultation with Congress.  It would create a “Joint Congressional 
Consultation Committee,” similar to the makeup of other proposed congressional 
consultation groups.616   
While the commission hoped its bill would create “practical ways to proceed in 
the future,” it appears to have strongly favored strengthening the president’s war 
powers.617  The act would still give presidents a carte blanch to initiate hostilities – one 
week in this case.  This is enough time to initiate a large military operation, such as 
Panama or Grenada, which may become politically unattractive for Congress to question 
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once begun.  The act’s explicit exclusion of operations to “prevent imminent attacks,” 
conduct “limited acts of reprisal against terrorists or states that sponsor terrorism,” and 
conduct “covert operations” would create terminology ripe for exploitation by executive 
branch lawyers.618  Future presidents would be able to cloak major offensive operations 
within these types of operations.   
The most unusual part of the act was its requirement for Congress to vote down a 
military operation twice.  If the president did not sign the joint resolution of disapproval, 
and Congress was unable to override the veto, the Commission recommended Congress 
rely on the power of the purse.619  This is a risky proposition, because Congress is 
oftentimes is unwilling or politically unable to use the power of the purse on an ongoing 
military operation.  At this point, the president would be clear of any further 
congressional interference.  Additionally, the act made what at first glance appeared to be 
a directive requirement to the president to provide Congress with a classified report 
“before ordering or approving any significant armed conflict.”620  However, the following 
section stated “if the need for secrecy or other emergent circumstances” prevented the 
president from reporting prior to hostilities, the president could submit a report within 
three days of significant armed conflict.621  If the report to the joint congressional 
consultation committee was already classified, it is difficult to determine what 
circumstances would require further “need for secrecy” on the part of the president that 
would prohibit him from reporting prior to hostilities.     
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Louis Fisher harshly criticized the act for the double negative it placed on 
Congress to halt presidential wars.  He stated Congress can deny presidential requests not 
only through negative votes, but also through inaction – “If the president submits a 
proposal to use military force in some other country and Congress ignores it … Congress 
has decided … As a separate branch, Congress has every right to decide which 
presidential proposals to vote on.”622  He also disagreed with the act’s requirement that a 
president only need to consult with Congress prior to hostilities – “the Constitution is not 
designed to ensure that Congress will be ‘consulted’ before the president initiates war.”623   
The War Powers Consultation Act of 2009 is notable for its purpose and 
commission members.  However, it may have raised more constitutional questions than 
the current WPR as it would remove Congress from nearly all military decisions short of 
major war.  The act would give presidents loopholes in which to cloak operations from 
congressional authorization.  It also would provide them with a loophole with which to 
not notify Congress until after the commencement of hostilities.  One of Louis Fisher’s 
concluding comments on the act is a fair representation of how many who look to curtail 
presidential war powers would view it – “the commission’s draft bill weakens Congress, 
plays to executive strengths, and undercuts the rule of law.  It does great damage to the 
core structural safeguard of separation of powers and checks and balances.”624  The 
proposal would not fade away completely into obscurity as it would appear on Capitol 
Hill five years later. 
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6. Kaine-McCain – War Powers Consultation Act of 2014 – 113th Congress   
On January 16, 2014, Senators Tim Kaine and John McCain called for the repeal 
of the WPR and cosponsored the War Powers Consultation Act of 2014.  Both Senators 
cited the bill’s origin as the aforementioned War Powers Consultation Act of 2009.625  
Senator Kaine stated as one of his reasons for introducing the bill that “forty years of a 
failed War Powers Resolution in today's dangerous world suggests that it is time now to 
get back in and to do some careful deliberation to update and normalize the appropriate 
level of consultation between a President and the legislature.”626  The bill had the same 
key features of the War Powers Consultation Act of 2009:  1. The one-week trigger for 
significant armed conflict; 2. The same exclusions from significant armed conflict; 3. The 
Joint Congressional Consultation Committee; and 4. The double negative vote in 
Congress to override a presidential military operation.627  Senator McCain stated he 
“[viewed] our introduction of this legislation today as the start of an important 
congressional and national debate.”628  However, the bill never went to a vote in either 
chamber and now likely will fade away into obscurity along with the other proposals to 
repeal or amend the WPR.   
 
C. Conclusions on WPR Reform 
The lack of success in any WPR reform over the past 40-plus years shows the 
complexity of the war powers issue.  The two key issues of WPR reform have centered 
on the scope of the president’s unilateral war powers and reporting/consultation 
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requirements with Congress.  Some critics fear an expansion of a president’s unilateral 
war powers would have made many of the smaller conflicts in recent decades exempt 
from congressional oversight.  The counter to this argument is presidents initiated these 
conflicts with minimal communication to and no consultation with Congress anyway.  
Therefore, if neither the presidents nor Congress will adhere to the requirements of the 
WPR, should this law remain on the books?  However, as I stated in Chapter 2, there is 
evidence both branches have established boundaries and behaviors within the framework 
of the WPR, that while may not be overtly apparent, have given both branches flexibility 
in which to respond to crises, and most importantly, and helped avoid another 
presidentially-escalated war on the scale of Korea or Vietnam.   
A major problem in WPR reform or repeal is neither branch wants to appear to 
concede war power authority.  Presidents will veto any war powers legislation that they 
feel will weaken their inherent constitutional authority.  On the other hand, a full repeal 
of the WPR would most certainly be seen as a congressional concession.  Ironically, 
while there are numerous papers and studies making recommendations for reform, there 
is surprisingly next to nothing written about how to actually pass such an important and 
politically-divisive piece of legislation.  The present WPR was born out of a unique 
moment in time – the Vietnam and Watergate eras.  Only in a moment like this could 
Congress mobilize to build a veto-proof majority necessary to pass a law of this 
magnitude.   
The only scholar that I found to point out this dilemma is Michael Glennon.  He 




current political environment.”629  It is likely he would drop the “probably” from that 
statement if asked today.  Barring another unique moment in time like we had in 1973, 
the WPR is likely to remain the law of the land for decades to come.  As such, every 
president and Congress will need to continue to work within its guidelines, however 
blurry they become. 
 
Part II – The WPR and Modern Warfare (e.g., Covert Operations, Cyber, Drones) 
 A major criticism of the WPR has been it does not apply to covert operations and 
other methods of modern warfare.  As a result, many reform proposals have called to 
amend the WPR for these issues.  The 1973 Congress decided to exclude covert 
operations from the WPR out of a desire to not require public disclosure of these 
operations and because Congress was still in the infant stages of evaluating legislative 
reform for covert operations.630  Critics regularly state the 1973 Congress developed the 
WPR envisioning large, conventional wars like in Vietnam, and could not foresee how 
technology and combat would evolve in the future.631  The major problem of trying to 
apply the WPR to future wars is the Section 4(a) trigger, which states the deployment of 
U.S. forces into hostilities or situations expecting imminent hostilities triggers the 60-day 
clock.  Many believe the WPR’s definition of U.S. forces specifically means members of 
the U.S. military, and therefore a drone or missile strike, cyber-attack, or operation by 
                                                          
629 Glennon, Michael J., Constitutional Diplomacy, page 113.   
630 Damrosch, Lori F., “Covert Operations,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 83, No. 4 
(1989), page 797, and Spong, Jr., William B., “The [WPR] Revisited: Historic Accomplishment or 
Surrender?” page 831.   
631 As an example, see Crook, John R., “The [WPR] – A Dim and Fading Legacy,” Case Western Reserve 




personnel outside the Department of Defense would not trigger the WPR.632  In this 
section, I will discuss how modern warfare fits into the war powers debate.    
 
A. Covert Operations and War Powers 
As I have discussed, many critics cite the exclusion of covert operations from the 
WPR as a significant deficiency.  It is easy to infer from this criticism that if the WPR 
does not apply to covert operations, Congress must not have any checks against the 
president from conducting unrestrained covert operations.  This is not true.  Congress has 
different laws and a different level of oversight over covert operations and the 
intelligence community than it does over the military.  In this section, I will discuss the 
growth of U.S. covert operations and the evolution of the laws by which both the 
president and Congress must abide.   
The United States Code classifies the laws of the military and intelligence 
community under Titles 10 and 50, respectively.  With the growth of special operations 
forces in both the military and intelligence communities over the past 35 years, lawyers 
have begun to refer to these operations as either “Title 10” or “Title 50” based on their 
organizational jurisdiction.633  The military’s Special Operations Command (SOC), 
emerged out of the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980.  The fiasco made the 
military realize it needed to develop its own intelligence capability and joint command 
structure for covert operations.634  At this same time, the CIA began to expand its 
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capabilities to use lethal force, particularly in counterterrorism operations.635  As a result, 
both the military and intelligence community were developing their own in-house 
capabilities of their opposite, resulting in what is now called convergence.636   
Convergence continued to grow in the post-9/11 era as President George W. Bush 
tasked both the military and CIA to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda 
affiliates.637   As a result, the CIA became a full “combatant command,” particularly 
through the use of drones.638  While at the same time, the U.S. SOC became the military’s 
apparatus through which to conduct covert operations outside of conventional battle 
areas.639  Convergence is causing problems legally because the lines are blurring between 
“Title 10” and “Title 50” authority.  While both the WPR and intelligence regulations are 
coded under Title 50 of the U.S. Code, conventional military operations are subject to the 
WPR, while covert and intelligence operations are subject to the intelligence regulations I 
will now discuss.   
The key laws that form the backbone of covert operation oversight are the 
Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, and the Intelligence 
Authorization Act of 1991.  The Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974 (Hughes-Ryan) placed 
funding restrictions and reporting requirements on the president for covert operations.  
The act prohibited the CIA from using funding for covert operations (i.e., not 
intelligence-gathering operations) unless the president reported “in a timely fashion” to 
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Congress that the operation was important to national security.640  A key goal of the act 
was to prevent presidents from denying knowledge of covert operations in the future.  
President Reagan expanded the coverage of the act to apply to all agencies involved in 
covert activities.641  Unfortunately and ironically, President Reagan’s administration 
would bypass the requirements of this act during the Iran-Contra Affair by not reporting 
to Congress two of President Reagan’s covert finding reports, thus hiding the scandal 
from congressional oversight.642     
The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 codified two executive orders of 
Presidents Ford and Carter on congressional reporting requirements for intelligence 
activities.643  The act required agencies involved in current and significant anticipated 
intelligence activities to report them to the House and Senate Select Intelligence 
Committees.644  The act is significant because it expanded executive-branch reporting 
requirements to all intelligence activities, not just covert operations.   
The final significant law for covert operation oversight is the Intelligence 
Authorization Act of 1991.  The act repealed the Hughes-Ryan Act, only because it 
provided new requirements for presidential reporting of covert activities.645  Ironically, 
the law was the first to codify the definition of covert activities, which it defines as “an 
activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or 
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States 
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Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”646  As with Hughes-Ryan, it 
requires the president to report all covert activity to the congressional intelligence 
committees and denies funding for operations that the president does not report.  
However, the 1991 act excludes from covert activities all activities that are considered 
traditional intelligence, counterintelligence, diplomatic, military, or law enforcement.647  
As with all legal documents, an exclusion represents a potential loophole.   
 The 1991 act defines traditional military activities (TMA) as military-commanded 
operations where hostilities are ongoing or anticipated.648  Additionally, either the 
president or secretary of defense must approve the operation, again preventing future 
denial of knowledge.  However, as Hughes-Ryan permitted only presidential approval, 
national security law professor Robert Chesney believes the new act is a “milder” 
reporting requirement as an appointed, not elected, individual (i.e., the secretary of 
defense) can shield covert military operations from congressional oversight.649  Chesney 
believes the problem of excluding TMA from the covert reporting requirement is it “also 
very likely shifts a substantial amount of high-risk unacknowledged activity beyond the 
reach of the decision making rules.”650  At this point, one would assume the TMA would 
then be subject to the requirements of the WPR.  However, Chesney believes that due to 
the Obama Administration’s narrow definition of “hostilities” during the 2011 Libyan air 
campaign, “it is quite possible, if not probable, that a substantial amount of TMA would 
fall below the WPR threshold and hence generate no notifications to Congress.”651   
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 The 1991 act created a loophole where covert military operations, classified as 
TMA, could easily fall through the cracks of both the intelligence and war powers 
oversight requirements.  Furthermore, the 1991 act’s definition of hostilities creates the 
same problems as in the WPR.  Chesney fears the TMA definition is very vague as to 
what constitutes hostilities, who and what organizations compose the enemy, the 
geographic boundaries, and the duration of operations.652  As a result, like the 2001 
AUMF, TMA is subject to problems when fighting global terrorism, due to the 
organizational and geographic complexities of terrorist organizations.  Chesney believes 
Congress should revisit what constitutes TMA outside of conventional battle areas.653   
 While the aforementioned laws frame Congress’ current oversight over covert 
operations, there are some constitutional scholars that believe the Constitution gives 
Congress more inherent authority in the covert realm.  Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution gives Congress its inherent powers to declare war and raise an army.  
However, it also empowers Congress to “grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make 
rules concerning captures on land and water.”654  While many believe this to be an 
antiquated law granting Congress the power to authorize privateers to wage war on the 
open seas, some scholars believe it is still applicable in modern times.655   
How is it possible to make the jump from eighteenth-century privateers to modern 
covert operations?  One scholar has stated, “[Modern] covert war has the same 
distinguishing elements as the eighteenth century private warfare for which letters of 
marque and reprisal were required.  The two forms of warfare use private individuals or 
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forces, rather than United States armed forces, to engage in hostile action in foreign 
nations, both are mainly relied upon in the absence of a declaration of war, and both 
threaten further United States involvement in full scale warfare.”656  As the WPR applies 
only to U.S. military personnel, the president can bypass it by using covert action by the 
CIA or other intelligence agencies, as well as activities conducted by contractors or proxy 
armies.657  However, as I stated above, the 1991 act’s definition of TMA now allows even 
U.S. military personnel conducing covert operations to be exempt from congressional 
oversight.  This is what makes the case for the applicability of the marque and reprisal 
clause to modern warfare compelling and important.   
 Law professor Jules Lobel believes the Founding Fathers meant for the marque 
and reprisal clause to give Congress “power over all hostilities short of declared war.”658  
He goes on to state that our current intelligence oversight laws, which give the president 
authority to “conduct covert operations without congressional approval,” are actually an 
“unconstitutional delegation of congressional power.”659  This is a powerful claim, and 
one which the Supreme Court’s 1800 ruling in Bas v. Tingy arguably supports (see 
Chapter 1).  While evaluating the merit of this claim any further is outside the scope of 
this paper, it provides another example of the difficulties of interpreting constitutional 
authority in matters of war, this time with regards to covert operations.   
 Covert operations create a new legal complexity.  Because covert participants can 
include military, non-military government, U.S. contractors, and even foreign proxy 
armies, the laws to regulate these operations fall across multiple jurisdictions.  The 
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Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 may further complicate matters as it has created a 
loophole through which U.S. military covert operations may not be subject to 
congressional oversight under either the WPR or current intelligence laws.  The secrecy 
and deniability of covert operations put them at odds with democratic principles, 
particularly when there is minimal accountability and oversight.660  As covert operations 
continue to represent a larger part of U.S. military operations, it may be necessary for 
Congress to reassess the effectiveness of the current laws.   
 
B. Advanced Weaponry and War Powers  
There will always be controversy about the WPR’s applicability to advanced 
weaponry as long as its trigger is tied to the introduction of U.S. military personnel into 
hostilities.  While many criticize the 1973 Congress for not being able to envision 
weapons of the future, cruise missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles were clear 
and present dangers in the 1970s.  As I discussed Chapter 2, Louis Fisher made the claim 
that a nuclear strike would fail to trigger the WPR because of its short duration.  While an 
extreme example, technically, Fisher is right.   
President Clinton reported under the WPR cruise missile strikes in Iraq and 
Afghanistan/Sudan in 1993 and 1998, respectively.661  In both cases, it is debatable 
whether President Clinton needed to report these airstrikes under the WPR; neither 
missile strike placed U.S. forces into hostilities and both were of a short duration.  
Furthermore, both strikes were in retaliation for aggressions against the U.S. (i.e., 
retaliation for the failed assassination attempt of President George H. W. Bush in 1993 
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and for the U.S. Embassy bombings in 1998).662  As a result, it is likely these strikes were 
within President Clinton’s inherent rights as Commander in Chief to defend the nation 
and its interests.   
The aforementioned missile strikes represent some historical precedent for 
reporting hostilities under the WPR (although probably unnecessary) related completely 
to the use of advanced weapons.  Drones and cyberwarfare represent two of the latest 
evolutions in advanced warfare.  Like missiles, these weapons do not place U.S. military 
personnel in imminent danger and can cause severe damage within short periods, likely 
exempting them from the WPR trigger.  If the WPR does not apply, how do these new 
weapons fit within the war powers debate?   
Any discussion about advanced weapons such as drones and cyberwarfare, which 
the U.S. would likely use both covertly and against either sovereign nations or non-state 
actors within them, must start with an analysis of the rights of states under international 
law.  The U.N. Charter provides the modern international jus ad bellum (i.e., the right to 
war) requirements.663  Article 2(4) of the charter prohibits “the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,” while Article 51 
permits states the right of self-defense against armed attack.664  A strike by a drone, 
which is kinetic and causes physical destruction, would reach the level of violence to 
implicate the U.N. Charter.  However, while cyberattacks can cause significant death and 
destruction, such as an attack on a nuclear power plant or air traffic control system, most 
focus on theft, espionage, or denial of service.  While these non-kinetic attacks can be 
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devastating, they do not rise to the level of force the charter envisions.665  Evidence of 
this occurred in 2007 when a Russian cyberattack on government and banking systems in 
Estonia, a NATO member, did not trigger the collective self-defense action of the 
security organization.666   
 There is further debate as to whether “Title 10” versus “Title 50” operations by 
the U.S. would implicate the U.N. Charter’s measures for jus ad bellum.  A “Title 50” 
drone or cyber operation would include a complete denial of involvement on the part of 
the U.S.  Robert Chesney stated there is no evidence in the text or legislative history of 
Title 50 that Congress intended for operations under this section to violate the 
sovereignty of nations and international law.  Therefore, while Congress may be aware of 
and support covert military operations, from a legal standpoint, “Title 50” operations may 
allow the U.S. more freedom to operate in states without providing notification to or 
receiving consent from the host government.667  As a result, Chesney stated many recent 
U.S. operations are considered hybrids where U.S. military assets operate under CIA 
command in order to retain “Title 50” designation.668   
 Drone warfare has emerged to become a major weapon in the U.S. arsenal.  It 
played a major role in the 2011 Libyan air campaign, and continues to be a major factor 
in the War on Terror.  As I discussed in Chapter 2 and earlier in this chapter, the Obama 
Administration has taken an aggressive position that drone operations do not constitute 
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hostilities due to their limited mission, risk, and exposure to U.S. military personnel.669  
The Obama Administration is likely correct that an individual drone strike would not 
trigger the hostilities clause in the WPR, but it is impossible to deny they qualify as a 
kinetic use of force.   
A major concern for the use of drones is the flexibility they provide to expand the 
battlefield out of the conventional battle areas.  While the 2001 AUMF authorized the 
president to pursue those responsible for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, drone 
warfare has aided both the Bush and Obama Administrations to pursue and attack 
terrorists and organizations whose ties to the September 11 attacks are marginal, at best.  
Furthermore, it may be too difficult and legally complex for Congress to reauthorize the 
2001 AUMF for new variants of the original Al Qaeda organization.  As a result, drones 
provide speed and flexibility in the warzone with which Congress is unable to keep 
pace.670   
This poses an issue for modern jus ad bellum matters as well.  Because the 2001 
AUMF is the first time the U.S. declared hostilities against a non-state actor, it creates 
problems within current international law, which typically views states as aggressors.  
While there is a strong nexus between Afghanistan and the 2001 AUMF, the expansion 
of the War on Terror and specifically drone strikes into Pakistan and Yemen is less clear.  
Political scientist Michael Boyle believes the drone strikes in these countries are illegal 
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under international law as “a state of war does not exist” between the U.S., Pakistan, and 
Yemen.671      
Cyberwarfare is a second, relatively new form of advanced warfare.  A U.N. 
panel stated “the threat of a cyber-attack is ‘among the most serious challenges of the 
twenty-first century.’”672  It is widely believed the U.S. was involved in the Stuxnet 
cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear program in 2010.673  In 2012, the National Defense 
Authorization Act authorized the president to “conduct offensive operations in 
cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to … the War Powers 
Resolution.”674  Not only did Congress for the first time formally authorize the president 
to conduct offensive cyber operations, but it also placed them under the WPR’s 
purview.675   
Like drone warfare, it is unlikely cyberwarfare could trigger the WPR due to its 
limited nature and insulation of U.S. personnel from hostilities.  Therefore, Congress’ 
attempt to tie cyberwarfare to the WPR may not have any legal standing, regardless that 
the president signed it into law.  Nevertheless, the threat cyberwarfare can pose to a 
nation, in both kinetic and non-kinetic forms, is very real.  Scott Borg, a cyber-industry 
expert, believes a cyber-attack on critical infrastructure has “the potential to cause 
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hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of damage and to cause thousands of deaths.”676  
The Department of Defense has also stated “some activities conducted in cyberspace 
could constitute a use of force, and may as well invoke a state’s inherent right to lawful 
self-defense.”677  If the potential damage from a cyberattack is this significant, the current 
legal arguments against naming cyberwarfare as a true destructive weapon may be 
masking its true potential.   
During the 2011 Libya and War Powers Hearings, both State Department Legal 
Advisor Harold Koh and members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated 
the inadequacies of the WPR on the modern battlefield.  Harold Koh stated, “At the time 
the law was passed, they were thinking about Vietnam. They weren’t thinking about 
drones or cyber.  So that would be one possibility to change the law to address realities of 
modern conflict.”678  Committee Chairman Senator John Kerry further stated, “the 
[WPR] was not drafted with drones in mind.  As our military technology becomes more 
and more advanced, it may well be that the language … needs further clarification.”679  
However, as I have discussed in this chapter, the chances of amending the WPR to apply 
better to the modern battlefield may be remote; particularly if presidents continue to 
believe these weapons are essential to their protecting the nation as part of their inherent 
powers as Commander in Chief.  In this case, future presidents will likely veto any bill 
Congress passes which constrains their ability to use these weapons unilaterally.   
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C. Conclusions on the WPR and Modern Warfare 
Covert operations play an important role in national security.  Proposals to amend 
the WPR for covert operations are unwise as they will make these matters public, which 
are best kept classified for national security purposes.  Therefore, it is essential to ensure 
there are sufficient regulatory and oversight laws in place to give the public assurance 
that even classified operations are subject to appropriate congressional oversight.  The 
current War on Terror exacerbates these challenges as the U.S. is fighting much of it 
using covert tactics.  Therefore, it would be wise for Congress to reconsider whether it 
should revise the TMA exclusion in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 to ensure 
no covert activities go unregulated.  The marque and reprisal clause in the Constitution is 
another area in which Congress should evaluate its inherent rights to oversee covert 
operations.   
Advanced weaponry pose a new challenge to appropriate authorization and 
oversight.  Both drones and cyberwarfare limit risk to U.S. military personnel and extend 
the battlefields in ways that were unimaginable at the time the current war powers and 
intelligence laws were written.  As a result, these weapons likely would not trigger the 
conventional war regulations of the WPR and also could be hidden as Title 50/TMA 
operations cloaking them from the intelligence oversight laws as well.  As one scholar 
stated, advanced weapons remove “a legislative check on executive power, and when 
considered in light of historical views on the balance of power, [augment] executive 
power.”680 
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 Congress needs to reevaluate the effectiveness of its conventional and covert war 
powers laws as the TMA loophole and advanced weapons likely enhance executive 
power.  One recommendation is to clarify whether the WPR trigger applies only to U.S. 
military personnel or any offensive use of force.681   Unfortunately, any reform to the war 
powers laws would take massive political will, and therefore, is extremely unlikely in the 
current political era.  If WPR reform is not possible, another option for Congress to 
maintain a legislative check would be to counter any presidentially-initiated operation 
using covert forces or advanced weapons through case law where the courts have sided 
with Congress against presidentially-initiated offensive military operations. 
 
Part III – The Presidency and Congress – Contemporary Interpretations of War 
Powers 
 
 War powers are a huge element of U.S. foreign policy in 2015.  The U.S. is 
continuing to battle Al Qaeda and its affiliates around the world and is contemplating 
how to eliminate the threat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) poses to the Middle 
East.  However, there is growing concern that the Obama Administration is battling 
terrorism under Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMF) which legally may no 
longer be applicable to the current phase of the War on Terror.  President Obama has 
taken the unusual step of asking Congress for authorization to fight ISIS, while also 
stating he has the authority to do so under the current AUMFs.  Meanwhile, Congress 
continues to show a lack of resolve to act as a unified body in both working with 
presidents and utilizing the WPR as it is written.  I will discuss in this part the 
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contemporary issues related to the WPR from the perspectives of both the president and 
Congress.   
 
A. The Presidency – The Growing Obsolescence of the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs 
and ISIS 
 
Both Presidents Bush and Obama have used their authorization under the 2001 
and 2002 AUMFs to wage the War on Terror.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the 2001 
AUMF authorized the president to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations 
or persons.”682  The 2002 AUMF authorized the president to “defend the national security 
of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” as well as enforce U.N. 
Security Council resolutions and continue to battle terrorist organizations responsible for 
the September 11, 2001 attacks.683  However, over thirteen years after the September 11 
terrorist attacks and eleven after the capture of Saddam Hussein, the U.S. has eliminated 
most of the key targets for which Congress approved the original AUMFs.  Nevertheless, 
the U.S. is continuing to strike Al Qaeda-affiliated groups around the world and is 
expanding its role in combatting ISIS.  There is a growing debate as to whether the 2001 
and 2002 AUMFs are obsolete as authorization for the current phase of the War on 
Terror.   
Congress authorized both the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs under the WPR.  However, 
unlike in Lebanon where Congress placed an 18-month time limit on President Reagan’s 
authorization, it placed no time limits in either AUMF.  Senators John McCain and John 
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Kerry had argued tying the 2001 AUMF to the September 11 terrorist attacks limited the 
authorization.  However, Harold Koh has stated the 2001 AUMF does the opposite by 
allowing presidents to cite it as authorization as long as they can tie the adversary to 
Al Qaeda.684  In a 2013 congressional hearing, senior Department of Defense official 
Michael Sheehan stated the U.S. would be fighting Al Qaeda and its affiliates for “at least 
10 to 20 years.”685  Mr. Sheehan further stated the administration was “comfortable with 
the AUMF as it is currently structured.”686   
The 2001 and 2002 AUMFs are not the first instances of open-ended war 
authorizations.  Neither the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution nor the 1991 AUMF against Iraq 
had fixed durations.  Presidents Johnson and Nixon used the former as authorization to 
build up and continue the Vietnam War for seven years (until Congress repealed it) and 
Presidents George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush used the latter to conduct 
air strikes and no-fly zones over Iraq up to the 2003 U.S. invasion.687  The problem is any 
time Congress declares or authorizes war, it is difficult to take that power back from the 
president – “once the President receives the authorization to wage war, the President is 
for all intents and purposes, transformed into a king.”688  In the cases of both the 2001 
and 2002 AUMF, Congress authorized the president to use “necessary and appropriate” 
force, which is the “maximum discretion” Congress can authorize to the president.689  
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Due to Congress’ wording of the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, Presidents Bush and 
Obama have had near unlimited authority in conducting the War on Terror.  The war has 
expanded beyond the original battlefields of the AUMFs:  Afghanistan and Iraq.  The 
U.S. is conducting strikes around the world, but particularly in Pakistan and Yemen 
(under authorization from the 2001 AUMF), regardless of the tenuous connection of the 
targets to the September 11 terrorist attacks.  Former Attorney General Michael Mukasey 
(under President George W. Bush) stated the Pakistani Taliban, “are arguably not within 
[the 2001 AUMF’s] reach.”690  Furthermore, the U.S.’ main target in Yemen, Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula, formed after the September 11 terrorist attacks and has an 
“indirect at best” connection to Al Qaeda proper.691  One scholar fears the U.S.’ 
continued use of the 2001 AUMF will not only discredit it internationally, but also 
encourage other nations to adopt the same legal interpretation in future conflicts.692   
As I discussed in Chapter 2, President Obama went to Congress in 2013 to request 
authorization to intervene in the Syrian civil war.  This was an unusual shift of positions 
for the president, who in 2011 unilaterally involved the U.S. in the NATO-led 
intervention in the Libyan civil war.  In Libya, President Obama cited his authority to 
intervene pursuant to a U.N. Security Council Resolution and his inherent authority as 
Commander in Chief.  However, in Syria just two-years later, he did not assert his 
executive authority and instead asked Congress to give him authorization.  I believe he 
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did this due to the differences in political risk and popularity of intervention in Syria 
versus Libya.693   
 In February 2015, President Obama again went to Congress to obtain 
authorization to intervene in Syria and Iraq, this time against ISIS.694  ISIS has become a 
threat to regional stability after emerging out of the 2011 U.S. withdrawal of Iraq and the 
Syrian civil war.  The organization has captured territory across both Syria and Iraq, and 
is trying to create a caliphate based on extremely-conservative interpretations of Islam.  
ISIS has been behind terrible atrocities in the areas it controls, including the murder of 
U.S. citizens.695     
 As with President Obama’s 2013 appeal to Congress for authorization to 
intervene in Syria, his 2015 request for authorization to intervene against ISIS has created 
an interesting debate about the inherent powers of the president and Congress in war 
matters.  Some feel President Obama’s request to Congress was a concession of 
presidential power – “There is a deep concern in the Executive Branch that any 
concession to Congress on war powers will create a precedent that could erode 
presidential powers.”696  Others like Louis Fisher believe the Constitution gives Congress 
the sole authority to initiate war on any scale.697   Even more interesting were President 
Obama’s mixed signals in his request to Congress – “Although existing statutes provide 
me with the authority I need to take these actions, I have repeatedly expressed my 
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commitment to working with the Congress to pass a bipartisan authorization for the use 
of military force (AUMF) against [ISIS].”698  Therefore, what are President Obama’s 
motives for yet again going to Congress?   
 As with Syria, I believe the Obama Administration has determined the political 
risks too high to intervene without Congress’ authorization.  But, I believe there is more 
to the president’s motives than this.  President Obama is a constitutional scholar, and 
understands how the Constitution expects the branches to interact.  The Obama 
Administration is also the first administration since the passing of the WPR in 1973 to 
not question the constitutionality of the law, which is a huge departure from previous 
administrations, and a concession of presidential power in itself.699  As a result, while the 
president has told Congress he has the authority to intervene against ISIS without 
Congress, I believe he is a constitutional idealist who wants to see the Constitution 
function as the Founding Fathers intended.  There are other benefits as well.  A unified 
executive and legislature strengthens U.S. credibility abroad, which in this case is 
particularly important as the president struggles to build a coalition to directly confront 
ISIS.700   All of these factors have contributed into the president’s decision to go to 
Congress for authorization.   
 The president’s AUMF proposal attempts to address some of the concerns about 
the growing obsolescence of the 2001 and 2002 AUMF.  The president’s proposal would 
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repeal the 2002 AUMF for Iraq, replacing it with the authorization in the new AUMF.701  
It would terminate in three years, addressing a major criticism of the open-ended 2001 
and 2002 AUMFs, and cites congressional authorization in accordance with Sections 5(b) 
and 8(a)(1) of the WPR (as all modern authorizations have done).702  The proposal also 
states it “does not authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces in enduring 
offensive ground combat operations,” which critics believe creates a loophole for the use 
of ground forces in operations of shorter durations.703  While the proposed AUMF does 
not address the 2001 AUMF, President Obama stated in his proposal to Congress he 
remains “committed to working with the Congress and the American people to refine, 
and ultimately repeal, the 2001 AUMF,” and believes his new proposal could “serve as a 
model for how we can work together to tailor the authorities granted by the 2001 
AUMF.”704 
 President Obama’s AUMF proposal has received mostly negative criticism in the 
weeks following its release.  An editorial in the Wall Street Journal considered the 
proposal “political cover for his military strategy,” while the New York Times stated it 
“turns presidential history on its head.  Presidents typically resist congressional 
encroachment and assert the broadest possible interpretation of their ability to order the 
military into combat.”705   Republican Congressman Mac Thornberry stated President 
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Obama “should explain why he is seeking to tie his own hands by limiting authority that 
he's already claimed,” while Democratic Congressman Adam Schiff said, “It’s I think 
quite carte blanche in terms of geography, types of forces, etc. And therefore, I think 
we’re going to have to have a lot of work on that.”706  Congress has yet to take any action 
on the president’s proposal.  If Congress does not ultimately take any action, President 
Obama has made it clear he believes he already has authority to act on his own.  The 
WPR debate continues…    
 
B. The Congress – An Effective Check on Presidential War Power?   
“We are making ourselves irrelevant.”707  Senator Bob Corker said this about 
Congress’ role in war powers during the 2011 Libya and War Powers Senate Hearing.  
Senator Corker is not alone as many critics also feel Congress has acquiesced too much 
war power authority to the president – “Congress has thus far failed to play its role as a 
brake as the founders envisioned.”708  One theory for this problem is while the 
Constitution gives Congress the power to initiate war, it does not give it the power to end 
war.709  As a result, Congress hands the president most of its leverage with a declaration 
or authorization.   
While many have argued Congress’ most powerful weapon is still the power of 
the purse, as it can terminate funding on a presidential military operation at any time, this 
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is not a realistic option as the president still maintains sole authority to withdraw U.S. 
forces.  More importantly, no Congress would morally or politically allow U.S. forces to 
be unsupported once in theater.710  As a result, Congress’ best chance to remain a check 
against the executive branch in war matters is to restrict the president’s authority in the 
AUMF, something on which Congress has a mixed track record.711  Scholars have raised 
the idea that the nation is more at risk in how Congress authorizes (or “abdicates”) power 
to the president in war matters than from a “unilateral use of force.”712 
 Michael Glennon believes the WPR has been a failure for Congress.  In his 
opinion, the 1973 Congress made three miscalculations:  1) how Congress would need to 
enforce the WPR against the president; 2) Congress’ ability or desire to play its role in 
the WPR; and 3) that the Supreme Court would strike down the legislative veto, a key 
element of the WPR.713  Political scientists Timothy Boylan and Glenn Phelps believe 
Congress uses the WPR as “a shield against the need to take action.”714  However, not 
everyone is completely down on the WPR.  Some argue the WPR can be effective, but 
only if Congress asserts itself.  If Congress doesn’t, “the President will fill the vacuum, 
and the WPR will be destined for impotence.”715   
 Although the WPR is a flawed document and the members of Congress deserve 
some criticism for the expansion of presidential war power in the post-WWII era, the 
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institution and design of Congress itself is also to blame.  Congress has a “collective 
action problem” in foreign affairs.716  While the press will focus pressure and attention 
solely on the president in a foreign affairs crisis, it will hardly ever focus pressure or 
attention on any single member of Congress.  Furthermore, any accolades Congress may 
receive in foreign affairs will be shared across the institution versus with a single 
member.717  Due to the lack of incentives for congressmen to involve themselves in 
foreign affairs and military conflicts, law professor Neal Devins stated, “Rather than 
oppose the President on a potential military action, most members of Congress find it 
more convenient to acquiesce and avoid criticism that they obstructed a necessary 
military operation.”718  As a result, the institution and design of Congress encourages 
members to focus on domestic policy issues and the interests of their constituents.719    
  Partisanship is another factor scholars consider in evaluating the behaviors of 
congressmen in foreign affairs and military actions.  As can be expected, political 
scientists Jon Pevehouse and William Howell found a positive correlation between a 
president’s use of force and party control in Congress.720  Neil Devins stated 
congressional oversight is also positively correlated to political polarization.  In his view, 
“when the President and Congress are from the same party, the majority in Congress will 
not use oversight to hold the President to task. And when the government is divided, 
Congress will make oversight a top priority.”721  This is troubling because it shows a 
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breakdown in the separation of powers, with Congress becoming more parliamentary in 
its interactions with the president.    
Political scientists Bryan Marshall and Brandon Prins expanded on the 
Pevehouse/Howell study and found a more accurate indicator of presidential use of force 
abroad is the president’s ability to pass policy through Congress versus party cover.  
They did not find the correlation between partisanship and presidential military action 
that Pevehouse and Howell found, but instead concluded presidents are less likely to 
pursue military adventures abroad if they are successful in passing their domestic policy 
agenda in Congress.722  Their findings support unilateral presidential uses of force, as 
they claim the president is more likely to pursue unilateral military action if Congress is 
obstructing him.  What we can take from these studies is presidents have incentives to use 
force when their party backs them in Congress, and also when their influence in Congress 
is waning, which in itself is concerning and reason to have strong checks in place to 
counter presidential authority.   
 Interestingly, there has been other research that shows different presidential 
behaviors based on party control in the two chambers.  Jong Hee Park’s research found 
presidential unilateral uses of force rise with party control in the Senate, but drop with 
party control in the House.723  Park believes a major factor for this is the electorates tie 
the Senate to national issues and the president’s performance versus the members of the 
House, who are better able to “[distance] themselves from unfavorable national 
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conditions.”724  Poor domestic conditions are another factor researchers have found for 
presidents to undertake military action overseas – “By sending troops abroad, it is 
supposed, presidents can shift public attention away from a failing economy and rally 
widespread support, as members of Congress automatically fall behind their chief 
executive.”725  A recent example of this is Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, which 
many believe was an effort to artificially boost patriotism at home and shift public 
attention away from Russia’s poor economic conditions.   
 Regardless of party affiliation and national conditions, the Founding Fathers 
designed the Constitution for Congress to act as a check on the president in war matters – 
“when Presidents act, it is up to the other branches to respond. In other words, Presidents 
often win by default – either because Congress chooses not to respond or because its 
response is ineffective.”726  Pevehouse and Howell stated an effective Congress can 
“increase the marginal costs” of the president pursuing “risky foreign conflicts.”727  
Congress passed the WPR to aid future Congresses in this very task.  However, the WPR 
still requires Congress to act, something it has been hesitant, or unable as a body, to do 
for much of the law’s existence.  As Congressman Lee Hamilton stated in defense of the 
WPR during the 1995 attempt to repeal it, “The Congress can stand against a president.  
The Congress can stand beside a president.  What Congress must not do is to stand aside.  
Congress should not cede its constitutional responsibilities.  We are a co-equal branch of 
government.”728 
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Part IV – Chapter 3 Conclusions 
 Nothing is simple with regards to the WPR.  It emerged out of a unique moment 
in America’s history, so unique that political complexities have made it impossible for 
either branch or political party to pass any reform.  The evolving nature of warfare is also 
showing weaknesses in the wording of the WPR.  A large loophole has developed 
between the WPR and intelligence laws, where many operations may go unreported, and 
many modern weapons may be exempt from the law as they do not place U.S. military 
forces in harm’s way.  Regardless of these problems, it is very unlikely that any war 
powers reforms will take place in the near future due to the political stakes involved for 
both branches.  It may be worthwhile to pursue closing the TMA loophole through new 
intelligence legislation, which does not pose as much of a threat to the inherent powers of 
both branches as a change in war powers authority would.  Most likely, the WPR is here 
to stay, and both branches will need to continue determine how best to work within its 
framework.   
 The contemporary war power interpretations of both branches are another major 
issue.  President Obama has recently shown more effort to work with Congress in war 
matters.  However, it is unknown whether this will bear any fruit for him or whether the 
next president will pursue the same course.  The bigger issue is with Congress.  
Unfortunately, political polarization and the structure of the institution itself provide little 
incentives for the branch to assert itself in foreign affairs.  The WPR can still work to 
provide a useful framework through which future presidents and Congresses can interact 
to shape future war policies.  Presidents will always exercise what they feel is their 




itself the ability to ensure it becomes the check against presidential war which the 










 The vague war powers text within the Constitution made the controversies over 
the WPR inevitable.  The Founding Fathers split the war powers between the president 
and Congress to prevent the rise of a tyrant.  The principle of separation of powers 
expects when one branch asserts itself, the others will respond and counter.  That 
principle played out when the 1973 Congress passed the WPR in response to the 
unchecked growth of presidential war power in the post-WWII era.  Since 1973, history 
has shown presidents continue maintain an aggressive position on inherent war authority 
while the post-1973 Congresses have not been able to match the unity and enthusiasm 
which enabled it to pass the WPR.  Furthermore, the courts have made it clear they will 
not intervene in war matters until the two branches reach a constitutional impasse.  
Therefore, Congress is on its own to mobilize when it feels the president has exceeded his 
inherent authority.   
 As I stated in my introduction, I agree with those who claim the WPR, while an 
imperfect document, is constitutional, has made a difference, and helped to curtail 
unilateral presidential war.  The WPR has flaws; some of its sections are contradictory, 
presidents can bypass its key trigger, and critics consider many of its sections 
unconstitutional.  However, the language in the WPR is consistent with the Constitution 
and judicial history. The WPR’s framework ensures Congress is always in control of 
overall authorizations for offensive war, whether through an outright authorization or the 
WPR’s de facto 60-day authorization (which Congress can terminate at any time through 
a vote).  It also acknowledges the president has constitutional authority as Commander in 




branches fulfill their constitutional duties before taking the country to war, but only if 
both branches are willing to abide by it. 
The WPR has changed the behaviors of presidents and Congress.  Most 
importantly, there has not been another Vietnam, which was the goal of its drafters.  
Presidents have had opportunities to escalate conflicts like as what happened in Vietnam, 
such as in Lebanon, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Libya, but 
they didn’t.  What has evolved in the 40-plus years of the WPR is a framework where 
Congress is deferring to presidents in small-scale operations, but involving itself in 
decisions to engage in major wars, such as the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  Congress to date has supported the president in the significant 
non-major operations, such as the invasions of Panama and Grenada.  However, this may 
not always be the case, and a time may come when a president unilaterally invades a 
small nation and Congress does not approve.  We will have to cross that bridge as a 
nation when it comes. 
What is less certain is the future effectiveness of the WPR.  The evolving nature 
of warfare is showing weaknesses in the wording of the WPR.  A large loophole has 
developed between the WPR and intelligence laws, where many operations may go 
unreported.  Many modern weapons may be exempt from the law as they do not place 
U.S. military forces in harm’s way.  However, due to the political stakes involved for 
both the executive and legislative branches, coupled with the highly-partisan environment 
in Congress, it is unlikely any reform will be possible in the near future.  Therefore, both 
branches will need to continue determine how best to work within the WPR’s current 




While neither branch may be following the WPR to the letter, both branches have 
established boundaries through their historical actions.  Presidents will always exercise 
what they feel is their inherent right to lead the nation’s military into battle.  Congress’ 
challenge is political polarization and the structure of the institution itself provide little 
incentives for the branch to assert itself in foreign affairs.  An impotent Congress cannot 
be the check which the Founding Fathers intended against presidential war.  
Nevertheless, while the results of congressional applications of the WPR have been 
mixed, the WPR restored modern Congresses with a confidence that earlier ones had lost 
in asserting themselves against the executive branch.     
 Ironically, the very vagueness of the WPR which brings much of its criticism is 
also its greatest strength.  Neither the president, nor Congress, know what parts of the 
WPR, if any, are actually unconstitutional.  They also do not know the true consequences 
of actually disregarding it outright.  This is because no lawsuit Congress has brought to 
the courts has had standing.  We know it is likely the Section 5(c) legislative veto is 
unconstitutional, but we also know the courts expect a true constitutional impasse before 
hearing a case, meaning Congress must essentially pass a legislative veto before having 
standing.  We also know the Campbell v. Clinton ruling may have invalidated the 60-day 
automatic withdrawal provision (unless Congress were to pass a negative resolution), but 
we also know presidents continue to report military operations “consistent with the 
WPR” and Congress still uses the 60-day limit as a marker like it did with President 




requirements are clear black-letter law, its enforcement structure owes its strength to 
behavioral norms rather than law.”729  
 A major issue for Congress is properly scoping authorizations.  Congress has 
done this before in placing a time limit on operations in Lebanon and prohibiting 
President Bush from regime change in Iraq in 1991, but hindsight is questioning whether 
Congress should have placed time and scope limitations in the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs.  
There have been other instances in which the Senate and House could not agree on the 
scope of the authorizations, such as in Yugoslavia and Libya.  In these cases, Congress 
sent mixed signals by not passing an authorization while still appropriating funds for 
combat operations.  However, in both of these cases, Congress and the president limited 
the scope of the operations to air campaigns only.  Congress made it clear it did not want 
boots on the ground in either of these operations, and Presidents Clinton and Obama did 
not pursue escalation to this level.  In this case, Congress’ lack of consensus for a ground 
war or other options was its de facto authorization for the air campaign.   
 A bigger issue in the war powers debates is the defining of hostilities, particularly 
with small-scale operations, or operations involving advanced weapons.  The executive 
branch has taken the position WPR-level hostilities must include a significant duration, 
place U.S. personnel at risk, have a risk of escalation, and have the regular use of kinetic 
weapons.  This definition would exclude covert operations, individual missile or drone 
strikes, and cyber-attacks.  Building on this matter is the covert TMA loophole, which 
has the potential to exclude military covert operations from any congressional oversight.  
Future presidents and Congresses will need to establish boundaries for these types of 
                                                          




operations as they are likely to become increasingly significant components of modern 
warfare.      
 There are several areas which I believe require further research.  The first is the 
applicability of our current laws to covert operations and modern weapons.  As I 
discussed in the previous paragraph, these types of operations can easily fall outside of 
the WPR and intelligence laws currently in place.  There is significant risk that a military 
operation that the CIA commands would qualify as TMA and fall through the cracks of 
current congressional oversight.  Should future presidents be able to authorize Osama Bin 
Laden-type raids against future targets (not covered under a current AUMF) without 
notifying Congress?  Raids of this magnitude can have significant foreign policy 
implications for a nation, particularly if something were to go wrong (which almost 
happened in the Bin Laden raid). Should Congress have a role in authorizing them?    
 A second, related area is drone strikes.  Most scholars already believe drone 
strikes do not fall under the purview of the WPR.  Yet, they can cause massive kinetic 
damage, and like a special forces raid, can have significant political consequences for a 
nation.  Should the WPR be amended to include drone strikes and other forms of 
advanced warfare?  There are also other considerations such as assassinations of U.S. 
citizens abroad, as with the 2011 drone strike which killed terrorist and U.S. citizen 
Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen.  President Obama had authority for this mission under the 
2001 AUMF.  However, al-Awlaki’s killing raised constitutional and international law 
questions.  Further research should be done to look at whether U.S. law should change to 
incorporate drone strikes in the WPR, as well as the legality of targeted killings abroad, 




 A third area deals with the growth of the CIA as a combatant command and the 
use of contractors in military operations.  The WPR only applies to the introduction of 
U.S. military personnel into hostilities, it therefore excludes CIA personnel, contractors, 
and foreign personnel acting on behalf of the U.S.  Further research should be done to 
analyze whether Congress should have more authority over approving non-military 
combat operations.  Additionally, how do private contractors fall under U.S. law and 
should any changes be made when they are working in hostile environments as agents of 
the U.S.?     
 Finally, more research should be done into the separation of powers issues 
surrounding war powers.  Would Congress need a veto-proof majority in both chambers 
to reach a constitutional impasse, or is a simple majority sufficient?  Additionally, how 
would a constitutional impasse be decided by the courts, particularly in a war powers 
context?  Further research could be done into evaluating how the WPR or even the 
constitution should be amended to clarify war powers between the branches.   
One issue for consideration would be should Congress be allowed not only to 
declare war, but also end war?  Allowing Congress the power to end war may give it 
leverage which would return some of the balance which has been lost in the post-WWII 
era.  A second issue is should presidents be legally allowed to initiate limited offensive 
combat operations?  This could potentially lead to presidential abuse, but would also 
provide the president with flexibility to respond to threats in the complex, modern world.  
I believe some flexibility for presidents in this area is in the best interests of the nation’s 
security.  Finally, should congressional appropriations be considered authorization?  The 




where Congress cannot morally cut off funding for ongoing operations without 
endangering U.S. personnel; negating this as a political tool for Congress.    
 Constitutional war powers will be a continuous source of disagreement between 
the president and Congress.  There likely will never be a single right answer as to how 
branches should share the powers.  Nevertheless, the WPR has undeniably rebalanced the 
war powers relationship between the executive and legislative branches.  It gives 
presidents the flexibility to act in short-term operations in which Congress would prefer 
to avoid.730  It also ensures Congress has a seat at the table for large conflicts, in which 
the Constitution requires congressional action.  The changing nature of warfare may 
require future changes to the WPR.  However, history has shown change is very hard due 
to the political stakes involved for both branches.  As a result, the president and Congress 
must continue to work within the WPR’s framework to chart the best course of action for 
the nation in times of war.   
                                                          


































Appendix 2 – Major U.S. Conflicts between 1899 and 1995  
Major Conflicts before the WPR – 1899 – 1972 731 
 
Case Initiation Date Duration Congressional Authorization 
Philippines 2/1899 14 years Authorized on 3/22/1899 
(30 Stat 977) and 5/26/1900 
Colombia/Panama 1901 13 years Authorized on 2/23/1904 
(33 Stat 2234) 
Mexico 4/9/1914 2 years, 
10 months 
Authorized on 4/22/1914 (H. J. 
Res 251) and again on 7/1/1916 
(39 Stat 337) 
Haiti 7/28/1915 19 years Authorized on 2/28/1916 and on 
6/12/1916 (39 Stat 223) 
Dominican Republic 5/5/1916 8 years, 
4 months 
Authorized on 2/11/1918 
(40 Stat 437) 
Trieste, Italy 9/16/1947 7 years Authorized on 4/4/1949 under NATO 
treaty, ratified by the U.S. Senate on 
7/21/1949 
Korean War 6/27/1950 3 years Authorized through numerous 
appropriations 
Taiwan Straits 8/17/1954 6 months Authorized on 1/29/1955 (H. J. 
Res. 159) and by treaty on 2/9/1955 
Vietnam 12/12/1955 8 years, 
9 months 
Authorized on 10/10/1964 (P.L. 88-
408) and through numerous 
appropriation bills 
Lebanon 7/15/1958 3 months Unauthorized 
Laos 4/19/1961 18 months Unauthorized 
Thailand 5/19/1962 2.5 months Unauthorized 




                                                          
731 Auerswald, David P. and Peter F. Cowhey.  “Ballotbox Diplomacy: The [WPR] and the Use of Force,” 




Appendix 2 – Continued 
Major Conflicts after the WPR – 1973 – 1995 732 
 
Case Initiation Date Duration Congressional Authorization 
Cyprus 7/1974 2 days 
(< 60 days) 
None 
Da Nang 4/5/1975 3.5 weeks 
(< 60 days) 
None 
South Vietnam 4/29/1975 1 day 
(< 60 days) 
None 
Mayaguez Incident 5/13/1975 2 days 
(< 60 days) 
None 
Iran 4/24/1980 1 day 
(< 60 days) 
None 
Gulf of Sidra, Libya 8/19/1981 1 day 
(< 60 days) 
None 
Lebanon 8/25/1982 3.5 weeks 
(< 60 days) 
None 
Lebanon 9/19/1982 18 months Public Law 98-119 733 
Grenada 10/25/1983 1 month 
(< 60 days) 
The House passed H. J. Res. 402 to 
start the war powers clock, though 
the Senate took no action 
Libya 3/23/1986 3 weeks 
(< 60 days) 
None 
Persian Gulf 5/17/1987 16 months Congress demanded executive 
reports, and some members filed a 
court suit, all of which led to greater 
executive reporting on the reflagging 
exercise 
Panama 12/20/1989 1 week 
(< 60 days) 
None 
Persian Gulf War 8/28/1990 7 months Public Law 102-01 734 
Somalia 12/3/1992 15 months Public Law 103-139, §8151(b)(2)(B) 
735 
                                                          
732 Auerswald, David P. and Peter F. Cowhey.  “Ballotbox Diplomacy: The [WPR] and the Use of Force,” 
page 521.   
733 Cited by author.   
734 Cited by author.  Congress did not provide authorization during the August – December 1990 buildup, 
but did authorize the use of force through Public Law 102-01 in January 1991.  U.S. forces remain in Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait to this day.   




Appendix 3 – Major U.S. Conflicts since 1995 
Case Initiation Date Duration Congressional Authorization 
Iraq (no-fly zone) 3/1/1991 736 12 years 737 Public Law 102-1, reaffirmed in 
§1095(b)(3), and §1096(b)(3) of Public 
Law 102-190 738 
Bosnia 4/13/1993 739 See next row Authorized through numerous 
appropriations 740 
Bosnia Peacekeeping 12/6/1995 741 11 years, 
7 months 742 
Authorized through numerous 
appropriations 743 
Afghanistan and Sudan 
Airstrikes 
8/20/1998 744 1 day (< 60 days) None 
Kosovo 3/24/1999 745 78 day air 
campaign 746 
Unauthorized, but appropriated under 
Public Law 106-31, 113 STAT. 76.747   
Afghanistan/ 
War on Terror 
10/7/2001 748 Over 12 years, 
still ongoing 
Public Law 107-40 749 
Iraq 3/19/2003 750 8 years, 9 months 
751 
Public Law 107-243 752 
Libya 753 3/19/2011 10/31/2011 
(seven months) 
Unauthorized 
                                                          
736 The author is assuming the no-fly zone begins the day after the Persian Gulf War ceasefire of February 
28, 1991. 
737 The author is assuming the no-fly zone ends the day before the March 19, 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.   
738 Grimmett, Richard F., “The War Powers Resolution:  After Thirty-Eight Years,” page 26, Public Law 
102-1, and Public Law 102-190, §1095(b)(3), and §1096(b)(3). 
739 Grimmett, Richard F., “The War Powers Resolution:  After Thirty-Eight Years,” page 56.   
740 For more information, see section in this chapter titled Operations in Yugoslavia – 1992-1999. 
741 Grimmett, Richard F., “The War Powers Resolution:  After Thirty-Eight Years,” page 31. 
742 Note – combined duration for total involvement in Bosnia.  The final significant U.S. forces involved in 
the Bosnia peacekeeping effort departed the country on December 2, 2004 – Associated Press, “U.S. 
Troops Mark End of Mission in Bosnia,” The Washington Post, November 25, 2004, A19.   
743 For more information, see the section in this chapter titled Operations in Yugoslavia – 1992-1999. 
744 Grimmett, Richard F., “The War Powers Resolution:  After Thirty-Eight Years,” page 61. 
745 Grimmett, Richard F., “The War Powers Resolution:  After Thirty-Eight Years,” page 61. 
746 Although the air campaign lasted only 78 days, a small number of U.S. personnel are still stationed in 
Kosovo as part of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), see 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm. 
747 For more information, see the section in this chapter titled Operations in Yugoslavia – 1992-1999. 
748 Grimmett, Richard F., “The War Powers Resolution:  After Thirty-Eight Years,” page 41. 
749 For more information, see the section in this chapter titled The War on Terror (Afghanistan and Iraq) – 
2001-Present.  Note, all anti-terrorist operations, including drone strikes against Al Qaeda targets in 
Pakistan, Yemen, and other areas also fall under the authorization of Public Law 107-40.   
750 Grimmett, Richard F., “The War Powers Resolution:  After Thirty-Eight Years,” page 67. 
751 Logan, Joseph, “Last U.S. Troops Leave Iraq, Ending War,” Reuters, December 18, 2011. 
752 For more information, see the section in this chapter titled The War on Terror (Afghanistan and Iraq) – 
2001-Present. 
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